MANU-SMṚTI

THE LAWS OF MANU, WITH THE BHĀṢYA OF MEDHĀTITHI

TRANSLATED BY

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PREFACE.

In the preface to Vol. I, Part I, it has been already explained that, with a view to expedite the publication of the voluminous work, it has been decided to issue to the public *half volumes.* Part I of Vol. I, comprising Discourse I and 28 verses of Discourse II, having been already published, Part I of Vol. II also, comprising the whole of Discourse III, is now placed before the public. The reason why Discourse III is published before the remaining portion of Discourse II, lies in the fact that the two volumes are being printed at two different presses. It is hoped that both these volumes, comprising Discourses I to IV, will be ready before long.

GANGANATHA JHA.

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SECTION (1)—PERIOD OF STUDENTSHIP

VERSE I

DUTIES RELATING TO THE THREE VEDAS SHOULD BE OBSERVED UNDER THE PRECEPTOR FOR THIRTY-SIX YEARS, OR FOR HALF THAT PERIOD, OR FOR A QUARTER, OR PRECISELY TILL THEY HAVE BEEN GOT UP.—(1).

Bhāṣya.

Two kinds of Religious Students have been described above—the life-long student and the student for a limited period. Verse 2.244—where it is said that 'he serves the Precèptor till the dissolution of his body'—has described the life-long studentship; while verse 2.108—where the 'Final Return' has been described as the limit—has indicated the other alternative. As regards the 'Life-long Student,' the mention of the name itself, which is based upon reason, serves to indicate the limit of the period of studentship; the term '*naiṣṭhika*' meaning that which goes to the very '*niṣṭhā*' or end of a thing; and the exact period has been stated by the direct declaration that 'it extends to the dissolution of the body.' As regards the 'limited' studentship, we have the following texts bearing upon it :—(*a*) 'by this course of application etc.,' (6. 85), (*b*) 'the entire Veda should be acquired by means of particular austerities and several observances prescribed by Injunctions' (2.165); and since these texts do not specify any particular number of Vedas to be learnt, it would seem as if these injunctions intended the pupil to learn one, two, three, four, five six, seven or any other number of Vedic

texts, in fact, as many as he could learn. The present verse proceeds to restrict the number of Vedas to be learnt.

'*Duties relating to the Three Vedas should be observed.*'—'*Relating to the three Vedas*' means 'conducive to the learning of the three Vedas;' the act of 'learning' being implied by the compound, on the strength of the fact that the 'getting up of the Veda' has been presented before.—'*Duties*'—*i.e.*, the whole lot of duties laid down for the Religious Student,—'*should be observed*'—one shall observe them; the verbal affix having the injunctive force.

From the above it might be assumed that the duty of 'fetching the fuel' and the rest also should continue to be kept up only till the texts have been got up (and no longer); and, in order to preclude this notion, the text adds—'*for thirty-six years*;' which means that even after the Veda has been got up, the full period has to be completed.

"If the detailed duties, that have been laid down are related to the injunction of learning the Veda,—and this Injunction ceases to be operative after the Veda has been learnt,—then why should the observances of studentship be continued for twelve years, even after the Veda has been learnt?"

What you say is too little. You might say the same in regard to the performance, at the *Darṣa-pūrṇamāsa*, of all those secondary details that come after the *Āgnēya* and other primary offerings. The fact of the matter is that, just as in the case of the sacrifice, the due result is obtained only when the act is performed along with all its details, so in the case in question also the fulfilment of the Injunction (of Learning) is complete only after the act has been performed along with all the details in the duly prescribed order.

"There are several lesser alternative periods—half, and quarter of the full period—mentioned as the limit for study; and when these are permitted, who is there

who would keep up the observances, which require such effort, for twelve years ?"

Pupils, desirous of more extensive results, will have recourse to the carrying out of the larger details. To this effect we have the saying— 'when there is greater effort, there must follow larger results.'

" As a matter of fact, the learning of the Veda, through study, does not lead to any other result except the understanding of the meaning of Vedic texts. They say that—'the revered Ritualists do not regard mere learning as the result ;' and in the *Shabara-bhāṣya* also we read—'the purpose served by it has been found to consist in the comprehension of what should be done.' And certainly, there is no diversity (or divergent grades) in the said comprehension."

If that be so (if the comprehension of meaning were the sole end of Vedic Study), then, inasmuch as such comprehension could come about at the time of learning the Text, even without the keeping of any observances, there should be no keeping of the observances at all. Then again, who says that the Injunction of Vedic Study is for the purpose of comprehending the meaning of Vedic texts ? In fact, the Injunction of Vedic Study is for the purpose of Vedic Study itself ; there is no reason for regarding one thing as being for the purpose of another thing. As for the comprehension of meaning, it follows after the Text has been learnt, by the very nature of things, and not by virtue of the Injunction.

" Then, is the Injunction meant for one who desires Heaven ? "

How can this also be possible ?

" What, then, is the meaning of your assertion that there are larger results obtained (when the act is performed along with more extensive details) ?"

The meaning of the statement is as follows :—The whole Injunction prescribes a sanctificatory process, in which

'Vedic Study' forms the predominant factor, by reason of the sanctification being accomplished during that 'study.' And Injunctions of sanctifications do not stand in need of the direct mention of the result the seeker whereof would be entitled to their performance; in fact, through the object sanctified, they become part and parcel of another Injunction in connection with which a particular result has been mentioned. For example, we have the Injunction 'the corns should be threshed;' and this 'threshing' becomes related to the transcendental results proceeding from the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa sacrifices,—not by itself, but—only through the removal of the chaff which goes to purify the corns of which is made the cake used at the *Āgnēya* and other offerings making up the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; and it is thus that the threshing comes to be recognised as something to be done. In the same manner, the Veda cannot be regarded as something to be sanctified or refined, except as subordinate to something else. As a matter of fact, we find that the comprehension of meaning actually follows after 'Vedic Study;' from which it follows that this act of 'study' itself extends up to the comprehending of the meaning, just as the act of 'threshing' extends up to the accomplishment of the Rice. The only difference in the two cases is as follows:—By reason of its injunction occurring in the same context, the 'threshing' becomes quickly recognised as related to another Injunction mentioning a result; while the Injunction in question (of Vedic Study) does not occur in the context of any particular act, and is regarded as extending up to the comprehension of meaning; so that its connection with results is only implied by the fact of its being of use in the performance of all those acts that are enjoined as leading to various results. Thus the fact that an Injunction aims at some useful purpose of man is readily understood; and it makes no difference whether it does so directly or indirectly. And since its connection with a result is clearly implied, the Injunction in question gets itself carried out independently

by itself, even though the comprehension of meaning is of use in connection with the injunctions of compulsoryand voluntary acts.

Some people have held the view that—"the injunction of Vedic Study serves, through the comprehension of meaning, the same purpose as the injunctions of the Jyotiṣṭoma and other acts, and that the additional effort (involved in Vedic Study and comprehension of meaning) serves to enhance the quality of the results brought about by those acts." But what fault has the Injunction of 'becoming a Teacher' done for those people, that they should have made great efforts to deny the view that this latter also serves the same purpose as the Injunction of 'Vedic Study?' If it be urged that—"under this view, the Veda would become unauthoritative,"—our answer is that, that might be so; but when a certain fact is well established by reason and arguments, it is not abandoned or rejected for the sake of accomplishing any purpose. In fact, an argument is set aside only by another and a more cogent argument.

"But if the Injunction of Vedic Study were taken as serving the same purpose as that of 'becoming a Teacher,' then the former would lose its injunctive character; as in that case no significance would attach to what is expressed by its own words."

The same thing happens also when the Injunction in question is made a part and parcel of the Injunction of the Jyotiṣṭoma, etc.

If, on the other hand, the Injunction of Vedic Study is regarded as independently by itself conducive to the carrying into effect of what it enjoins, then, standing upon an equal footing with all other Injunctions, it rightly comes to be acted up to by itself, as a necessary factor (of all performances).

Thus then, out of the several alternative options—some heavier than the rest—that have been set forth (in the verse), if the lighter alternative serves to accomplish the desired

purpose, all that the undertaking of the heavier option can do is to add something to the quality of what has been prescribed by the Injunction. Just as is the case with the options of giving 'one, three or twelve cows' as a fee in connection with the Laying of Fire. Thus then, if the Injunction of Study has been carried into effect on its own account (and the Veda has been studied), we cannot escape from its twofold relation—*viz.*: (1) its leading to the performance of what it itself prescribes, and (2) its helping the performance of the Jyotiṣṭoma and other acts; it matters little whether such relation is directly stated, or implied, or assumed; for this latter fact would involve a diversity only in the means whereby the knowledge of the relation is obtained, and not any in the relation itself.

"How is it that you are making statements, of which the succeeding ones are inconsistent with the preceding ones? It has been asserted above that Injunctions of sanctification are never directly related to results; while now it is stated that the Injunction in question is by itself conducive to itself being carried into effect. It might be urged that—'Though it is true that the Injunction of Sanctification is not related to any directly mentioned result, yet there is nothing incompatible in its being related to such results as are indirectly indicated.' But even this makes no difference, if the performance of the act (of Study), as prompted by the injunction in question, is made to extend to the comprehension of meaning also. Even so, the mere learning of the Text being got at in accordance with the Injunction of 'having recourse to a teacher &c.,' it would become admitted that Injunctions of sanctification are related to definite results. If, on the other hand, the performance of the act (of study) were in accordance with the Injunction as helping other Injunctions (*i.e.*, those of the Jyotiṣṭoma and other acts), then, in that case, it would come to this that the Veda would be studied by one seeking after the stated result, and not that the person who has studied the Veda is entitled to the performance of

acts leading to that result; and in that case, the Shudra's title could not be denied. Nor does it necessarily follow that the meaning of Vedic texts should be learnt immediately after the texts have been learnt. In fact, whenever one might, by chance, come to understand that 'a certain Vedic act, named Jyotiṣṭoma, leads to Heaven,' he would learn the details of the procedure of that act, and at that same time he would also read up such Vedic texts related to that act as would have to be recited by the sacrificer."

To the above, some people make the following answer, on the basis of the principle enunciated in Pūrva-Mīmāmsā—Sûtra 4. 1. 18 *et. seq.* The *Sviṣṭakṛt* and other similar offerings have been regarded as being of both kinds, serving the purposes of sanctification and also leading to specific results; and, on the same analogy, 'Vedic Study' also would be of both kinds—being purely sanctificatory, as indicated by the words of the Injunction prescribing it, and also leading to particular results, by virtue of its bringing about the comprehension of the meaning of texts which ultimately leads to the performance of acts (directly bringing about those results). It is in this manner that the Injunction of Vedic Study becomes conducive to definite results.

"But who is the person to whom the results accrue (and who, by seeking for that result, comes to perform the act)?"

Our answer is that it is the Boy belonging to one of the three higher castes, who has gone through the Initiatory Rite. That this is so is clear from the fact that the act (of Vedic Study) has been prescribed among the duties of the Religious Student. The Injunctive and other similar affixes are expressive of that injunction or persuasion which is inseparable from the person sought to be persuaded; and when the question arises as to particular details regarding that person, (*a*) sometimes the information is supplied by the words of the Injunction itself—*e.g.*, in the sentence 'one desiring heaven should perform the Agnihotra throughout his life';—(*b*) sometimes, even though not directly mentioned,

he comes to be assumed on the basis of what is directly stated ;—*e.g.*, in the case of the *Vishvajit* and other sacrifices ; —(*c*) sometimes, again, he is indicated by the examination of other Injunctions in view of the force of the context and the nature of things. In the present case, all this is present :—(*a*) the Religious Student happens to be the person dealt with in the context (in which the injunction of Vedic Study occurs); (*b*) the comprehension comes about from the nature of things ; and (*c*) the Study is of use in connection with all other Injunctions, as it is only one who has learnt the Veda that is entitled to the performance of any Vedic act.

This explanation is not accepted by others. [According to these] it is in the character of the 'Injunction of Santcification' itself that the Injunction in question has the corresponding result indicated. As a matter of fact, all sanctificatory acts are done for the sake of the thing sought to be sanctified ; and if no peculiarity is perceived in that object, then the act would lose its very character of 'sanctification,' as it happens in the case of the '*Saktu.*' In the case in question, however, there does appear a peculiarity in the shape of the comprehension of acts conducive to definite results. The case of the '*Sviṣṭakṛt*' offering has been cited above ; but in that case the two-fold character has to be admitted, as if both were not held to be denoted by the root and the affix, then the act (of 'sacrifice') would cease to be itself.

From all this it follows that the Injunction in question stands by itself, and pertains to the initiated boy ; and hence the act (of 'study') has to be done for its own sake, and not as subserving, like the *threshing* of corn, the purpose of results proceeding from the performance of the *Darśha-pūrṇamāsa* and other sacrifices.

The same should be understood to be the case with the learning of more than one Veda. In connection with this also, the question might arise as to why one should learn several Vedas, when the Injunction is duly fulfilled by the

learning of one Veda only? And here also the answer would be that the learning of several Vedas would be conducive to large results. The result of such learning also would be of the nature described above, and not of the nature 'milk,' 'curd,' and the like. Such being the case, if one has learnt a single Veda, when he comes to undertake the performance of acts requiring the use of mantras not occurring in the particular Vedic Rescension learnt by him, the very force of circumstances permits his learning of those Mantras; though in describing the title to the performance of Vedic acts, as belonging to 'persons who have learnt the Veda,' the qualification mentioned is that he should have *duly learnt* the Veda. [But the peculiar circumstances of the case render it permissible for the performer to learn the mantras at the time].

Others have held that in the text—'that the Veda with its six subsidiary sciences should be learnt is what should be done by the Brāhmaṇa without any other motive,'—the phrase 'without any other motive' explains the nature of the act as regards the person to perform it; the term 'without any motive' means 'without having any other end in view;' so that what is meant is that the act should be done as a compulsory one. Unless we take this term as indicating the nature of the person to perform it, it cannot be construed with the rest of the sentence either in the form of an act, or in that of an agency contributing towards the act, or in that of a qualification of the act, and so forth.

Thus, then, even though the Injunction in question be one of sanctification, yet it may have its result indicated indirectly (as explained before), or stated directly (as now explained); and neither of this involves any incongruity.

Others, again, argue that since it is an Injunction of sanctification, it is better to take it as not related to any result at all. For the result is sought after only for endowing the act with a certain peculiarity; and this peculiarity in the present case is obtained by noting the thing

to be sanctified. It is true that Injunctions of sanctification stand in need of the mention of purposes served by them ; but all that is sought to be accomplished by an injunction is the result of the act enjoined ; and such result, in the present case, is actually found to consist in the 'getting up' of the text ; and there is nothing incongruous in this.

The present verse not specifying the period for the learning of each Veda, we derive the knowledge of the specific period from other Smṛti-texts, which lay down that the studentship relating to each Veda is to extend over twelve years.

The next question that arises is—which are the 'three Vedas' that are meant here ?

They are the Ṛgveda, the Yajurveda and the Sāmaveda.

"Then, is the *Atharvan* not a Veda at all ?"

Who says so ? All that is meant by the present context is a certain sanctification ; and when the sanctification in question is found to be one that can be accomplished by taking the words of the present verse in their literal sense, the Injunction in question has its performance secured by being extended up to the comprehension of meaning ; and this for the simple reason that the said comprehension is of use in all performances. As for the Atharvan Veda, it deals for the most part with magical spells, and hence neither the *Jyōtiṣṭoma* and other such acts, nor any details pertaining to these, are prescribed in it ; in fact, all the duties relative to the *Hotṛ* the *Adhvaryu* and the *Udgātṛ* are completely laid down in the Three Vedas ; the duties of the Brahman-priest also are laid down in the Three Vedas. Then, again, the term 'three' denotes a special number, and whenever a particular numeral is used, it is always with reference to a particular character (in which the things included under that number are found to agree). So that, in the case in question, those alone can be taken as included under the number 'three' which are found to possess the common character of containing Injunctions re-

garding what ought to be done. And the Atharvan does not fall within this category; as it does not contain any injunctions of such primary acts as the Jyotiṣṭoma and the rest, nor of any of their subsidiaries. As regards the *Shyēna* and other malevolent sacrifices, these also are performed by the same priests (as the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, &c.), and their procedure also is the same, with a few additional details; but even those peculiar details are such as have been prescribed in the Three Vedas. Thus, then, since the Atharvan Veda is not found, in the performance of any act, to be grouped either with Ṛk and Yajus, or with Ṛk and Sāman, it cannot be included under the appellation of 'Three Vedas;' and this is the reason why it has not been mentioned in the present context. But, since it is included under the term '*svādhyāya*,' '*veda*,' there is nothing incongruous in its being included under the wider Injunction of 'Vedic Study.'

'*For half that period*'—'*that period*' refers to 'thirty-six years;' the 'half' of which is eighteen years. Here also the division of time would be six years for each Veda.

'*Or for a quarter*;'—'Quarter' is the fourth part of the said number, *i.e.*, nine years, that is, three years for each of the three Vedas.

"But how can the Veda be got up in three years."

It is quite possible that a certain pupil may be exceptionally intelligent (and he could get up the Veda in three years).

Other people offer the following explanation:—The duties prescribed in the verse are not made conditional upon the character of the 'learning;' they are conditioned by the injunction bearing upon the duties themselves. So that if, before the learning has been accomplished, the rules are duly observed for a few days during the course of learning, the purpose of the Injunction becomes duly fulfilled; as the observance of the details even to that extent would go to fulfil the conditions of the Injunction of Vedic Study. If one puts an end to his observances before he has got up the text, then he

(comes to be called a '*Vratasnātaka*' 'renouncer of observances.' Thus, inasmuch as both these contingencies are possible, it is only right that a definite period of time should have been prescribed ; and the meaning is that one does not become entitled to the title of '*Vratasnātaka*,' unless he has put in *three years'* work (at least). Though some *Smṛtis* lay down that 'there is Final Bath only on the completion of Vedic Study,' yet it is quite reasonable to apply the name 'Bath' (*snāna*) figuratively to the completion of the observances relative to Vedic Study.

This, however, is not right. Though the observances are objects of independent Injunctions, yet the right course to be adopted is that they should be kept up as long as the 'study' continues. In fact, the observances having been actually enjoined in connection with Study, they must continue throughout the study. If the first part of the present verse (consisting of the first three feet) were taken separately, then the words of the text themselves would make the observances abandoned after three years only, even before the 'study' has been finished. If, on the other hand, the whole verse—including the last quarter—is taken as a single sentence, then the observances cannot cease until the Veda has been wholly learnt. In fact, the particle '*eva*,' 'precisely,' clearly indicates that this last view is the correct one.

"If there is no cessation of the observances until the Vedas have been learnt, how is it that three are two distinct titles (1) '*Vratasnātaka*', 'who has completed the observances.' and (2) *Vedasnātaka*,' 'who has completed the Veda' ?"

We shall explain this under Discourse IV.

The aggregate of 'thirty-six years' is called '*ṣaṭtṛmshadabdam* ;' that which pertains to this aggregate is '*ṣaṭtṛmshadābdikam*'. Similarly, the term '*traivēdikam*.' That whose extent is half of that is '*tadardhikam*.' Similarly, '*pādikam*' and '*grahaṇāntikam*.' The possessive affix in these terms is in accordance with Pāṇini's Sûtra 5. 2. 145. The forms cannot come under Pāṇini's 5. 1. 57.—(1).

SECTION (2)—ENTRANCE INTO THE HOUSEHOLD.

VERSE II

HAVING LEARNT, IN DUE COURSE, THREE VEDAS, OR TWO VEDAS, OR ONE VEDA, HE SHOULD ENTER UPON THE STATE OF THE HOUSEHOLDER, HAVING NEVER DEVIATED FROM THE VOWS OF STUDENTSHIP.—(2).

Bhāṣya.

The 'learning of Three Vedas' has been mentioned (in the preceding verse); the learning of 'two' and 'one' Veda, not having been mentioned anywhere, are here put forward as alternatives. The term '*veda*' in this connection has been explained as standing for Recensional Text; 'and what is meant is that one should learn three, or two, or one Recension of each of the three Vedas,—and not that three or two or one Recension of a single Veda should be learnt. Because the work to be learnt has been called the 'Triplicate Science.'

'*Having learnt*'—having got up, by means of the above described course of studentship.

'*He should enter upon the state of the householder*'—The exact nature of the 'Householder's stage' is going to be described later on (Verse 4, below).—'*Enter,*' *i. e.*, live; verbal roots having several meanings. The prefix 'ā' denotes limit.

One who has taken a wife to himself is called 'householder,' which term is used in its conventional, not etymological, sense; The term 'house' standing for *wife*; and he who *takes his stand upon that house* is called 'Householder.'

The term '*āshrama,*' '*state,*' stands for all those duties, positive and negative, that have been prescribed (for the married man). Just as for the 'initiated boy,' there is 'state of studentship' till the Final Return from the Preceptor's house, so for one who has married, it is the 'state of the Householder.'

'*Nor deviated from the vows of studentship,*'—*i.e.*, he who has not broken the vows of not having intercourse with women. This epithet has to be regarded as a distinct sentence, in accordance with the usage of stories; the sense being that (*a*) 'the boy should not deviate from the vows of studentship' and (*b*) 'he should enter upon the state of the Householder.' If the whole were taken as a single sentence, then, as a result of this, one who has deviated from the vows would never be entitled at all to enter upon the Householder's state. If, however, we take the epithet as an independent injunction put forth for the man's benefit (and not as a necessary condition for entering upon Householdership), then deviation from it makes the man liable to the penalty of expiation, but it does not make him unfit to enter upon Householdership.

By the words, '*having learnt, he should enter*,' all that is meant is that the two acts should come in this order,—entrance upon Householdership following the 'learning;' and it is not meant that marriage should come immediately after study. Because where the words signify mere sequence, immediate sequence is not always meant. Hence during the time intervening between 'Vedic Study' and 'marriage,' it becomes possible for the boy to carry on the study of Grammar and other Sciences, which help in the understanding of the meaning of Vedic texts. In fact, it is only the learned man that is entitled to Householdership; and it is not like the 'Vedic Study,' to which the entirely ignorant boy is entitled. Though during boyhood, the boy is like a lower animal, incapable of understanding what he is entitled to, yet he is made to act either by his Father or by his Preceptor. In fact, the act of 'Vedic Study' by the boy falls within the Father's province; the proper teaching of the child being the Father's duty; and the reason for this lies in the fact that it is only when the child has been properly taught that the Father is regarded as having duly fulfilled the injunction of 'begetting a child.' 'Teaching' of the child, again, consists in explaining to him what he should do and what he should not

do. And, if the Boy fails to understand his duties when these are explained to him, he is led by the hand, like the blind man, and made to fulfil them ; just as he is caught firmly by the hand and saved from falling into the fire or into the well, in the same manner, he is also saved from drinking and other evils leading to imperceptible effects. Or, again, just as a boy is made, against his wish, to drink a wholesome medicine, so in the same manner, he is also made to do acts prescribed in the scriptures. After he has become capable of understanding things a little, he is directed by means of such words 'you should do such and such an act.'

Such being the case, when the Boy has learnt the Veda, he should be instructed by his Father or Preceptor in such words as—'You have learnt the Veda, now you are fit for carrying on an investigation into what is contained in it,—hence you should now hear lectures on the subsidiary sciences.' It is only when this advice has been given that the father is regarded as having fulfilled the duty of 'begetting a child' ; as it has been declared—'the child is begotten only when he comes to understand his own duties.'

From all this it becomes established that one should not marry immediately after learning the Veda, until he has learnt what is contained in the Veda ; and the words of the text have to be construed thus—'Having learnt—*i.e.*, after learning has been finished—one should continue to be firm in the vows of studentship (*i.e.*, of continence'). The cessation of continence having become permissible (after the Veda has been learnt), its maintenance is reiterated with a view to indicate that the other vows and restraints—such as the avoidance of honey, meat and the rest—may be withdrawn. The conclusion thus comes to be that, so long as the Veda is being learnt, the Boy should keep all his vows of studentship,—but when the learning of the Veda has been completed, and he continues his studies further for understanding what is contained in the Veda, he should abstain only from intercourse with women.

Though the term '*brahmacharya*,' '*vows of studentship*,' is ordinarily explained as standing for those observances and restraints that are kept up for the proper learning of the Veda, —yet in the present context it has been used in the sense of 'avoiding intercourse with women,'—as we shall show later on.

'*In due course*,'—*i.e.* according to that order of reading which is well known among students ; *i.e.* first of all one should read the sixty-four sections of the Samhitā (of the Ṛgveda), then the Brāhmaṇa, and so forth, in the same order of sequence in which they may have been studied by his forefathers. In matters like this, no one can rightly say that 'one should not follow either family traditions, or the dictates of morality, or orderly sequence.' The meaning of all this is that 'one should not abandon that Recensional Text which may have been learnt by his father and other ancestors.'—(2)

VERSE III.

WHEN, BY THE DUE OBSERVANCE OF HIS DUTIES, HE HAS ACQUIRED THE VEDA AND HIS HERITAGE FROM HIS FATHER, AND IS SO INCLINED,—HIS FATHER SHALL FIRST HONOUR HIM, ADORNED WITH GARLANDS AND SEATED UPON A COUCH, WITH THE "COW."—(3)

Bhāṣya.

'*When he has acquired the Veda and his heritage, the father shall honour him first with the cow.*' He who has acquired both, the Veda ('*Brahman*') and the heritage ('*dāya*') is called '*brahmadāyādāharaḥ*.' '*Dáya*' (Heritage) is *what is given*, i.e., *property* ;—'*Brahman*' is '*Veda*' ; — '*haraṇa*' is *acquiring*. It is only when the boy has learnt the Veda and received his share of the ancestral property from his father that he takes to the Householder's state ; a man without any property not being entitled to enter upon that stage. If the father happens to have no property, he should earn wealth by begging for the avowed purpose of marrying his son (and thereby maintaining his line), and then marry him.

Others explain the *Veda* itself as being the 'heritage;' and regard the present verse as a reiteration of the foregoing Injunction, for the purpose of indicating that it is to be learnt from the Father.

"It having been declared before that it is the Preceptor whose function it is to teach the Veda, why is it that the boy is now spoken of as acquiring the Veda and 'heritage' *from his father?*"

The answer to this is as follows:—For him whose Father is living, the Father himself is the 'Preceptor.' It is only when the Father is not living, or when he is somehow incapacitated, that another person may act as the 'Preceptor.' By the appointing of another man as the 'Preceptor,' the Father's title to act as one ceases. But, whether the Father himself teaches his son or some one else teaches him, it makes no difference.

Some people have urged the following argument—"In connection with the Upanayana, it has been laid down as a compulsory duty that the 'gift should consist of some very superior thing' (Gautama, 25.6); from which it is clear that the function is to be performed by some one else (and not by the Father himself)."

This is not right. That the Fee should consist of a very superior thing is an Injunction in connection with the Upanayana, the Initiatory Rite; and whether the Initiator is the Father or some other Preceptor, neither of these persons requires any incentive to perform this function; and fees are paid only as incentives to service; nor is any incentive necessary in a case where the person engages in the work under the influence of some other form of prompting. For these reasons, the term 'Fee' in the context in question, being found incapable of conveying the sense of *an incentive to work*, must be taken as standing for some such gift as is made for the purpose of some transcendental results, just like the giving of gold. And it is the Father who should make the Boy the owner of enough wealth to enable him to make a gift of the 'superior thing.'

If one were to insist upon the following argument—" it is not possible for the term *fee* to be used in any sense other than what is paid as an incentive to serve, and so long as a word can be taken in its primary sense, it cannot be right to have recourse to any secondary signification,"—then, in that case, the said Injunction of the Fee will have to be regarded as applying to such cases where, as in the case of Satyakāma Jābāla, neither the Father is alive, nor is there any other Preceptor appointed as the Father's substitute, and where the Boy presents himself (to a Teacher) for Initiation. And it has been already explained that such a boy, having passed his childhood, is fully entitled to have his sacraments performed for himself.

Thus, in both cases, it is the Father's function; he may do the initiating himself or get it done by another Preceptor.

'*Inclined*'—*i.e.*, who is inclined towards entering the life of the Householder,—and not him who is going to be a life-long student, even though the latter may be returning home simply for the sake of obeying the rule regarding the completion of study.

'*Adorned with garland*'—this is meant to include all the details that have been laid down by the authors of the *Gṛhyasūtras* in connection with the '*Madhuparka*' offering.

'*Seated upon a couch*'—seated upon a valuable sofa.

'*With the cow*'—*i.e.*, with the '*Madhuparka*' offering. The offering of the cow in the '*Madhuparka*' has been prescribed as an optional alternative; hence the term 'cow' here stands for that particular act (of *offering*) which is done by means of the cow.

'*Shall honour*'—this is the duty of the Father or the Preceptor.

'*First*'—*i.e.*, before marriage.

'*Inclined*'—*i.e.*, lying down upon the couch for the purpose of receiving the offering.

'*By the strict observance of his duties*'—this is a super-

fluous reiteration ; and it makes no difference whether it is construed with 'acquiring the Veda and his heritage,' or with 'shall honour.'—(3).

VERSE IV.

THE TWICE-BORN PERSON, HAVING, ON BEING PERMITTED BY THE PRECEPTOR, "BATHED" AND "RETURNED" ACCORDING TO RULE, SHALL TAKE A WIFE OF THE SAME CASTE AS HIMSELF, WHO IS ENDOWED WITH SIGNS.—(4).

Bhāṣya.

Even on the completion of the observances relating to Vedic Study, the Boy shall "bathe" only when '*permitted by the Preceptor.*' '*Bathing*' here stands for a peculiar sacrament prescribed in the *Gṛhyasūtras,* as the limit for the observances of the Religious Student. Why the term 'bathing' is used in this figurative sense we have already explained above.

'*Having returned*'—*i.e.*, having gone through a particular consecratory rite consisting of the offering of the *Madhuparka,* etc., as laid down in the *Gṛhyasūtra,* and having returned from the Preceptor's home to his Father's home.

All this has been mentioned as supplementary to the Injunction contained in the term '*shall take,*' being already known from other sources. The 'return' spoken of here is not a part of the 'marriage.' Hence for him who has learnt the Veda in his Father's house, though there can be no 'Return,' yet marriage is done.

Some people take the 'Return' to mean that Bath which forms part of the marriage rites. Against this view it might be argued that the participial ending '*ktvā*' (in '*snātvā*') clearly indicates that the two (Bath and Return) are entirely different. But that ceremony of 'Return' which consists in 'bathing' and which forms part of the marriage rite, is going to be described later; where a particular form of 'Bathing' with its details is found laid down. [Hence the 'Return'

mentioned in the present verse cannot be regarded as part of Marriage.]

Or, the term '*Return*' may be taken as intended to connote *the renouncing of restraints and observances.* In that case, '*returned*' would mean 'having resumed the former condition free from all restraint.' Special stress is laid upon the *renouncing of restraints* in this connection, because the observances and restraints imposed upon the Religious Student are exceptionally hard, which is not the case with the other subsequent stages of life.

'*According to rule*'—this is to be construed like the term 'in strict accordance with his duties' (of the preceding verse).

'*The twice-born person shall take a wife*'—'Shall take' constitutes the injunction of marriage. Marriage is a sacramental rite, a refining process, as is indicated by the Accusative ending in '*bhāryām*.'

"But before marriage there does not exist such a thing as *wife* for whom the refinement could be effected in the same manner as ornamentation by collyrium is done to the Eye. In fact, it is by means of marriage itself that the *wife* is brought into existence."

In the case of the sacrificial post, we find such injunctions as the 'sacrificial post shall be cut,' and that same piece of wood becomes the *post* on which the refining process of *cutting*, &c., has been performed. Exactly in the same manner it is by means of the refining process of marriage performed upon her that the person becomes a 'wife.'

The word 'marriage' denotes the *taking hold of the hand*, which forms the principal factor in the ceremony. To this effect we have the assertion—'marriage is taking a wife, *i.e.*, the taking hold of the hand;' and in this work also marriage is spoken of as 'the sacrament of taking hold of the hand' (verse 43 below). The offering of parched grain and such other rites are the subsidiary details (of Marriage); and all this may be learnt from the *Gṛhyasūtras*.

Later on (in verse 8) we read—'one shall not marry a *maiden* with golden hair, &c., &c. ;'—and from the use of the term 'maiden' there it is clear that marriage is a sacrament for maidens, and not for any and every woman ; and we are going to explain later on that in the present context the term 'maiden' stands for *the female who has had no intercourse with a male.*

'*Of the same caste as himself*'—*i. e.*, belonging to the same caste.

'*Endowed with signs.*'—The term '*signs*' stands for the colour of the complexion, lines on the body, moles and such other marks which are indicative of unwidowed life, offspring, wealth, and so forth,—which may be learnt from the science of Astrology.—'*Endowed*'—*i.e.*, equipped—'with these signs ;' *i.e.*, bearing auspicious marks. Even though indicators of evil are also called 'signs,' yet since what is mentioned here is, that one should marry a girl with these signs, it follows that what is meant is the girl with good, auspicious, signs. In fact, the term, '*lakṣaṇa*,' 'sign,' is used in ordinary parlance in the sense of desirable signs ; *e.g.*, men and women are spoken of as 'endowed with signs' which means that they bear auspicious marks.

What we have to consider in this connection is the question of *title* (Who is entitled to marry ?).

Since the Injunction of marriage enjoins a sacrament, a consecration, it comes to be performed just like the Laying of Fire ; and just as the Laying of Fire serves, through the *Āhavanīya* and other fires, the purposes of compulsory and voluntary acts, and hence it comes to be performed for the bringing into existence of the *Āhavanīya*, &c., as subsidiary to those acts,—so the Marriage also brings into existence the 'Wife,' and through her serves the fulfilment of the visible and unvisible ends of man. For example, when desire for sexual intercourse arises in man, there arises the possibility of his having recourse to any and every woman ; but intercourse with maidens and wives of other men being pro-

hibited, the said desire comes to be accomplished only through one's own married wife [The married wife thus serves a visible end]. Then again, there is the saying that 'every religious act shall be done by the husband and wife together,' which shows that it is only as accompanied by his wife that man is entitled to the performance of religious acts; and thus it is clear that the accomplishment of the invisible (transcendental) purposes of man also is dependent upon the wife.

In connection with this subject, some people make the following observations :—" As just described, persons, with their sexual desire aroused, have, of their own accord, their marriages done for the purpose of accomplishing their visible ends; and after they have married, they happen to perform certain religious acts; and in this case, the marriage might thus turn out to be of use in the fulfilment of religious acts. But in a case where a man's desire for intercourse with women has entirely ceased, there is no marriage at all;—there being no marriage, the man is not entitled to the performance of religious acts;—in the absence of such title, the non-performance of acts shall involve no sin;—consequently, there need be nothing reprehensible in the conduct of the man who does not take to the Householder's life and does not perform any religious acts conducive to the ends of man."

This, however, is not right. Religious acts are as much conducive to the fulfilment of man's purpose as sexual desire is. In fact, every man engages in activity only for the accomplishment of some purpose of his. If this were not so (*i.e.*, the entrance into the Householder's state were not essential), then there would be no room for such assertions as 'desisting for a year from entering into the Householder's state, &c., &c.' We shall explain this fully under Discourse VI, in connection with the question of option regarding the Life-stages.—(4)

SECTION (3).—MARRIAGEABLE GIRLS.

VERSE V.

SHE WHO IS NOT A "SAPIṆḌA" OF ONE'S MOTHER, NOT OF THE SAME "GOTRA" AS HIS FATHER, AND WHO IS NOT BORN OF (UNLAWFUL) INTERCOURSE—HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR MARRIAGE.—(5)

Bhāṣya.

The text proceeds to show what sort of maiden should be married.

'*She who is not a sapiṇḍa of one's mother, and who is not of the same gotra as his Father, has been recommended for marriage.*' The term '*sapiṇḍa*' indicates the relations on the mother's side. According to another Smṛti, women are called the "mother's sapiṇḍa" only up to three steps of relationship. But, as a matter of fact, marriage with relatives on the mother's side is permitted beyond not the *third*, but the *fifth*, step of relationship. Says Gautama (4—3 and 5)—'Beyond the seventh step of relationship on the Father's side and beyond the fifth step on the mother's side.' Thus, inasmuch as the term '*sapiṇḍa*' cannot be taken here in its literal sense (of relation within *three* steps of relationship), it has to be explained, in accordance with other *Smṛtis* (such as Gautama), as standing for 'mother's relation.' The meaning thus comes to be—'She who is not born of the mother's family;' and the limit of *relationship* is to be taken as prescribed by Gautama. So that one should not marry the girl who is descended either from his maternal grandfather or great-grandfather, up to five steps downwards, on account of the closeness of relationship among the descendants of these. Hence the mother's sister, the daughter of the mother's sister, as also those descended from the maternal great-grandmother, all these become excluded, on the ground of all of them being 'relations.'

'*She who is not of the same gotra as his Father.*'—The term '*gotra*' has been declared to stand for the descendants of

Vashiṣṭha, Bhṛgu, Garga and the rest.—'*Of the same gotra*' means *belonging to same gotra*. That is, a 'Vashiṣṭha' girl cannot be married by a 'Vashiṣṭha' boy; nor the 'Garga' girl by a 'Garga' boy.

In the *Vashiṣṭha* (Dharmashāstra), there is prohibition also of the girl belonging to the same *gotra* as one's mother. It says—'If the twice-born person marries a girl of the same *gotra* or the same *Pravara* as himself, he shall renounce her and perform the penance of the Chāndrāyaṇa; so also if he has married the daughter of his maternal uncle, or a girl of the same *gotra* as his mother.'

Gautama says—'There is marriage between parties not having the same *Pravara*' (4.2); so that if the *Pravara* is different, there may be marriage, even though the *gotra* happen to be the same.

This, however, is not right; because another Smṛti (Yājnavalkya) has prohibited both—'one should marry a girl born of a *different gotra and Ṛṣi*' (Achāra, 53),—where '*Ṛṣi*' stands for 'pravara.'

"But how can a girl be born of the same *Ṛṣis* when her *gotra* is different?"

Why may this not be possible when the *Smṛti* distinctly speaks of it? This subject is one that falls entirely within the purview of *Shruti and Smṛti*, and is beyond our perception; so that there could be no incongruity (in what is directly asserted in the *Smṛti*).

"What are '*pravaras*,' after all?"

Well, you are asking too little; you might as well ask —'What is a Brāhmaṇa?' 'What is a gotra?' In fact, just as the generic character of 'man' being equally present in all men, the 'Brāhmaṇa' and the rest constitute the particular species included under that generic character,—exactly in the same manner, the generic character of '*Brāhmaṇa*' being common among a number of men, '*Vashiṣṭha*' and the rest come in as specific sub-divisions; and related to each '*gotra*' there are a few names of '*Ṛṣis*;' and the person who be-

longs to a certain '*gotra*' has to connect himself with these Ṛṣi-names, which are called his '*pravara*.' This same is the meaning of the term '*pravara*' in connection with the prohibition of marriage.

The writers of Sūtras have mentioned the *pravaras* along with each distinct *gotra*, in such words as—'such and such are the *pravaras* of the person belonging to such and such a *gotra*.' As for the distinct *gotras*, these are duly remembered by the persons born in those *gotras* themselves—'we belong to the '*Parāshara-gotra*,' 'we belong to the *Upamanyu-gotra*,' and so forth. Though, like their *gotra*, people remember their *pravaras* also, yet inasmuch as the number of *pravaras* is large, it was thought that people might forget them, and hence the Smṛtis were written for the purpose of mentioning the *pravaras* connected with each of the *gotras*. As for the *gotra*, save that people themselves remember it, there is no other indicative in the form that 'he who is like this and that belongs to such and such a *gotra*.' All that has been declared in connection with *gotra* is that persons belonging to the same *gotra* must belong to a common stock and a common caste.

This diversity of *Gotra* and *Pravara* is found only among Brāhmaṇas, not Kṣattriyas and Vaishyas. Say the authors of the *Kalpasūtra*—'that of the Kṣattriya and the Vaishya is determined by that of their priests.' On the ground of this Kalpasūtra-statement occurring in the section dealing with *Pravara*, it might be construed to be a denial of *pravara* only, which might be understood to apply to those two castes also by reason of particular *gotras* having been mentioned in relation to them. But, in reality, there are no *gotras* mentioned in connection with them.

"Under the circumstances, what sort of restriction would there be on the point of relationship, in connection with marriages?"

Our answer is as follows:—The rule of Gautama (4. 3), that 'it should be beyond the seventh step among the relations

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on the father's side,' is common to all castes (and this would supply the necessary limitation).

In the present verse also the term '*not of the same gotra*' means 'who is not a *Sapiṇḍa*;' and just as the term '*sapiṇḍa*,' in the preceding phrase, so the same term here also, would be taken as standing for 'relations;' and in this way we secure the exclusion of girls descended from the father's sister, as also of other girls descended from one's great-grandfather, up to the seventh step. And it is only persons up to the seventh step of relationship that have been called '*sapiṇḍa*.'

Others have explained '*gotra*' to mean *family*. And in this case, there is no need for any limit; there can be no marriage among parties who know each other as 'belonging to the same family.' In accordance with this view also the term '*asapiṇḍā*' has to be construed twice over; so that, as before, the daughter of the father's sister and others become excluded.

"But, according to this view, the exclusion of girls belonging to the same *gotra* and having the same *pravaras* becomes difficult. As among these there is no such idea as that 'we belong to the same family.'"

The answer to the above is that this difficulty is sought to be explained by a reference to tradition. There is a tradition that 'Vashiṣṭha and others like him are the prime progenitors of families, and persons descended from them and belonging to their *gotra* are the *Pravaras*, who were their sons and grandsons endowed with excellent austerities and learning and vastly famous.' [And in this sense 'persons belonging to the same *gotra* and having the same *pravaras*' may be regarded as 'belonging to the same family.'] In other *Smṛtis* also we find the same rule.

The following facts, however, have to be borne in mind in this connection:—In the phrase, 'having the same *pravaras*,' the *sameness* is in regard to the *names*, not the

mere *number*, of *Pravaras* ; and the question arises, whether the prohibition applies to all cases where all the Pravara-names are the same, or only to those where even one name happens to be common. If the whole set of names constitutes the '*pravara*,' then there is no 'sameness of Pravara' in a case where a few names are common but others are different, and hence the 'set of names' in the two cases becomes different ; so that the prohibition would not apply to such a case ; and marriage could take place between the *Upamanyus* and the *Parāsharas*, whose *gotras* are different,—one belonging to the *Gotra* of Upamanyu, and the other to the *gotra* of Parāshara,—but there is difference in their '*pravaras*,' in the sense noted above ; because for the '*Upamanyu gotra*' the *Pravaras* are 'Vashiṣṭha, Bharadvāja and Ekapāt,' while for the '*Parāshara gotra*' they are 'Vashiṣṭhya, Gārgya and Parāsharya.' If, on the other hand, only one name constituted the 'Pravara'—and not the whole set, then the prohibition would apply to even such cases where a single name happens to be common. *E.g.*, when it is said '*Māṣa* grains should not be eaten,' one ceases to eat even mixed *Māṣa* grains.

What, then, is the right view ?

The right view is that single names constitute '*pravara* ; it is in accordance with this that we find such usage as '*ēkam vṛṇītē*,' '*dvau vṛṇītē*,' '*trīn vṛṇītē*,'—where there is co-ordination between 'one,' 'two' and 'three' with the '*Pravara* ;' and it is said that 'there should be no marriage even when one pravarà-name is common.'

The mention of the 'twice-born person' is merely indicative ; as for the *Shūdra also* there is no marriage up to seven grades of relationship on the father's side, and five on the mother's side.

'*Marriage*'—*i.e.*, taking to wife.

'*Recommended*'—enjoined with commendation.

'*Who is not born of (unlawful) intercourse*,' *i.e.*, who is born directly from her lawful father. '*Niyoga*' (begetting of off-

spring by the widow) having been permitted, tha girl who would be born under that form would not be excluded by the foregoing qualifications; hence she is separately excluded by the term '*who is not born of unlawful intercourse*;' which means that one should not voluntarily marry a girl born of 'Niyoga,' because she is born of unlawful intercourse.

Others read '*Amaithunē*' (for '*Amaithunī*'), and explain it to mean that the girl described has been recommended as an associate at religious functions, and *not for sexual intercourse.*

And such a prohibition would be by way of eulogy; the sense being—'if one marries a girl with these qualifications, she fulfills his religious functions, even though there be no sexual intercourse.'

VERSE VI.

IN FEMALE CONNECTION ONE SHOULD AVOID THESE (FOLLOWING) TEN FAMILIES,—EVEN THOUGH THEY BE GREAT AND RICH IN THE POSSESSION OF CATTLE, GOAT AND SHEEP AND GRAIN.—(6).

Bhāṣya.

This verse is a deprecatory exhortation, supplementary to the Prohibition coming later.

'*Rich*' denotes *prosperity.*

'*Possession*'—*property.*

'*Though great*'—*high.*

The possessions are further specified—'*in the possession of cattle, &c., &c.*' The affix '*tas*' in '*gojāvidhanadhānyataḥ*' has the force of the Instrumental; the construction being—'*gojāvidhanēna-dhānyēna.*' The term '*possession*' has been added for the purpose of qualifying '*cattle,*' etc., the sense being 'cattle and the rest, which constitute *possession.*'

'*Grain*' stands for property in the shape of *kūṭa* (?)

'*Female-connection*'—*i.e.*, Marriage—the compound being construed as 'the connection for the purpose of obtaining a female mate.'—(6)

VERSE VII.

SUCH FAMILIES AS—(1) THAT IN WHICH THE SACRED RITES HAVE BEEN ABANDONED, (2) WHICH IS MALE-LESS, (3) WHICH IS DEVOID OF THE VEDA, (4) MEMBERS OF WHICH ARE WOOLLY AND SUBJECT TO (5) PILES, (6) PHTHISIS, (7) DYSPEPSIA, (8) EPILEPSY, (9) LEUCODERMA, AND (10) LEPROSY.—(7)

Bhāṣya.

'*That in which the sacred rites*'—the natal and other sacraments—'*have been abandoned*'—neglected; *i.e.*, in which the consecratory rites as also the compulsory 'Five Sacrifices,' etc., are not performed.

'*Male-less*'—productive of females; *i.e.*, in which, as a rule, only female, not male, children are born.

'*Devoid of the Veda*'—destitute of Vedic study.

'*Romashārshasam*'—This copulative compound mentions two kinds of families. '*Romasha,*' '*woolly,*'—*i.e.* the members of which have their arms and limbs covered with much and long hair. '*Piles*'—fleshy protuberances in the anus, which being a disease, are extremely painful.

'*Phthisis*'—the disease of consumption.

'*Dyspepsia*'—slow-digestion: by which the food eaten is not properly digested.

'*Epilepsy*'—leading to loss of memory and other cognate troubles.

'*Leucoderma*'—white spots on the body, with holes.

'*Leprosy*'—is well-known.

All these words—beginning with '*romasha*'—are names of particular diseases, and are to be taken as ending in possessive affixes.

Older commentators have explained that the prohibition herein contained is based entirely upon ordinary visible considerations: As a matter of fact, bipeds inherit the peculiarities of their mother's families; hence, children born of mothers belonging to families that have 'abandoned the sacred rites,' etc., etc., would be prone to the same defects;

and diseases are apt to be infectious; works on medicine having declared that 'all diseases, with the sole exception of Diarrhœa, are infectious.'—(7)

VERSE VIII.

HE SHOULD NOT MARRY A MAIDEN WITH TAWNY HAIR, NOR ONE WITH SUPERFLUOUS LIMBS, NOR ONE WHO HAS DISEASE, NOR ONE WHO HAS EITHER NO HAIR OR TOO MUCH HAIR, NOR ONE WHO IS GARRULOUS, NOR ONE WITH REDDISH EYES.—(8)

Bhāṣya.

The prohibition in the preceding verse was with regard to the family of the bride; while that in the present verse pertains to her body.

The girl whose hairs are of either tawny or golden colour is called '*kapilā*.'

'*With superfluous limbs*'—*e.g.*, having six fingers.

'*Who has disease*'—who is suffering from many diseases, or is overtaken by some incurable disease;—the possessive affix having the sense of *many* or of *permanence*.

'*Who has no hair*'—'*loman*' standing for *hairs* in general also. What the present qualification has in view, however, is the entire absence of hair in the arm-pits and between the thighs.

'*Garrulous*'—who talks much and disagreeably, when it is necessary to speak very little.

'*With reddish eyes*'—Whose eyes are red, on account of some disease.—(8)

VERSE IX.

NOR ONE BEARING THE NAME OF AN ASTERISM, OR A TREE, OR A RIVER; NOR ONE HAVING HER NAME AFTER A LOW CASTE OR A MOUNTAIN; NOR ONE NAMED AFTER A BIRD, A SERPENT OR A SLAVE; NOR ONE WITH A NAME INSPIRING TERROR.—(9)

Bhāṣya.

'*Asterism*' is constellation; one who bears the name of one of these; such as '*Ārdrā*,' '*Jyēṣṭhā*,' and the like.

'*Bearing the name of a tree*'—such as 'Shimshapā,' '*Āmalakī,*' and so forth.

'*River*'—the Gangā and the Yamunā; she who bears these names.

The term "*ṛkṣavṛkṣanadī*" is to be expounded as a copulative compound; which with the following term '*nāman*' forms a genitive *Tatpuruṣa* compound; and these, along with the term 'nāman' repeated, form a *Bahuvrīhi* compound; the repeated term '*nāman*' being dropped.

'*Having her name after a low caste*'— such as '*Barbarī*' '*Shabarī,*' and the like.

'*Mountains*'—such as the Vindhyā, the Himālaya, and the rest.

This compound ('*parvatanāmikām*') also is to be expounded as the former; and has the '*ka*' affix added to it.

'*Named after a bird*'—such as '*Shukī*' '*Sārikā,*' and the like.

'*Serpent,*' snake; one who is named after it; such as '*Vyālī,*' '*Bhujangī.*'

'*Slave*'— such names as '*Dāsī,*' '*Bālī.*'

'*Inspiring terror*'—that which causes fear; such as *Ḍākinī,*' '*Rākṣasī.*'

VERSE X.

ONE SHOULD MARRY A FEMALE WITH A FAULTLESS BODY, BEARING AN AGREEABLE NAME, HAVING HER GAIT LIKE THAT OF THE SWAN OR THE ELEPHANT, HAVING FINE HAIR ON THE BODY AND THE HEAD, AND FINE TEETH, AND WITH TENDER LIMBS.—(10)

Bhāṣya.

One whose body is free from defects is called '*avyangāngī*;' the term '*avyaṅga*' standing for *freedom from defects*; just like such other words as '*pravīṇa,*' '*udāra,*' and the rest. Since the term '*avyaṅga,*' etymologically, means 'free from defects in the limbs,' the second '*aṅga*' must be taken as standing for the *whole body*; hence the epithet '*avyaṅga*' denotes *fulness or comeliness of the bodily form.*

'*Saumya*,' 'agreeable'—it has been laid down in this book that the names of women should be sweet-sounding and easy to pronounce.

She who moves like the swan or the elephant. That is, one whose gait is as elegant and languid as that of the swan or the elephant.

The term '*tanu*,' '*fine*,' here does not stand for '*small*;' it means moderate. Just as the girl who is neither fat nor lean is called '*tanvaṅgī*,' 'one with a fine body.'

'*Mṛdvaṅgī* is one whose limbs are *tender*, not hard or rough.

Such a female '*one should marry*.' '*Female*' here must be taken to stand for the *maiden*, as it is the maiden that is being spoken of in the context.

"If that is so (if this verse also refers to the *maiden*), then the prohibition contained in verse 8 regarding 'one who has no hair, &c.,' is superfluous; as the positive injunction, contained in the present verse, implies that 'one who is not as here described should not be married.'"

True, that is so; the same fact when stated by means of two verses—affirmatively in one and negatively in the other—becomes clearly understood.

In the present context, the term 'maiden' is used in the sense of a woman who has not experienced sexual intercourse. Says Vashiṣṭha—'One should acquire a wife who has had no sexual intercourse and who is similar to himself.' But one who has been 'consecrated' (by marriage) by one man is no longer capable of being 'consecrated' by another; as there can be no doing of what has been already done. So that, if a girl has been married, and her husband goes away before she has had intercourse with him,—if she happens to be a loose woman, she cannot be married to another person, even though she is still a '*maiden*' (in the technical sense); and it is such a maiden that is mentioned in the words of Vashiṣṭha quoted above. In another work also it is said—'One should marry a female, never before married by another person, who

is younger than himself and has brothers' (Yājñavalkya, *Āchāra* 52).—(10)

VERSE XI.

THE WISE MAN SHALL NOT MARRY ONE WHO HAS NO BROTHER, OR WHOSE FATHER IS NOT KNOWN; FOR FEAR OF HER HAVING THE CHARACTER OF THE "APPOINTED DAUGHTER."—(11)

Bhāṣya.

She who has no brother,—such a girl one should not marry,—'*for fear of her having the character of the appointed daughter*;' *i.e.*, by reason of her being an 'appointed daughter;' *i.e.*, by reason of there being the doubt that the girl's father might have performed those rites that would have made her an 'appointed daughter.'

"Why should such a doubt arise at all?"

Such a doubt would arise if the girl's father is not known, having died or having gone away to a foreign country. Under such circumstances, the girl is given away in marriage either by her mother or by other members of her father's family. Since it is laid down that when the girl has reached the marriageable age, if her father happen to be absent, she shall be given away in marriage by the said relations. The exact rule on this point we shall quote later on. If the father is known, however, there is no fear of the girl being an 'appointed daughter;' as he will himself declare whether or not she has been 'appointed.'

'*Or*' in the text should be taken in the sense of 'if;' the sense being that 'if the father is not known, the girl should not be married.'

Others have taken the two clauses as formulating two independent prohibitions: (*a*) 'If the father is not known'—*i.e.*, if it is not known from whom she is born; this being a prohibition of marrying the girl of unknown parentage;—and (*b*) the next prohibition is to be construed as 'one should not marry the girl who has no brother, for fear of her being an ap-

pointed daughter.' They further point out that the latter phrase, 'for fear of her being an appointed daughter,' cannot be construed with the clause, 'if her father is not known.'

In the whole of this section on Marriage, wherever the prohibition is not based upon grounds that are not perceptible—*e.g.*, 'one should marry a maiden who is not his father's *sapiṇḍa*,' etc. (when the grounds of interdiction are trnscendental, not perceptible, as in the case of the prohibition of marriage with a diseased girl, etc.),—if the prohibition is disobeyed, the 'marriage' itself remains unaccomplished. Hence, if one happens to marry a girl belonging to the same *gotra* as himself, the marriage, even though performed, would be as good as *not performed*; and this for the simple reason that the character of 'marriage' is determined by scriptural injunction,—just like the character of the 'Fire-laying' rite; and, hence, a transgression of the injunction means the non-accomplishment of the Rite. In the case of Fire-laying, it is found that if there is omission of any subsidiary detail, the *Āhavanīya*' and other 'Fires' are not accomplished; similarly, a girl that belongs to the same '*gotra*' as a man can never become the 'wife' of that man. Hence it has been ordained that such a girl, even though she may have gone through the sacramental rites, shall be given up. Further, in connection with such marriages, Vashiṣṭha and other revered writers have prescribed specia lexpiratory rites. Even though, in reality, what such a marriage involves is only a discrepancy in the Rite caused by the transgression of one of the interdictions relating to a subsidiary detail,—and it does not involve any sin on the part of the man,—yet the Expiratory Rite has to be performed, in view of its being directly enjoined by the scriptures. Or, we may take it thus that what is prohibited is 'intercourse' with a girl of the same '*gotra*,' and the Expiatory Rite relates to the series of acts perpetrated by the man (in the form of the marriage-ceremonies.)

As regards the prohibition of marriage with girls belong-

ing to families that may have dropped the sacred rites and so forth,—it is based upon perceptible grounds; and, hence, when such girls are married, the 'marriage' is duly accomplished, the girl actually becomes the man's 'wife,' and she shall not be given up. It is in view of this fact that in verse 6, we have the laudatory epithet 'even though they be great,' which draws a line of distinction between the two sets of prohibitions. Such also is the custom among all cultured people: they do occasionally marry girls 'with tawny hair,' etc., but never one that belongs to the same *gotra*.—(11)

VERSE XII.

FOR 'TWICE-BORN MEN' A GIRL OF EQUAL CASTE HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR THE FIRST MARRIAGE-SACRAMENT. FOR THOSE, HOWEVER, WHO TAKE TO IT THROUGH MERE DESIRE, THESE (FOLLOWING) SHOULD BE REGARDED AS PREFERABLE IN DUE ORDER.—(12)

Bhāṣya.

In verse 4, we had the wrds 'the twice-born person should take a wife,' where the *wife* has been spoken of by means of a word ending in the Accusative, which makes the *wife* the *primary*, and the *marriage* the *secondary*, object; and yet the singular number (in 'wife') is meant to be duly significant; since it forms part of the predicate of the sentence; just as we have in the case of the assertion, 'he cuts the *sacrificial post*.' In the case of a thing whose character is determined and known from other sources,—if such a thing happens to be referred to in connection with the Injunction of some other act, it is always understood to be referred to exactly in the form in which it has been known; *e.g.*, in the case of the injunction, 'wash the cup;' and this for the simple reason that all 'references' are based upon what is previously known. Thus, in connection with the 'cups,' their *number* is already known from such statements as 'at the morning-extraction the Adhvaryu takes up *ten* cups;' their use also is already known from the statement, 'libations are poured with the

cups ;' hence, in the subsequent statement, 'wash the *cup*,' no significance is attached to the singular number in the word 'cup,'—this statement being construed in connection with what is already known about it. In the present instance, on the other hand, the thing concerned—the 'wife'—is one whose character has not been determined anywhere else ; in fact, it is only from the present text that we derive our knowledge of what the 'wife' is ; hence, we understand it exactly as it is here described ; so that due significance is to be attached to the number, just as much as to the basic noun itself. All this we shall discuss with detailed arguments under discourse V.

Thus then, due significance being attached to the (singular) number (in the word 'wife,' as used in verse 4),—if one happens to marry a second time, even though the marriage-rites might be duly performed, she does not become a 'wife;' just as when one *Āhavanīya* is already there, the second fire, even though duly kindled, does not become '*Āhavanīya*.' But, under certain circumstances, the taking of a second wife is considered desirable ; and it is in connection with this second marriage that we have the rules propounded in this and the following verses. It is in view of this that Gautama has said—'If one's wife is endowed with virtue and offspring, one should not take another ; in the event of failure on either of the two points, one may have another.'

'*Of equal caste*,'—*i.e.*, of the same caste.

'*For the first*,'—first of all ; *i.e.*, for one who has not taken a wife from a different caste ; '*has been recommended*.'

Having married a girl of his own caste, if the man finds that she does not inspire his love ; or if the act of child-begetting is not fulfilled,—then there comes about the man's desire for another wife ; and then *these*—going to be mentioned below—'*are to be regarded as preferable*'—superior—on the strength of the scriptures.

This, then, is an exception to the rule regarding having only *one* wife, as also to that of having a wife from one's own caste.

Objection :—"The restriction appears to be upon the taking of a second wife from one's own caste; as the plurality (of wives) does not appear to be sanctioned regarding girls of one's own caste."

Answer—All that the present text permits is the exceeding of the number 'one.' And, if what is sanctioned is the exceeding of it by means of marrying a girl of a different caste,—what is there that would prevent one's marrying (again) a second girl of his own caste? It is for this reason that what Gautama has declared applies equally to all—'if there is failure in regard to either of the two, one may take another wife.' In the following verse also we read, 'she and *one of his own caste*,' where also the second wife from one's own caste is permitted.—(12).

VERSE XIII.

FOR THE SHŪDRA, THE SHŪDRA GIRL ALONE HAS BEEN ORDAINED TO BE THE WIFE; FOR THE VAISHYA, SHE AS ALSO THE GIRL OF HIS OWN CASTE; FOR THE KṢATTRIYA, THOSE TWO AS ALSO THE GIRL OF HIS OWN CASTE; AND FOR THE BRAHMAṆA THOSE THREE AS ALSO THE GIRL OF HIS OWN CASTE—(13).

Bhāṣya.

There being a distinction of castes, 'one's own caste' constitutes the (upward) limit. Just as for the Brāhmaṇa, there are Kṣattriya and other wives, so it would seem as if for the Shūdra also there would be wives belonging to the lower orders of 'washer-woman and carpenter.' In order to preclude this possibility, the text lays down the restriction that the *Shūdra* can have a wife from his own caste only. A wife of the higher caste is precluded by the qualifying phrase, 'in due order,' in the preceding verse.

'*She*'—*i.e.*, the Shūdra woman—'*and girl of his own caste*'—*i.e.*, the Vaishya woman—'for the Vaishya.'

'*Those two*'—the Vaishya woman and the Shūdra woman,—'*and the girl of his own caste*'—'*for the Kṣattriya.*'

Similarly, '*for the Brāhmaṇa.*'

The right order would appear to be that the verse should begin with the '*Brāhmaṇa*;' but it begins with the '*Shūdra*,' which only goes to lend strength to the aforesaid notion (that a wife of the higher class is not permitted).

In this connection, it has been declared that 'what is meant by the text is that there should be *option* in order, and not a combination of all (the several kinds of wives).'—(13)

VERSE XIV.

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE WHATSOEVER HAS A SHŪDRA WIFE BEEN ORDAINED FOR THE BRAHMAṆA AND THE KṢATTRIYA,—EVEN THOUGH THESE BE PLACED IN PERIL.—(14)

Bhāṣya.

Even when the Shūdra girl is extremely handsome, and the *Brāhmaṇa* or *Kṣattriya* bridegroom is in the 'tenth stage' of his life,—he should never marry the Shūdra girl.

On this point, a descriptive phrase is added—'*under no circumstance whatsoever*'—*i.e.*, in no story at all—'*has been ordained*'—described.

'*In peril*'—Even in the greatest distress.

In the preceding verse, the *Shūdra* wife has been permitted, and here she is prohibited. Hence there should be option.

"Option is permissible only when there is possibility of the two courses being adopted at one and the same time, and both courses are equally sanctioned by scriptural injunctions; and it cannot be permitted when a course of action is open to one only under the influence of passion, while it is prohibited by scripture. In the case in question, the taking of a Shūdra wife is not sanctioned by scripture, it is possible only under the influence of passion; and all that the foregoing verse means is that the marriage of a Shūdra girl under the influence of passion is not entirely prohibited; hte prohibition, on the other hand (contained in the present

verse), is purely scriptural. Hence the conclusion is that the *Shūdra* girl should not be married at all. It is in view of this that Yājñavalkya (*Āchāra*, 56) has declared.—'It is said that twice-born persons may take Shūdra wives; but that is not my opinion.'"

Our answer to the above is as follows:—In all cases, option is admitted only in view of the likely futility of the injunction (of one or the other course of action). If the *Shūdra*-wife were absolutely prohibited, then the *Kṣattriya* and *Vaishya* girls alone would have been mentioned as permitted (to the Brāhmaṇa) in times of peril; and in that case, the counter-exception (mentioned in 13), as also the prohibition (contained in 14), would both be superfluous; as the marrying of the girl of one's own caste would have been already secured by the restrictive rule. Thus, then, since there is a clear incompatibility between the sanction (in 13) and the prohibition (in 14), the two should be regarded as optional alternatives.

"The presence of an option means that the agent may do what he likes; and, as the marrying of the Shūdra girl (if one wishes to do so) would be already secured by the counter-exception (in 13), there would be no need for putting forward the prohibition (in 14) [as the not-marrying of the Shūdra girl is already deduced from the general rule of marrying within one's own caste]."

But the marrying of the *Shūdra* girl has not been left entirely to the wish of the agent, in the way in which the marrying of *Kṣattriya* and *Vaishya* girls has been; in fact, it has not been permitted, except in times of very great distress.

From all this the following conclusion appears the right one to adopt:—The general rule regarding marrying a girl of one's own caste having already indicated, by implication, the impropriety of marrying girls of other castes,—that the Shūdra girl should have been prohibited again (in 14), already shows that the rule regarding not marrying girls of other

castes is not absolute; and since this rule is not absolute, it follows that in times of difficulty, or in the event of not finding a girl of his own caste, while the *Shūdra* girl shall never be married, those of the other two castes may be married.—(14).

VERSE XV.

TWICE-BORN MEN, MARRYING, THROUGH INFATUATION, A GIRL OF THE LOW CASTE, QUICKLY REDUCE THEIR FAMILIES, ALONG WITH THEIR OFFSPRING, TO THE POSITION OF THE SHŪDRA.—(15).

Bhāṣya.

This is a deprecatory exhortation, supplementing the foregoing prohibition.

'*Of the low caste*'—*i.e.*, of the Shūdra caste; the *Shūdra girl* being the subject of consideration; and further, because the statement ends with the assertion that the families along with offspring are reduced to the position *of the Shūdra.*

'*The twice-born men, through infatuation*'—*i.e.*, on account of folly arising from greed for wealth, or from lust, —'*reduce their families to the position of the Shūdra.*' That is, sons born of that wife become *Shūdras*, and so also grandsons and great-grandsons descended from them. Hence, it is added—'*along with their offspring*'—the term '*offspring*' standing for the line of descendants, consisting of sons, grandsons, &c.—(15).

VERSE XVI.

ONE WHO MARRIES A SHŪDRA GIRL BECOMES AN OUTCASTE,—ACCORDING TO ATRI AND TO THE SON OF UTATHYA; ACCORDING TO SHAUNAKA, BY THE BIRTH OF A SON; AND ACCORDING TO BHṚGU, BY HAVING CHILDREN FROM HER (ALONE).—(16).

Bhāṣya.

'*Shūdrāvēdī*' is one who acquires—*i. e.*, marries—a *Shūdra* girl.

'*Becomes an outcaste*'—*i.e.*, as good as an outcaste.

Such is the opinion of Atri, and of Utathya's son. The authorities have been mentioned with a view to inspire respect.

The first half of the verse is supplementary to the prohibition contained in the preceding verse.

'*According to Shaunaka, by the birth of a child.*' This is an entirely different rule. It presumes that marriage with a Shūdra girl is permitted, and then prohibits intercourse with her during her 'courses': 'birth of a son' is possible only by having intercourse on the even days of the woman's period. Thus the meaning is that 'one should not have intercourse with his Shūdra wife during her courses.'

'*According to Bhṛgu, by having children from her.*' This also is a distinct rule by itself. '*Tadapatya*' is one who has only such children as are born of his *Shūdra* wife; and the character of such a man is called '*tadapatyatā*.' This is the opinion of *Bhṛgu*; which means that 'after one has begotten children from wives of the more respectable castes, he may have intercourse with the Shūdra wife.'

The mention of 'outcaste' here is only meant to indicate degradation; it does not mean that the man is to be actually treated as an 'outcaste,' as described under 11.182. All this we shall explain later on.—(16).

VERSE XVII.

HAVING PLACED A SHŪDRĀ WOMAN ON HIS BED, THE BRÂHMAṆA GOES TO PERDITION; AND HAVING BEGOTTEN A SON BY HER, HE FALLS FROM BRAHMAṆAHOOD ITSELF.—(17).

Bhāṣya.

This is a laudatory exaggeration.

If on the Shūdra wife he begets a son, *he falls from Brahmaṇahood itself*, *i.e.*, the son becomes a non-Brāhmaṇa. This also is a deprecatory exaggeration.

'*Son*'—is in the masculine gender. So that (in the preceding verse also) the term '*begetting of children*,' '*sutotpattyā*,' should be taken to refer to the *male* child; even though in the compound the word can be taken both ways—either as '*sutā*' in the Feminine, or as '*suta*' in the Masculine. It is with this view that we have pointed

out above that what is prohibited is intercourse with the woman on the even days of her 'period' (as it is only by intercourse on those days that a male child is born).—(17).

VERSE XVIII.

IF THE RITES PERFORMED BY ONE IN HONOUR OF DEITIES, PITṚS AND GUESTS ARE DOMINATED BY HER (HIS SHŪDRA WIFE), THEN THE PITṚS AND THE GODS DO NOT EAT OF THEM; AND THE MAN DOES NOT GO TO HEAVEN.—(18)

Bhāṣya.

This prohibition pertains to all times.

Even if a Shūdra girl happens to be married, the rites, herein mentioned, should not be performed in a manner by which she might dominate them. That is to say, the Shūdra wife is not entitled to participate in the husband's religious acts, in the manner in which wives of the three higher castes are.

Since she is a 'wife,' it might be thought that she is so entitled; and it is in view of the possibility of such notion being entertained that we have the present prohibition. The meaning thus is that when one is going to spend his wealth over some religious act, he need not seek her consent, in the way he seeks that of his wives of the twice-born castes; in other cases, however—such as the expenses incurred for seeking prosperity and obtaining pleasure,—she is not to be disregarded. That she should be employed, like a servant, during the performance of *Shrāddha*, &c., is not prohibited; *e.g.*, there would be no harm if she were to thresh corn and so forth; but she should not be made to serve food and do such other acts.

'*Rites in honour of deities*' are (1) the *Dasha-pūrṇamāsa* and other sacrifices, and (2) the feeding of Brāhmaṇas in honour of Deities, as already explained by us under 2.189.

'*Rites in honour of Pitṛs*'—*i.e.*, Shrāddhas and offering of water-libations.

'*Rites in honour of guests*'—*i.e.*, the reception and feeding of guests, and offering them water for washing their feet, and so forth.

"The prohibition here put forth is already implied by the rule that wives of one's own caste should not be superseded by other wives."

Not so; because the rule speaks of the wife of the same caste being actually present. Hence people might be led to argue as follows—"If the wife of the Brāhmaṇa's own caste happens to be in her courses, or absent, then his Shūdra wife may preside over the rites, just like his *Kṣattriya* and *Vaishya* wives; further, the prohibition contained in the rule referred to pertains, not to her title to preside, but simply to the act of examining the clarified butter and so forth, which are done by the wife in accordance with the rule that the clarified butter used at sacrifices should be such as has been examined by the wife; and, as the rule simply mentions the general name 'wife,' it may be taken to mean that the act may be done by any wife that has been obtained."

And it is with a view to prevent this being done,—and of wives of different castes doing the said acts in the same way in which they are done by any one wife from among several wives of the same caste,—that we have the present prohibition.

The '*domination*,' by the wife is due to her being entitled to the act.

'*The deities and the Pitṛs do not eat of it*;'—this means that the acts become futile.

'*He does not go to heaven*;'—*i.e.*, if the guest takes food, the householder fails to attain Heaven, which he would attain as the result of his having fed his guests. '*Heaven*' here stands for all those rewards that have been described as proceeding from the 'honouring of guests,' and it is a reference to all that has been said under 3. 106.—(18).

VERSE XIX.

THERE IS NO EXPIATION FOR HIM WHO HAS DRUNK THE MOISTURE OF THE MOUTH OF A SHŪDRA WOMAN, WHO HAS BEEN TAINTED BY HER BREATH, AND WHO HAS BEGOTTEN CHILDREN ON HER.—(19).

Bhāṣya.

This is an exaggerated exhortation.

'*Vṛṣalīphēna*' is the moisture of her mouth ; he by whom this has been drunk is '*vṛṣalīphēnapīta* ;'—the past participial adjective '*pīta*' being put last by the analogy of such compounds as '*palāṇḍubhakṣita*,' and so forth.

If we adopt the other reading '*vṛṣalīpītaphēnasya*,' then the compound '*pītaphēnaḥ*' is to be expounded as '*pītaḥ pheno yasya* ;' and this, with the term '*vṛṣalī*' taken as an Instrumental *Tatpuruṣa*,—according to Pāṇini 2. 1. 30. (the sense being 'the moisture of whose mouth has been drunk by a *Shūdra* woman). Or, '*pītaphēna*,' expounded as above, might be taken as forming a *Genetive Tatpuruṣa* with '*vṛṣalī*.'

The meaning is the same in all cases. When the husband and wife lie together, the touching of their lips, etc., are inevitable. Hence, what the word of the text indicates is *sexual intercourse*, by mentioning something that is concomitant with it.

From the context it is clear that this verse is supplementary to the foregoing prohibition, and it is not an independent assertion. If it were an independent assertion, we should have the prohibition of *kissing* only, and the other forms of intercourse would become sanctioned ; so that, by having intercourse with a *Shūdra* woman, only if one avoids *kissing*, he would not be transgressing any scriptural injunction.

'*Who has begotten children on her*'—*i.e.*, who has had intercourse with her during her 'courses.'

'*Expiation*'—purification there is none. This indicates a high degree of deprecation.—(19).

SECTION (4)—THE EIGHT FORMS OF MARRIAGE.

VERSE XX.

UNDERSTAND BRIEFLY THESE (FOLLOWING) EIGHT FORMS OF MARRIAGE OF GIRLS, AMONG THE FOUR CASTES,—WHICH ARE BENEFICIAL AND NOT-BENEFICIAL HERE (IN THIS LIFE) AND ALSO AFTER DEATH.—(20)

Bhāṣya.

This is a brief re-capitulation of what is going to be described in detail.

'*Beneficial and not-beneficial*'—Some marriages are beneficial, while others are not so.

'*Eight*'—this mentions the number.

'*Marriage of girls*'—*i.e.*, marriage which serves as the sacramental rite for girls.

"What is it that is called *Marriage*?"

It is the name given to a sacramental rite performed for the girl, obtained by certain means, which serves to make her a wife.

A girl having been obtained by certain means, one performs for her, for the purpose of making her a *wife*, a sacramental rite, which ends with the seeing of the constellation of Ursa Major, and is marked by the holding of hands; and it is this rite, along with its entire procedure and subsidiary details, that is called 'Marriage.'—(20).

VERSE XXI.

(1) THE BRĀHMA, (2) THE DAIVA, (3) THE ĀRṢA, (4) the PRĀJĀPATYA, (5) THE ĀSURA, (6) THE GĀNDHARVA, (7) THE RĀKṢASA AND (8) THE PAISHĀCHA, WHICH IS THE EIGHTH AND THE LOWEST.—(21)

Bhāṣya.

These are the names of the eight forms of Marriage that were referred to in the preceding verse by the number 'eight.'

'*Lowest*'— this has been added with a view to deprecate the Paishācha form of marriage.—(21)

VERSE XXII.

WHICH (OF THESE) IS LAWFUL FOR WHICH CASTE, WHAT ARE THE GOOD AND BAD POINTS OF EACH, THE GOOD AND BAD EFFECTS OF EACH UPON THE OFFSPRING,—ALL THIS I SHALL EXPLAIN TO YOU.—(22)

Bhāṣya.

'*Lawful*'—that which is not fallen from the law; *i.e.*, prescribed by the scriptures.

'*What are the good and bad points of each form*'—*i.e.*, which points in each are conducive to desirable and which to undesirable results.

'*Offspring*'—*i.e.*, in the birth of children.

'*Good effects*'—good qualities. '*Bad effects*'—defects. In reality, the 'good and bad effects,' in the form of Heaven and Hell, pertain to the bridegroom ; but here they stand for that which brings about these effects.

Though this is already implied in what has gone before (in the first line), yet it is mentioned again for the purpose of making the idea clearer.—(22)

VERSE XXIII.

ONE SHOULD KNOW THE FIRST SIX IN THE ORDER STATED AS LAWFUL FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA, THE LAST FOUR FOR THE KṢATTRIYA AND THOSE SAME, EXCEPTING THE "RĀKṢASA," FOR THE VAISHYA AND THE SHUDRA.—(23).

Bhāṣya.

The first six forms of marriages, in the order in which they have been named above, are lawful for the Brāhmaṇa.

The term '*Kṣattra*' stands for the *Kṣattriya*. For him '*the last four;*' *i.e.*, the '*Āsura*,' the '*Gāndharva*,' the '*Rākṣasa*,' and the *Paishācha*.'

For the *Vaishya* and the *Shūdra*, '*those same, excepting the Rākṣasa*,' *i.e.*, leaving off the '*Rākṣasa*' form.—(23)

VERSE XXIV.

THE WISE ONES HAVE REGARDED THE FIRST FOUR AS COMMENDED FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA, THE RĀKṢASA ALONE FOR THE KṢATTRIYA AND THE ASURA FOR THE VAISHYA AND THE SHUDRA.—(24).

Bhāṣya.

The further recommendation of the '*Brāhma*' and other three forms for the Brāhmaṇa, means that the '*Āsura*' and the '*Gāndharva*' are prohibited for him.

Similarly, for the *Kṣattriya*, it is the '*Rākṣasa*' alone, not the '*Āsura*' and the '*Gāndharva.*'

For the *Vaishya* and the *Shūdra*, it is the '*Āsura*' alone.

Among those that have been sanctioned (before) and prohibited now, there is to be option; so that one may have recourse to the optional forms only when those that have been sanctioned absolutely in all cases are not possible. If a man were to have recourse to those forms of marriage that have been sanctioned in one place and interdicted in another, without considering the possibility or otherwise of those that are absolutely sanctioned,—he would be committing a wrong, and his offspring would be defective;—this is what the law-giver has indicated under verse 23 above by the phrase, 'the good and bad effects upon the offspring.' But such an act would not nullify the marriage itself in the way in which the fact of the bride being the bridegroom's '*sapiṇḍa*' does. —(24)

VERSE XXV.

OF THE FIVE, THREE HAVE BEEN DECLARED TO BE LAWFUL AND TWO UNLAWFUL, IN THIS TREATISE; THE PAISHĀCHA AND THE ĀSURA FORMS SHOULD NEVER BE ADOPTED.'—(25)

Bhāṣya.

The law laid down in this verse pertains to the *Kṣattriya* and the rest, not to the Brāhmaṇa; for if it referred to the latter, there would be an inconsistency regarding the '*Rākṣasa*' forms; as the Brāhmaṇa can never do the 'killing and wounding' (which are inevitable in that form), which acts are possible only for the *Kṣattriya* and others.

'*Of the five*'—Forms of marriage, beginning with the '*Prājāpatya*'—three are lawful, and two—*i.e.*, the *Paishācha* and the *Āsura*—should never be adopted.

Though the '*Prājāpatya*' has not been mentioned in connection with the *Kṣattriya* and others, yet it is here specially enjoined for them ; so also the '*Rākṣasa*' for the *Vaishya* and the *Shūdra*. It is the *Āsura* and the *Paishācha* that are interdicted.

The conclusion on this point is as follows :—For the Brāhmaṇa there are six forms of marriage ; of these the '*Brāhma*' is the best of all ; inferior to that are the '*Daiva*' and the '*Prājāpatya* ;' inferior to these is the *Ārṣa*, then the '*Gāndharva*,' then the '*Āsura*.'

There are some people who regard this verse as pertaining to the Brāhmaṇa also. According to these, the '*Rākṣasa*' form is permissible for that Brāhmaṇa who may have adopted the profession of the *Kṣattriya*. They argue that, even though the Brâhmaṇa may have abandoned his own functions and taken to those of other castes, if they do some 'killing and wounding' in connection with marriage, he may become liable to the performance of expiatory rites for doing those acts ; but that would not deprive the 'Rākṣasa marriage' of the character of 'marriage.'

That the '*Brāhma*' is the best form of marriage has been shown by its results (described in versus 37, *et seq*.). As for the other three, though they have not been interdicted under any circumstances, yet their inferiority is deduced from the fact that the results following from them are of an inferior type. As regards the '*Āsura*' form, since it has been specifically prescribed for the *Vaishya* and the *Shūdra*, it implies the exclusion of the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kṣattriya* from it. And yet we have the distinct injunction of six forms as permitted for the Brāhmaṇa (in 23 above). From all which it follows that there is option ; but it is an option with the restriction that one is to have recourse to the second option only in the event of the first option being impossible. Fur-

ther, that an option is intended, is clearly established by the fact that several forms of marriage are permitted, and yet a combination of all is impossible; just as, in the case of *Vrīhi* and *Yava*, we admit an option, because both are sanctioned, and yet they cannot be combined. Thus, then, when other forms are possible, if one were to adopt the '*Āsura*' form, its results, in regard to spiritual merit and the character of the offspring, would be inferior.

As regards the *Kṣattriya*, the '*Rākṣasa*' form is the best; as it had been enjoined absolutely without any option by all the four verses. Verse 23 permits four forms for the *Kṣattriya*, which means that the '*Āsura*,' the '*Gāndharva*,' and the '*Paishācha*' also are permitted; while those latter have been interdicted by the assertion that the Rākṣasa alone is for the '*Kṣattriya*,' (24). Hence it follows that these latter forms are *optional*, not primary. In consideration of the context, it is clear that the injunction is for the '*Rākṣasa*' form only. But, since there is no definite exclusion of the '*Prājāpatya*' form, this latter also is equal to the '*Rākṣasa*,' for the *Kṣattriya*.

Similarly, for the *Vaishya* and the *Shūdra* also, the '*Prājāpatya*,' which has been mentioned as permitted in all cases, is not prohibited. The '*Āsura*' and the '*Paishācha*' are both 'permitted' and 'prohibited' for them; the '*Rākṣasa*' also has been interdicted by the phrase, '*excepting the Rākṣasa*' (23), while it is permitted by the assertion that 'three are lawful' (25).

It is for the *Brāhmaṇa* only that the '*Paishācha*' is not permitted, and for the *Kṣattriya* and the rest, the '*Brāhma*,' the '*Daiva*' and the '*Ārṣa*' are not permitted at all.—(25)

VERSE XXVI.

THE TWO FORMS OF MARRIAGE MENTIONED BEFORE—*i.e.*, THE GĀNDHARVA AND THE RĀKṢASA—HAVE BEEN DECLARED, WHETHER SEPARATELY OR MIXED, TO BE LAWFUL FOR THE KṢATTRIYA.—(26)

Bhāṣya.

'*Singly*'— this is a mere re-iteration, each single form

having been already prescribed in the foregoing verses. The 'mixed' form is what is prescribed here; where the '*Gāndharva-Rākṣasa*' are prescribed independently of (apart from) the other forms. The notion derived from what has gone before being that each form stands apart by itself, just like the *Vrīhi* being used apart from the *Yava*,—the present verse lays down the combination (of two). When we have two such texts as 'offer the *Vrīhi*' and 'offer the *Yava*,' each of which prescribes a substance to be used at a sacrifice independently of the other,—we conclude that the two are meant to be optional alternatives, and they are not meant to be mixed up; because, if the mixture of both were used, we would be obeying neither the injunction of *Yava*, nor that of *Vrīhi*. Similarly, in the present case, when only one girl is to be married, it being impossible to adopt any two forms of marriage, the present text proceeds to prescribe the combination of two of them.

Such a combination of the said two forms would be possible under the following circumstances :—A girl living in her father's house, happens to see a boy living in the same house and having heard praises from messengers, falls in love with him, but not being mistress of herself she cannot meet him,—and then she enters into a compact with her lover, requests him to take her away by some means or other, and gets herself carried away; and the bridegroom, being possessed of great strength, carries her away after having 'killed and wounded' (her guardians): Now in this case, since there is 'voluntary union between the two' (verse 32), it fulfils the conditions of the '*Gāndharva*' form; while, since he has carried her away, after 'having killed and wounded' (verse 33), the conditions of the '*Rākṣasa*' form also become fulfilled.

These two forms are possible for the *Kṣattriya* only. *These two are lawful for the Kṣattriya* — says the Text.

Mentioned before — is a mere reiterative reference.

Others have offered the following explanation :—When

a *Kṣattriya* marries several girls, he marries one by the '*Gāndharva*' form, and another by the '*Rākṣasa*' form;—and this is the '*mixed form*' meant by the text. And when all are married by one or the other of these two forms, it is a case of '*separately*' mentioned by the text. And from this we gather that it is only these two forms of marriage that the *Kṣattriya* might adopt promiscuously—sometimes the one and sometimes the other; while in the case of the '*Prājāpatya*' and the rest, he should adopt the same form in all his marriages which he happens to adopt in the first.—(26)

VERSE XXVII.

WHEN ONE HIMSELF INVITES A MAN ENDOWED WITH LEARNING AND CHARACTER AND GIVES TO HIM HIS DAUGHTER, AFTER HAVING DRESSED AND WORSHIPPED (THEM),—THIS IS CALLED THE "BRĀHMA" FORM.—(27)

Bhāṣya.

The author now describes the exact nature of the several forms of marriage.

'*After having dressed.*'—What is meant is a particular form of dressing, ordinary dressing being absolutely necessary (and hence implying no special regard). Hence the meaning is—'After having dressed with nice and suitable clothes, such as might be available at the place.'

'*Having worshipped*;'—*i.e.*, having done worship with bracelets, armlets and other ornaments, and also special modes of honouring, indicative of great affection.

There is nothing to indicate the connection of the 'dressing' and 'worshipping' with either the bride only or with the bridegroom only; hence they should be taken as relating to both.

'*Endowed with learning and character.*'—This implies also the other qualifications of the bridegroom, mentioned in other law-books: such as 'intelligent, loved by the people, having his virility carefully tested' (Yājñavalkya, *Āchāra*, 55).

'*Himself*;'—*i.e.*, not previously requested by him.

'*Invites*' him;—*i.e.*, gets the bridegroom to come, by sending his own man.

This giving away of the daughter is the '*Brāhma form*' of marriage. Though the term 'form' is a general one, yet, in consideration of the context, it has to be taken as standing for *marriage*.

The upshot of this definition comes to be that 'when a man obtains a wife without asking for it, and with due honour, it is the *Brāhma* form of *marriage*.'

"The definition provided in the text cannot be right; as, in reality, 'marriage' is for the purpose of accepting a wife [so that the mere 'giving' by the father cannot be *marriage*.]"

The 'giving' spoken of in the text is meant to extend right up to the end of the marriage-ceremony; in fact, until the marriage has been performed, the 'giving' is not complete; it is at the time of 'marriage' that there is 'acceptance' of the girl by the bridegroom; and until this *acceptance*, the 'gift' is not complete. Specially, 'giving' here does not consist merely in the renouncing of one's proprietary right; it extends up to the creating of the proprietary right of another person (the recipient). It is in view of this that the author is going to declare later on—'the learned should regard the seventh step as the final stage of the marriage' (5. 152). Thus, then, it is at the time of marriage that the maiden should be given away; it is for this reason that the author of the *Gṛhyasūtra* has laid down the rites in connection with the *Brāhma* marriage as to be performed at the time of the marriage itself.

As for the 'giving' before the marriage, this is merely a verbal compact; and if no such compact has been entered into, it is just possible that at the desired time the marriage may not be actually performed; for in the absence of formal agreement, the father of the bride may not give her, or the bridegroom may not accept her. Hence it is necessary

that before the actual marriage, a regular contract should be entered into, in some such form, 'she is to be given by you and accepted by me.' [Just as an internal sacrifice becomes naturally excluded when it is deficient in some essential factor and does not fulfil the conditions of the injunction. ?]

Some people argue as follows :—"When the cow and such other things are given away for the purpose of obtaining a transcendental result, the *giving* is accomplished merely by the recepient accepting it with the proper texts and the same should be the case with all acts of *giving.* So that, in the case in question also, marrying occupying the same position as *accepting,* 'marriage' should be regarded as synonymous with *acceptance* ; and the act of *accepting* consists in *making the thing one's own* ; as says the revered Pāṇini in Sū. 1. 3. 56—'The root *yama* with the prefix *upa* in the sense of *making one's own* takes the Ātmanēpada.' From this it is clear that marriage is done only for the purpose of *receiving the maiden.*"

This, however, is not right. In fact, the 'marriage' is of the maiden that has been *accepted,* and it is for the purpose of making her a *wife.* The Injunction bearing upon marriage is not in the form that—'one should *accept* the maiden by means of this rite ;' nor are the sacred texts recited at marriage such as signify the act of *accepting* ; as is the case with such *mantras* as—'*dēvasya tvā pratigṛhṇāmi, etc.*'

As for what has been said regarding the sense of *making one's own,* such a sense is not incompatible with our view. The act of 'marrying' also is of the nature of *making one's own.* The act of 'giving' only brings about the ownership of the recipient ; and the act of 'marrying' creates a particular form of ownership. Further, the wife is not a 'property' in the same sense that the cow and other things are ; the latter are 'property' in the sense that they may be used in any way one likes, while the maiden married by one can be used only as 'wife ;' so that the relation between husband and

wife is of that of a peculiar kind of ownership; as will be shown later on, under 5. 152.—(27).

VERSE XXVIII.

WHILE A SACRIFICE IS BEING PERFORMED, IF ONE GIVES AWAY HIS DAUGHTER, AFTER HAVING DECKED HER, TO THE PRIEST WHO IS OFFICIATING AT IT,—THIS THEY CALL THE "DAIVA" FORM.—(28).

Bhāṣya.

'*Being performed*;'—*i.e.*, when a sacrifice, such as the Jyotiṣṭoma and the like, has been commenced; if one gives away his daughter to the '*priest*'—the Adhvaryu—'*who is officiating*'—working—'*at it*;'—'after having *decked her*;'—this is a mere re-iteration; this forming an essential condition in every form of giving one's girl in marriage; that 'one should give the girl in marriage after having decked her' being a general injunction.

"The cow, the house, the mule and other things have been mentioned as the fee for priests, the giving of the daughter has not been found laid down anywhere as helping in the fulfilment of sacrificial performances."

What has 'helping in the fulfilment of sacrificial performances' got to do with the subject under consideration? All that is meant is that, when a sacrifice has begun to be performed, if one gives his daughter to the priest, this constitutes the '*Daiva*' form of marriage.

In this case, there is some slight return made by the bridegroom in the form of services rendered in connection with the sacrifice. Even though the daughter is not given in consideration of any sacrificial services rendered, yet when she is given to him while he is engaged in a certain act, it does give rise to the inference (that she has been given as a reward for those services). And it is in view of this fact that the '*Daiva*' form has been regarded as inferior to the '*Brāhma*' form (in which latter, there is not the slightest suspicion of any kind of return).—(28).

VERSE XXIX.

'WHEN THE MAIDEN IS GIVEN AWAY IN DUE ACCORDANCE WITH RULE, AFTER TAKING, IN OBEDIENCE TO LAW, FROM THE BRIDEGROOM, ONE OR TWO PAIRS OF COW AND BULL,—THIS IS CALLED THE "ĀRṢA" FORM.'—(29).

Bhāṣya.

"*Pair;*"—*i.e.*, the cow (female) and the bull (male).—'*one or two*,'—'*after taking*'—receiving—'*from the bridegroom*,'—*when the maiden is given away*,'—this is the '*Ārṣa*' form.

'*In obedience to law*;'—*i.e.*, with the idea that such receiving is sanctioned by law, and not with the idea of receiving it in exchange for (price for) the girl. The sense is that what is received cannot be regarded as the *price*; as there is no possibility of any higher or lower demand being made (as there would be if it were a question of *price*).—(29)

VERSE XXX.

WHEN THE FATHER, HAVING DECKED THEM, GIVES AWAY THE DAUGHTER WITH THE WORDS, "MAY YOU BOTH TOGETHER PERFORM YOUR DUTY," MAKING THEM ALSO REPEAT THEM,—THIS IS CALLED THE "PRĀJĀPATYA" FORM.—(30).

Bhāṣya.

The '*Prājāpatya*' form of marriage is that in which the girl is given away on the clear undertaking having been taken in so many words that "you both together shall duly fulfil your duties."

'*Duty*' has been mentioned only by way of illustration; the undertaking refers to '*duty*,' '*property*' and '*pleasure*' also; as, in all these three, the interests of the husband and the wife are common. In reality, what is actually uttered is the word duty' only, the expression used being 'may duty be performed by you both,' and not that 'may duty, property and pleasure be accomplished;' but, in consideration of what has been

said in other law-books, the term '*duty*' in the said expression has been explained as standing for 'property' and 'pleasure' also. Hence the conclusion is that the expression 'may duty be performed by you both together' is to be pronounced at the time that the girl is being given away to the person upon whom the condition has been imposed that 'this girl is to be given to you only if you fulfil your duty, property and pleasure along with her,' and who has accepted the condition at the time of marriage. Thus, then, even though 'property' and 'pleasure' also are meant to be included, yet they are not actually mentioned, because they are not of sufficient importance. Says Gautama (4. 7)—'In the Prājāpatya form of marriage, the mantra used is *may you together perform your duty*;' and the use of the term '*mantras*' clearly shows that the words to be used should be precisely as they are laid down here, just as in the case of *mantra-texts*. Further, in the case of very powerful men, it would not be right to make it a condition that the wife shall partake of all their properties and pleasures; and yet that these also are meant we learn from other law-books.

This form of marriage is inferior to the preceding ones only by reason of this condition being imposed; as this shows that there is a desire on the part of the giver for some sort of return from the recipient.

The bridegroom also is made to repeat in his words the condition that he accepts; and the exact form laid down is not for the giver only. For 'having made to repeat' would have been enough if only one of them were to say it, the phrase, '*with the words*,' would have been superfluous; the act of *repeating* being always by means of words only. Says the author of the *Gṛhyasūtra*—'Having said *this is true for you*, he should make the bridegroom say *this is true for us*.' In fact, the prefix in '*anubhāṣya*' ('having made to repeat') clearly indicates the *confirmation* of what has been said before.—(30).

VERSE XXXI.

WHEN ONE CARRIES AWAY THE MAIDEN, AFTER HAVING GIVEN, OF HIS OWN WILL, AS MUCH WEALTH AS THE CAN TO THE KINSMEN, AS WELL AS TO THE BRIDE HERSELF, THIS IS CALLED THE "ĀSURA" FORM.—(31).

Bhāṣya.

'*Kinsmen.*'— the father and other relations of the bride.

'*As well as to the bride*;'—*i.e.*, by way of 'dowry.'

The compound '*Kanyāpradāna*' is to be expounded as '*Kanyāyāḥ āpradānam*'—the meaning being 'the carrying away of the maiden.' This constitutes the '*Āsura*' form of marriage.

Of his own will;—*i.e.*, in any manner he may chose; not according to rules laid down in the scriptures. This is what distinguishes this from the '*Ārṣa*' form. In the latter, the scripture restricts the gift to 'a cow and a bull' only; while in the present case, the '*wish*' of the giver shall depend upon the beauty, the character and such other qualities of the bride.—(31).

VERSE XXXII.

THE MUTUAL UNION OF THE BRIDE AND BRIDEGROOM, THROUGH LOVE IS TO BE KNOWN AS THE "GĀNDHARVA" FORM; IT HAS SEXUAL INTERCOURSE FOR ITS END AND IT HAS ITS SOURCE IN LUST. —(32).

Bhāṣya.

The '*union*'—coming together at one place—'*of the bride and bridegroom, through love*'—through mutual longing.

In deprecation of this form of marriage it is added—'*It has sexual intercourse for its end*'—it serves the purpose of sexual intercourse only. This is made clearer by the next clause—'*it has its source in lust*;'—'*source*' is that from which a thing springs; and it is from lust that this union springs.—(32).

VERSE XXXIII.

THE FORCIBLE ABDUCTION OF THE MAIDEN FROM HER HOME, WHILE SHE IS CRYING OUT AND WEEPING, AFTER HAVING BEATEN AND WOUNDED AND PIERCED,—IS CALLED THE "RĀKṢASA" FORM. (33).

Bhāṣya.

'*Forcibly*;'—*i.e.*, having subdued the guardians of the girl, if one carries her away by force, this is called the '*Rākṣasa*' form. This is all that is meant to be stated here. '*Having beaten,*' etc., is a mere descriptive re-iteration; for it is always understood that, while the bridegroom is forcibly taking away the girl, if some one seeks to stop him, he shall beat them and do the rest of it. But if, knowing the great strength of the abductor, her guardians, through fear, let her go,—then also it is a Rākṣasa form of marriage; and it is not a necessary condition of this form that the *beating, etc.*, must be done.

'*Having beaten*'—by means of sticks, etc.

'*Wounded*'—cutting limbs by strokes of the sword and other weapons.

'*Pierced*'—walls and forts.

'*Crying out and weeping*;'—*i.e.*, unwilling girl. This is what distinguishes this from the '*Gāndharva*' form. '*Crying out*' stands for such loud wailings as—'there is none to protect me, I am being taken away, save me,' and so forth; while '*weeping*' stands for shedding tears, which is the characteristic of all frightened women.—(33).

VERSE XXXIV.

WHEN THE MAN APPROACHES THE GIRL BY STEALTH, WHILE SHE IS ASLEEP, OR INTOXICATED OR UNCONSCIOUS,—IT IS THE "PAISHĀCHA" FORM, THE WICKEDEST AND THE BASEST OF MARRIAGES.—(34).

Bhāṣya.

The unwillingness of the girl is the condition common to the '*Rākṣasa*' and the '*Paishācha*' forms; the difference

is that in the former there is *beating*, while in the latter there is *stealth*.

'*Asleep*'—overpowered by sleep.

'*Intoxicated*'—senseless, under the influence of wine, &c.

'*Unconscious*'—who has lost consciousness on account of the disorders of the wind-humour.

'*By stealth*'—not openly.

'*Approaches*'—has sexual intercourse with.

This is the Paishācha marriage, of all marriages the '*wickedest*'—the most sinful. That is to say, the issue of such a marriage does not become the *rightful* child.

In connection with this subject, some people think that the '*Gāndharva*' form of marriage is accomplished by mere 'intercourse,' the '*Rākṣasa*' by mere 'abduction' and the '*Paishācha*' by mere 'approach,'—irrespective of the sacramental rites relating to the 'taking of the hand' and the rest. And they base this idea upon the fact that all these three are mentioned in apposition to 'marriage' which forms the subject-matter of the context.

But, according to these people, in the '*Brāhma*' and other forms also, since the 'giving' is mentioned in apposition to 'marriage,' the sacramental rites would cease (to be necessary factors in the marriage). But we have shown above, how these rites cannot be omitted. The fact of the matter is that it is only figuratively that the term 'marriage' has been applied to that act of '*giving*' which is done for the purpose of 'marriage.'

As regards the '*Gāndharva*' form, the revered Kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyana has described it, in connection with the union of Duṣyanta and Shakuntalā, as being 'without fire and without sacred texts;' and this shows that there are certain sacramental rites of 'taking the hand,' etc., but they are done without sacred texts etc.

As regards the '*Paishācha*' form, there is a difference of opinion:—In this form (it is argued) 'approaching' is the prime factor; but that does not deprive the girl of her

'maidenhood;' as this can be put an end to only by the sacramental rites attendant upon marriage; so that the girl still continuing to be a 'maiden,' the prohibition of rites in connection with 'non-maidens'—which we find in the statement that 'the sacred texts relating to marriage are restricted to *maidens only*' (8. 226)—does not apply to this form of marriage; and hence its connection with the sacramental rites remains undisturbed. The prohibition just referred to is for the purpose of precluding the sacramental rites (from the case of non-maidens); while the girl married by the '*Paishācha*' form has her maidenhood destroyed only when she has gone through the rites. Thus, then, even though the 'approaching' may take place first, yet the taint of 'non-maiden-hood' does not apply to her. It is only in accordance with this view that Karṇa can be called 'maiden-born;' for if mere intercourse with man were to deprive the girl of her maidenhood, how could we have such a statement as 'the son born of a maiden is called *maiden-born*.' If, on the other hand, the name 'maiden' be applied only to such girls as have not had the sacramental rites performed for them, then the said statement would be all right, Karṇa and others of his kind being sons of *unmarried* girls. It is only if 'approaching' be the prime factor that it is possible for a child being born from a 'maiden.' In fact, we find in stories the description of the 'marriage' of girls who had been previously 'approached' by the 'Paishācha' form.

It might be asked—"when sexual intercourse has been already accomplished with the help of intoxicants, etc., what would be the use of the sacramental rites?"

The answer to this is as follows:—Though the act of copulation has been accomplished, and the man has transgressed the prohibition of intercourse with a 'maiden,' yet the performance of the rites is necessary,—firstly, for the purpose of making her entitled to share in the religious acts of her husband, and, secondly, for the purpose of avoiding the sin of repeating the act of having intercourse with a 'maiden.' This form of

marriage is thus deprecated by reason of its involving a transgression of the prohibition of having intercourse with a maiden, and also because it subserves the purely physical purposes of the man (and not any religious purpose).

The above view, however, is not right; because, in ordinary parlance, the term 'maiden' denotes the girl who has had no intercourse with man, and not one for whom the sacramental rites have not been performed. In fact, even though her sacramental rites have not been performed, if a girl happens to have sexual intercourse with man, she ceases to be regarded as a 'maiden;' and when such girls have taken to the profession of prostitutes, intercourse with them does not involve the sin of having intercourse with a 'maiden.' It is true that the words 'virgin' and 'maiden' have been regarded as referring to a female in the earlier years of her age; but, in connection with rules relating to marriage, they are always used in the sense of one who has had no intercourse with man. It is for this reason that when a man is found to be seeking marriage with a girl who maintains the appearance of a virgin, and does not openly go in for sexual intercourse,—he is warned by people with such words as—'she is no longer a virgin, her virginhood has been destroyed.'

Further, in the case of marrying such a girl, there would be a serious deficiency in the sacramental rites themselves. *E.g.*, the rite of 'conception' has to be done with sacred texts, such as '*Viṣṇuryoniṅkalpayatu, etc.* (Ṛgveda, 10. 184. 1),—which means 'May Viṣṇu generate upon your generative organ;' and there can be no 'generation' (by Viṣṇu) of what has already been 'generated' (by another man); so that the use of the sacred text in this case would be meaningless. Nor could any such text be used when an unmarried girl would be 'approached' in the '*Paishācha*' form; as it has been definitely declared that it is to be used only in the case of 'married' girls. Nor would it be right to hold that the 'generation (spoken of in the said text) refers to the

case of marriages other than the '*Paishācha* ;' for the use of the text has been prescribed without any restriction at all.

The above and several other difficulties crop up if 'approaching' is regarded as the principal factor. The term '*Upagamana*,' 'approach,' then, should be taken as standing for the acts of embracing, kissing and such other concomitants of actual 'intercourse;'—such use of the term being due to the fact that the said acts are concomitants of, and lead up to, the act of 'intercourse.' As regards the expression, 'the maiden-born son,' inasmuch as the direct meaning of the term 'maiden' is not applicable, it is taken in its indirect meaning of 'one who has not gone through the sacramental rites.' As for the case where the sacramental rites are performed even after 'intercourse,' such cases are very rare. Then, as regards the statement—'when the sacrament is performed for a pregnant girl, with or without the knowledge of her being so, etc.' (9. 173),—this refers to cases where the person performing the sacramental rites is not the same that has had the previous intercourse with her; so that this would not be a case of '*Paishācha*' marriage at all; as in this latter, the girl is given in marriage to that same person who has had intercourse with her (during sleep, etc.), and that same person would be performing the rites for her. Then again, so far as the performance of rites for the pregnant girl is concerned, it has been directly laid down by scriptural texts. All this we shall explain in full detail under Discourse IX.

Others, again, have held the view that—"in reality, the *intercourse* itself is the principal factor; for, if it were not so, there would be no point in the prohibiting of *intercourse* (with maidens)."

But if 'intercourse' were the principal factor, then that itself would constitute 'marriage;' none other being possible, according to the reasoning just put forward; so that there would be no object for the prohibition, as 'intercourse,' when *voluntary*, would constitute the *Gāndharva*'

marriage; when '*forcible*,' it would be '*Rākṣasa*' marriage; and in other cases it would be '*Paishācha;*' and no other 'intercourse,' without rites is possible, whereby the prohibition could apply to all forms of 'intercourse.' As a matter of fact, however, there certainly is an object for the prohibition,—in the shape of such cases where there is forcible intercourse by stealth, or where the girl is given away by her parents, but no sacramental rites are performed. This latter cannot come under the '*Gāndharva*' marriage; as it is not 'voluntary' on the part of the girl. It is for this reason that in such a case the husband does not incur the sin of having intercourse with a 'maiden;' as this latter contingency happens under totally different circumstances.

Thus, then, since the performance of sacramental rites has been interdicted in the case of girls who have already had sexual intercourse,—and since the '*Paishācha*' also is, like the 'Brāhma' and the rest, a means (of acquiring a wife),—and since, therefore, this form also is capable of being called 'marriage,'—it follows that what is denoted by the term '*approach*,' '*upagama*' ('intercourse') is only a secondary factor.

The differentiating characteristics of the eight forms of marriage are as follows:—(1) that marriage which comes without asking, just like landed property, gold and the rest, is '*Brāhma;*' (2) that which comes by virtue of one's priestly character is '*Daiva;*' (3) that which is accompanied by the present of a cow and a bull is '*Ārṣa:*' (4) that which is accompanied by the condition, 'may you together perform your duties,' and which comes either by or without asking, is '*Prājāpatya;*' the characteristics of the others are easily discerned.

In the words, '*Brāhma,*' etc., the nominal affix denotes *relation;* and the relationship of Brahmā and the rest is ascribed to the marriage, with a view to eulogising it. So also in the rest. In the case of the term '*Paishācha,*' the meaning is 'that which is fit for Pishāchas,' and it connotes deprecation.—(34).

VERSE XXXV.

'FOR THE CHIEF OF TWICE-BORN MEN THE GIVING AWAY OF ONE'S DAUGHTER WITH WATER ALONE IS COMMENDED; BUT FOR THE OTHER CASTES IT IS WITH MUTUAL DESIRE.'—(35).

Bhāṣya.

'*For the chief of twice-born men*;'—*i. e.*, for Brāhmaṇas. '*Giving away of the daughter.*'—when one is giving away his daughter, the giving away '*with water*,' '*is commended.*' That is, when one is giving his daughter to a Brāhmaṇa, he should give her 'with water' only.

"How can *water* be the instrument (means) of *giving?*"

What is meant is that without water, there can be no 'giving;' since we have the law—'alms and gifts should be given *with water*, after the uttering of the syllable *namaḥ*, and so also in all religious acts.'

Or, by the restriction expressed by the phrase, '*with water alone*,' the text means to exclude the '*Ārṣa*,' the '*Āsura*' and the '*Prājāpatya*;' as in these latter, *water* is not the only instrument used; other instruments also being used; such as 'a cow and a bull,' as also the compact (that 'you should perform your duty together').

What is really meant (by the girl being given 'with water alone') is as follows:—Just as when a cow, or gold or such other things are given, the giver does not impose any conditions,—such as 'this cow should be thus tended by you, she should be fed upon such and such grass,' and so forth,—in the same manner should the girl also be given; and the father shall not, through his great love for his daughter, impose upon his son-in-law any conditions; nor should he receive from him any presents.

As for the *Kṣattriya* and other castes, there should be 'giving' of the girl, when there is mutual desire on the part of the bride and the bridegroom; and not otherwise, as it is done in the 'Brāhma' form of marriage.

Others explain this as follows—what is meant by

'*mutual desire*' is that the father may either receive presents or give her 'with water' only.

According to this explanation, it becomes indicated that the 'Brāhma' form of marriage pertains to all castes.—(35).

VERSE XXXVI.

THE QUALITY THAT HAS BEEN ASCRIBED BY MANU TO EACH OF THESE FORMS OF MARRIAGE—LISTEN TO ALL THAT, O BRĀHMAṆAS, FROM ME, AS I PROCEED TO DESCRIBE THEM CORRECTLY.—(36)

Bhāṣya

The author is reminding his audience of what he had said before (Verse 22) regarding the 'good and bad points of each form of marriage.' Many things have been promised as to be described; and what he means to do by this verse is to point out that by means of the forthcoming verses he is going to explain such and such a subject. The reiteration contained in this verse therefore is quite proper.

'*Of these forms of marriage*'—The genitive has the sense of *selection*. The meaning being that from among these marriage-forms, to each has been ascribed a quality by the teacher, Manu;—'*To all this listen, O Brāhmaṇas.*' This is addressed by Bhṛgu to the great sages.

'*Correctly*'—without altering anything.

'*I proceed to describe*'—expound.—(36)

VERSE XXXVII.

THE SON BORN OF THE WIFE MARRIED BY THE BRĀHMA FORM IS A PERFORMER OF RIGHTEOUS ACTS, ABSOLVES FROM SINS TEN PITṚS ON THE ASCENDING SIDE AND TEN ON THE DESCENDING SIDE OF HIS FAMILY, AS ALSO HIMSELF AS THE TWENTY-FIRST.—(37)

Bhāṣya.

'*Pitṛs on the ascending side,*' *i.e.*, father, grandfather, and so forth.

'*Pitṛs on the descending side,*' *i.e.*, son, grandson, and so forth.

These he '*absolves from sins*'—*i.e.*, saves them from the sufferings of hell, etc.

The son that is born of the girl married by the Brāhma form '*is a performer of righteous acts,*'—*i.e.*, his deeds are virtuous.

'*Pitṛs*'—those that have gone over to the other world. The term '*pitṛi*' here stands for *dead persons*; in no other sense could the son and other descendants be spoken of as one's '*pitṛs.*'

'*Ten*'—this is construed with both 'ascendants' and 'descendants;' as is clear from the man himself being spoken of as 'the twenty-first.'

This verse is a purely laudatory exaggeration. Hence the question need not be raised how the man can save from sin his descendants, who are not yet born. For *ancestors*, freedom from sin is actually brought about by the proper performance, by the son, of *Shrāddha* and other rites; this we shall explain under the section on '*Shrāddha.*' All that the assertion that 'he absolves from sins ten descendants' means is that in his family ten lines of descendants are born sinless.—(37)

VERSE XXXVIII.

THE SON BORN OF THE WIFE MARRIED BY THE DAIVA FORM (ABSOLVES FROM SIN) SEVEN ANCESTORS AND SEVEN DESCENDANTS; THE SON BORN OF THE WIFE MARRIED BY THE ĀRṢA FORM THREE OF EACH; AND THE SON BORN OF THE WIFE MARRIED BY THE PRĀJĀPATYA FORM SIX OF EACH.—(38)

Bhāṣya.

The girl wedded by the *Daiva* form of marriage is called '*the wife married by the Daiva form*;' and the son born of her.

[In the term '*Kāya*'] '*ka*' stands for Prajāpati; and that marriage of which he is the presiding deity is '*Kāya.*' In reality, marriage is a sacramental rite contsising in the 'taking' (of the girl's hand), and there is no connection with any deity; still Prajāpati is called its 'deity' only figuratively. Though it is true that there are offerings made to Prajāpati during the marriage-rites, yet, since such

offerings are common to all the preceding forms of marriage also, they cannot form the ground for the name '*Prājāpatya*' being given to any particular form. Further, such an explanation (of the name being based upon the presiding deity) would not be available at all in the case of the names '*Āsura*' and the rest: as at no marriage-rite are any offerings made to the *Asura* and others.

The short vowel in '*ḍha*,' in the term '*Kāyoḍhaja*,' is in accordance with Pāṇini 6. 3. 63 (where much latitude is allowed in the case of the final vowels of feminine endings).

"In the Text it is found that the marriage-form with inferior results has been mentioned after that with superior results; so that the '*Ārṣa*' should have been mentioned after the '*Prājāpatya*' (in verse 25)."

There is a special reason why the '*Prājāpatya*,' though with superior results, has been mentioned last. In verse 25 above, it has been declared that 'of the five three are lawful, etc., etc.,' when the '*Prājāpatya*' is meant to be included (among those permitted for the *Kṣattriya*); while if the '*Ārṣa*' were mentioned after the '*Prājāpatya*' (on the ground of the inferior results of the former), then it would be the '*Ārṣa*' that would become included (among those sanctioned for the '*Kṣattriya*').—(38)

VERSE XXXIX.

ONLY FROM THE FOUR MARRIAGES MENTIONED SUCCESSIVELY, BEGINNING WITH THE BRĀHMA, ARE BORN SONS ENDOWED WITH BRAHMIC GLORY AND RESPECTED BY CULTURED PERSONS.—(39)

Bhāṣya.

In verse 22, it has been asserted that the author was going to describe 'the good and bad points of offsprings;' this is what is being done now.

'*Anupūrvashaḥ*' (successively) is an expression that authors of *Smṛtis* use in the sense of '*ānupurvyēṇa*.'

The honour and fame that one receives by virtue of his learning, knowledge and superior wisdom, are called 'Brahmic glory;' those possessed of this are called 'endowed with Brahmic glory.' The term ends in the Possessive affix '*in*.'

'*Respected by cultured persons*'—favoured, not hated, not ill-treated; *i.e.*, liked. Inasmuch as the root in '*sammata*' does not signify *thinking*, it does not fall under Pāṇini's Sūtra 3. 2. 188; and hence the compounding does not become precluded by Pāṇini 2. 2. 12; and the genitive ending in '*shiṣṭa*' denotes mere relationship in general.—(39)

VERSE XL.

ENDOWED WITH BEAUTY AND THE QUALITY OF GOODNESS, POSSESSING WEALTH AND FAME, WITH FULL ENJOYMENT AND RIGHTEOUS, THEY LIVE FOR A HUNDRED YEARS.—(40)

Bhāṣya

'*Beauty*'—pleasing form.

'*Quality of Goodness*'—which is going to be described in Discourse XII.

'*Endowed with*' these—*i.e.*, possessing these two.

'*Possessing wealth*'—Wealthy.

'*Possessing fame*'—Well-known as possessing the qualities of learning, bravery, and so forth.

'*With full enjoyment*'—*i.e.*, supplied with sufficient quantities of such means of enjoyment as garlands, sandal-paint, music, vocal and instrumental, and so forth.

'*Enjoyment*' stands for non-separation from the above-mentioned means of enjoyment; and those for whom this is 'full'—not deficient, complete—are said to be 'with full enjoyment.'

'*Righteous*,' '*dharmiṣṭha*'—*i.e.*, engaged in the performance of righteous acts. The term '*dharma*,' according to some, is an adjective; and hence it has taken the superlative affix ('*iṣṭha*').

'*They live for a hundred years*'—(40)

VERSE XLI.

FROM THE OTHER REMAINING INFERIOR MARRIAGES ARE BORN SONS, ADDICTED TO SAYING HARSH AND UNTRUE WORDS, AND DESPISERS OF THE VEDIC DHARMA.—(41)

Bhāṣya.

From marriages other than the '*Brāhma*' and the rest—*i.e.*, from the '*Gāndharva*,' and the rest.

'*Those who say harsh and untrue words.*'—Angry and indecent words addressed to one's mother and sisters, etc., are what are meant by '*harsh words.*' The meaning of the term '*untrue*' is well-known. '*Nṛshamsa-anṛta*,' compounded copulatively, give the form '*nṛshamsānṛtē*,' 'harsh and untrue.' He who is in the habit of saying such words is called '*nṛshamsānṛtavādin*,' '*addicted to saying harsh and untrue words.*' Such is the explanation of the compound term.

'*Brahmadharma*' is '*Vedic Dharma*,'—*i.e.*, the *Dharma*, Duty, laid down in the Veda; those who *despise* it, *i.e.*, have no faith in it.

It is for this reason that these marriages have been deprecatingly called 'inferior marriages.'—(41)

VERSE XLII.

FROM UNBLAMABLE MARRIAGES UNBLAMABLE OFFSPRING IS BORN TO MEN; AND FROM BLAMEWORTHY MARRIAGES BLAMEWORTHY CHILD. ONE SHOULD THEREFORE AVOID THE BLAMABLE MARRIAGES.—(42)

Bhāṣya.

This verse sums up the results of marriages briefly.

Those marriages are called 'unblamable' which have been sanctioned by the scriptures; and the offspring—in the shape of son, etc.—born from wives wedded by those forms of marriage is '*unblamable*,'—*i.e.*, praiseworthy.

'*From blameworthy*'—*i.e.*, prohibited—'*marriages*' is born '*blameworthy*,' defective, child.

'*Therefore*'—with the view that such children may not be born as become a source of pain, '*one should avoid the blamable marriages.*'—(42)

VERSE XLIII.

IN THE CASE OF GIRLS OF THE SAME CASTE (AS THE BRIDEGROOM) THE SACRAMENTAL RITE OF "TAKING THE HAND" HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED; AND IN THAT OF THE MARRIAGE OF GIRLS OF DIFFERENT CASTES, THIS (FOLLOWING) SHOULD BE KNOWN AS THE RIGHT PROCEDURE.—(43)

Bhāṣya.

The rite called 'taking the hand,' as described by the authors of *Gṛhyasutras*, has been '*prescribed*'—laid down, mentioned by the scriptures as to be performed—'*in the case of girls of the same caste,*' being married.

'*In the case of girls of different castes*' being married, the following is '*to be known as the right procedure.*'—(43)

VERSE XLIV.

WHEN BEING MARRIED TO A MAN OF HIGHER CASTE, THE KṢATTRIYA GIRL SHOULD TAKE HOLD OF THE ARROW, THE VAISHYA GIRL OF THE GOAD AND THE SHŪDRA GIRL OF THE HEM OF THE GARMENT. —(44)

Bhāṣya.

When being wedded by a *Brāhmaṇa*, '*the Kṣattriya girl should take hold of*' the arrow held in the hand of the Brāhmaṇa bridegroom; the arrow having been prescribed in place of the 'taking of the hand.'

'*Goad*'—of oxen; it is made of iron, on being driven by which they suffer pain; just like the '*aṅkusha*' in the case of elephants.

'*Of the garment*'—of the cloth,—'the hem should be taken hold of by the *Shūdra* girl, when being married to men of the *Brāhmaṇa* and other higher castes.—(44)

SECTION (5)—DUTIES OF MARITAL LIFE.

VERSE XLV.

ONE SHOULD OBSERVE THE RULE OF APPROACHING (ONE'S WIFE) DURING THE PERIOD OF HER SEASON,—EVER ATTACHED TO HIS OWN WIFE. IN CONSIDERATION OF HER HE MAY APPROACH HER WITH A DESIRE FOR SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, EXCEPT ON THE SACRED DAYS.—(45)

Bhāṣya.

Marriage has been described. Marriage having been accomplished, and the wifehood of the girl having been established, one might have the idea that he was entitled to have intercourse with her that same day; hence, with a view to preclude the possibility of this being done, the text proceeds with the following rules.

One should not have recourse to his wife immediately after marriage, on the same day; he should wait for her puberty. In fact, the authors of *Gṛhyasūtras* have declared that 'after marriage, for three days or twelve days, or for a year, the pair should take food without salt, observing continence and lying down upon the ground.' (*Āshvalayana*, 1. 8. 10-12.) Hence, if puberty appears in course of the year, there should be no intercourse; similarly, even after the said time, there is to be no intercourse before puberty. In this manner, there is to inconsistency between the present text and the rule laid down by Ashvalāyana. As for the mention of the option of 'three days,' etc., what is meant is that, if the pair happen to be very passionate, they might adopt the lesser periods, but others should observe continence (for the full period of twelve months).

'*Season*' is that period of time during which the bodily condition of woman is marked by a flow of blood and indicates her capacity for conception. The actual sight of blood being merely an indication, even after the actual flow has

ceased, the time that follows—up to the limit to be described below—is also called the 'season.' Or, because of the association of the name 'season' with the term 'period,' the period itself may be regarded as the 'season;' and in this case, we would have the appositional compound (in '*ṛtukāla*').

The person who has resolved to approach only during the season is called '*one who observes the rule of approaching only during the season;*' the affix '*ṇini*' (in *gāmī*) having the sense of *vow* or *resolve*, according to Pāṇini 3. 2. 20; just as we have in the case of such terms as '*sthaṇḍilashāyī*,' '*ashrāddhabhojī*,' and the like.

'*Syāt*'—should be. Even though the injunctive ending has been added to the root '*as*,' *to be*, yet what it enjoins is the act of 'approaching;' the phrase '*abhigāmī syāt*' being equivalent to '*abhigachchhēt*,' 'should approach;' specially as, unless one does the act of *approaching*, he cannot become '*abhigāmin*.'

What sort of '*rule*' is this? (*a*) Is it that one must approach her during the 'season?' (*b*) or that he should approach her *only* during the 'season?' That is to say, is the rule *restrictive* or *preclusive*?

"Well, the very name '*vrata*,' '*vow*,' indicates scriptural *restriction*; and the verbal affix '*ṇini*' denotes 'vow;' so that why should there be any question of its being *preclusive*?"

Our answer to this is as follows:—We shall show later on that *preclusion* also is scriptural in character and restrictive in form.

"What then is the difference between the two?"

Restriction is supplementary to Injunction.

"What is Injunction?"

Injunction is that word which expresses the idea of some act to be done; *e.g.*, in the sentence 'one desirous of Heaven should offer the Agnihotra.' With the exception of this sentence, there are no other words which could give us the idea of the *Agnihotra* as something to be done. We have 'restriction' in a case where the partial idea of something to

be done for the purpose of a transcendental result is obtained even without the scriptural words; *e.g.*, if we have the injunction 'one should offer the sacrifice on even ground,' in connection with the *Dashapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, the idea of some place in general where they are to be performed is implied by the nature of the act itself; no sacrifice can be performed, except at some place; and places are of two kinds, *even* and *uneven*; now, in the event of the sacrificer happening to select an even spot [merely on the strength of the general injunction of the sacrifice],—the words, 'should offer the sacrifice on even ground,' become merely descriptive; but if, by reason of man's desire being untramelled, some one were to elect to perform his sacrifice on *uneven* ground, then the words, 'should offer the sacrifice on even ground,' become useful by asserting the necessity of adopting *even* ground; for, when the words clearly enjoin the *even* ground, the avoiding of *uneven* ground follows directly from the fact of its not being enjoined; so that the avoiding of uneven ground is obtained from the implication of the injunction of even ground. For every performance being dependent upon injunction, wherefore could there be adoption of what is not enjoined at all? If such were adopted, there would be no accomplishment of the act in due accordance with what has been enjoined.

[The above being an example of Restriction from *Shrauta* literature] we have an example from *Smārta* literature in the shape of the Injunction—'One should eat food facing the East.' When a man is going to take food, it is open to him to face any direction he likes; so that at one time he might face the East, at another he might face the West, or any other direction; and when he would face the East, he would not face any other, while when he would face another direction he would not face the East. Hence in the event of the man electing to face another direction, the injunction that 'one should eat food facing the East' comes in useful; and by disobeying this, one would be transgressing a scriptural injunction.

Similarly, in the case in question, the act of approaching one's wife at any time one chooses and not approaching her during the 'season,' would make one open to the charge of transgressing the scriptural injunction; as he would, partially (*i.e.*, by not approaching during 'season,' and by approaching out of season) be omitting to do what has been directly enjoined; and the act of approaching (out of season) would make him subject to expiation in the same manner as the transgressing of other acts enjoined in the scriptures. When it is open to one to approach one's wife, through passion, both during 'season' and out of it, then we have use for such a direction as 'one should approach one's wife *only during season, and never out of season.*' Just as the direction 'five five-nailed animals are edible,' has its use when it is open to man, under the influence of hunger, to eat the hare, etc., (which are permitted), as well as the monkey and the rest (which are not permitted). In this case, there is nothing to indicate that the two sets of animals may be eaten in turn (as it is possible in the case of the approaching of one's wife during 'season' and also, at another time, 'out of season'). So that in the case just cited (of the edibility of five five-nailed animals), there is possibility of both (eating of hare, etc., and eating of monkey, etc.) being done simultaneously; and hence we have the direction '*only five* five-nailed animals are edible,' which serves to preclude the other alternative (of *all* five-nailed animals being eaten). And thus, in this case, we have *Preclusion.*

"But they say that Preclusion is beset with three defects; in every case of Preclusion three defects crop up: (1) the renouncing of its meaning, (2) the assuming of a different meaning and (3) the setting aside of what is possible. (1) Now in the case of the words, 'five five-nailed animals are edible,' the idea afforded by it is in the affirmative form—'five five-nailed animals should be eaten;' and this is renounced when the words are taken to mean the negativing of the eating of animals other than the five. (2) Further, no nega-

tion is expressed by the words of the sentence; hence, when it is taken as *preclusive,* a meaning different from its own becomes assumed. (3) Lastly, it being open to the hungry man to eat all animals, when the sentence is taken as preclusive, that which is possible becomes set aside. These are the three defects that beset every case of preclusion."

There is nothing in all this. If the man is hungry, the eating of animals is already open to him; so that no injunction being needed for that purpose, it is not possible for the sentence to be taken in its direct sense (that certain animals shall be eaten); and hence, in order to guard against the futility of the injunction (if taken affirmatively), if it is taken in the negative sense (of *preclusion*), there can be no incongruity in this. It has been thus declared—'when what is laid down is what is absolutely unknown, it is a case of *Injunction*; it is a case of *Restriction* when the course laid down is partially (*i.e.,* optionally) possible; and it is a case of *Preclusion* when what is laid down is possible, as also something else.' (*Tantravārtika* 1. 2. 42).

Now we have to consider what is the right view to take in regard to our text.

Since the present case fulfills the condition of Preclusion that 'what is laid down is possible, as well as something else,' it should be taken as a Preclusion. It is possible for the man to approach his wife 'during the season' as well as 'out of season;' but if the approaching is done 'during season,' then it cannot be done 'out of season' at the same time (*i.e.,* both alternatives are not possible at the same time). Just as when the man is hungry, it is open to him to eat at *shrāddhas* as well as not at *shrāddhas*; and when the rule says, 'he should eat not at *shrāddha,*' he simply avoids eating at *shrāddhas*; and he does not give up all food, seeking thereby to obey the injunction of not eating at *shrāddhas*;—similarly, when the man has a longing for intercourse, it is open to him to have recourse

to it at all times, and we understand the present rule to mean that 'one should not approach one's wife out of season.' The act of approaching itself being already possible by reason of the man himself desiring it, it is only right that the sentence should be taken as laying down the proper time for that act. Otherwise, it would be prescribing something not referred to before at all. Further, the obeying of the injunction of begetting children is possible only for one who has married; and this begetting is possible only by approaching one's wife during 'season;' so that the act of approaching during 'season' is already rendered possible by all this. Then, again, for one who has already got a child, the act of approaching one's wife again for the purpose of begetting a second child cannot be regarded as being done in accordance with the injunction of begetting children, for the injunction being in the form 'one should beget a child,' and the singular number in 'child' being meant to be significant, the injunction will have been duly fulfilled by the begetting of the first child. [Thus, then, there would be no point in the present text enjoining the act of approaching one's wife during 'season']. Nor could the approaching be taken as laid down for the purpose of accomplishing a transcendental result; because it is not possible to impose upon it either the character of a sacramental rite, or that of an act for a definite result; specially, as the act of approaching during 'season' is already implied by the injunction of 'begetting a child.' From all this it follows that the statement that 'one should approach one's wife during season' is meant to prohibit the act 'out of season;' so that, in its own form, it is merely re-iterative (of what has been enjoined in regard to the begetting of a child), but in its indirect sense it is a *Preclusion*. And when thus taken in this indirect sense, the passage comes to serve a distinctly useful purpose.

When it is thus taken, then this text does not conflict with what has been said in Gautama's work. In the

latter, it is asserted—'one should approach one's wife during season, or at all times, with the exception of the sacred days' (5. 1-2); and here the phrase, 'or at all times,' mentions an option, which permits freedom of action; and there would be no point in laying down any such rule as 'one may do the act *at all times*, during season as well as out of season;' and (as the words stand) when the preceding clause is taken as laying down the rule that 'one should approach one's wife during season,' the same verb, 'should approach,' being construed with the subsequent phrase, 'at all times,' this also would have to be regarded as a rule, occurring as it does in the same context as the preceding rule; specially because, so long as the word is not actually repeated in the text (and is construed with the latter clause only as it stands in the preceding clause), no different meaning can be attributed to it. And it has already been explained that there would be no point in any restriction being imposed, apart from the 'season.'

From all this it follows that the assertion regarding 'approaching during season' is meant to prohibit the act 'out of season.' For one who has not yet got a son, the restriction (regarding approaching during season only) is got at from a different injunction (that of begetting a child); but for one who has already got a son might do what he likes (hence the prohibition becomes useful).

The act of approaching the wife out of season having been prohibited, the text proceeds to make an exception in the case of the wife evincing a desire for intercourse—'*In consideration of her, he may approach her, except on the sacred days.*' 'Her' refers to *the wife*. '*In consideration of her*,'—*i.e.*, intent upon pleasing her mind.

'*With the desire for sexual intercourse*,' '*ratikāmyayā*,' *i.e.*, in consideration of her wishes,—not by one's own wish—one may approach her with a view to the pleasures of sexual intercourse,—one who has already got a son

may do this during 'season,' and one who has not got a son may do it out of season.

Or, the pronoun '*tat*' (in '*tadvrataḥ*') may be construed with '*ratikāmyayā*;' such irregular construction being permissible, in view of the work being a text-book of *Smṛti.* The meaning in this case would be—'with a view to giving *her* pleasure, he may approach her at other times also, except on the sacred days.' And in this case, we might assume the presence of an 'a,' the term being '*aratikāmyayā*' —*i.e.*, '*not* with a view to giving pleasure to himself.' But in the explanation that has been given before, there would be no use for assuming this '*a*,' nor for construing the pronoun '*tat*' apart from its context.

The '*sacred days*' shall be described later on (4. 128) as—'the moonless day, the eighth day, the full-moon day and the fourteenth day.'

'*Attached to his own wife*'—*i.e.*, one should be ever bent upon satisfying her. Or, it may be taken as the prohibition of having recourse to others' wives, the meaning being—that 'one should love one's own wife, and should never make love to the wife of another person.'

'*Ever*'—throughout life one should observe this rule.

Thus the conclusion is that the present verse contains three statements.—(1) the first is that 'one should approach one's wife during season,' which only reiterates a rule already laid down elsewhere for one who has not yet got a son; (2) the second statement is that 'when urged by one's wife, one should approach her with a view to sexual intercourse, during season as well as out of season, except on the sacred days:' (3) and the third is that 'one should be attached to one's own wife only.' The verbal construction would be (*a*) 'one should approach one's wife during season,' for the purpose of begetting children; (*b*) 'with a desire for sexual intercourse he should, in consideration of her, approach her;' (*c*) 'he should be attached to his own wife.'—(45)

VERSE XLVI.

SIXTEEN DAYS, INCLUDING THE FOUR DAYS THAT ARE CENSURED BY GOOD MEN, HAVE BEEN DECLARED TO BE THE NORMAL "SEASON" FOR WOMEN.—(46)

Bhāṣya.

The verse is meant to provide a definition of 'season;' and what is stated here is based upon medical science, not upon any scriptural injunctions. Similarly, the two verses beginning with the *forty-eighth.*

'*Sixteen days,*' in every month, constitute the 'natural season' for women. That 'every month' is meant, we gather from other sources, though it is not mentioned in this verse.

'*Normal*'—what comes by nature; *i.e.*, what happens in the case of women in normal health; in cases of disease and such other causes, the flow is absent even when the time has arrived; and by means of such medicines as butter and sesamum, and so forth, or by excessive sexual intercourse, the flow is brought on even before time. Hence the sixteen days are called the 'normal season.'

'*Including the four days*'—the four days that are censured by all good men, during which the touching of, and conversing with, the woman has been prohibited; these are the four days beginning with the first day on which the flow of blood becomes visible. '*Day*' stands for 'day and night.'

VERSE XLVII.

OF THESE THE FIRST FOUR DAYS HAVE BEEN DEPRECATED, AS ALSO THE ELEVENTH AND THE THIRTEENTH, THE REMAINING TEN DAYS HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED.—(47)

Bhāṣya.

'*Of these*'—days—'*the first four*'—beginning from the day on which the blood is first seen—'*have been deprecated,*' *i.e.*, there should be no intercourse on those days. On the first three days, even touching is prohibited, the woman being impure on those days; on the fourth day, when she has bathed,—though, according to the words of

Vashiṣṭha, she is pure — there is to be no sexual intercourse; all the four days being equally deprecated (for that purpose).

'*The eleventh and the thirteenth*' days also 'have been deprecated,'—*i.e.*, on those days also intercourse has been forbidden. The 'eleventh' and the 'thirteenth' days are those counted from the first day of the flow ; they do not stand for the two dates of the month; because the genitive ending in '*tāsām*,' 'of these,' signifies *selection*; and, as the pronoun stands for 'days,' it must be the same thing (day) that is *selected* ; just as in the expression, 'of cows, the black one gives most milk.'

This prohibition of intercourse on the said six days is with a view to a transcendental result.

'*The remaining ten days have been recommended*,'—(of the sixteen days) six days having been forbidden, the commendation of the remaining ten days follows naturally ; and it is this same natural conclusion that is reiterated here.—(47)

VERSE XLVIII.

ON THE EVEN DAYS MALE CHILDREN ARE CONCEIVED, AND FEMALE ONES ON THE UNEVEN DAYS; THEREFORE ONE WHO DESIRES A SON SHOULD HAVE RECOURSE TO ONE'S WIFE ON THE EVEN DAYS OF HER "SEASON."—(48)

Bhāṣya.

Among the said ten days, the 'even days' are the sixth, the eighth, the tenth, the twelfth, the fourteenth and the sixteenth; and when one has intercourse with one's wife on these days, sons are born to him.

'*One who desires a son should have recourse to one's wife on the even days of her season*;'—*i.e.*, because '*female ones*'—*i.e.*, daughters are conceived—'on the uneven days,'—'*therefore*' for the bringing about of the birth of sons, '*one should have recourse to*'—have sexual intercourse with—'*one's wife, on the even days of her season?*'

This is a mere reiteration ; and it is also a restrictive rule, the meaning being that 'one, for whom no sons have been

born, should not have intercourse with one's wife on the uneven days.'—(48)

VERSE XLIX.

A MALE CHILD IS BORN WHEN THE MAN'S SEED IS IN EXCESS, AND A FEMALE CHILD WHEN THE WOMAN'S (IS IN EXCESS); WHEN THE TWO ARE EQUAL, THERE IS BORN EITHER A NON-MALE OR A BOY AND A GIRL; WHEN IT IS WEAK AND SMALL IN QUANTITY, THERE IS FAILURE.—(49)

Bhāṣya.

'*Seed*'—the man's semen, and the woman's ovule. Says the revered Vashiṣṭha—'man is the product of semen and ovule' (15. 1).

When the man's 'seed' is in excess of the woman's, then, even on the uneven days, a male child is conceived; similarly, on the even days also a female child becomes conceived, if the woman's 'seed' happens to be in excess.

This statement is meant to lead the man seeking for a son to have intercourse with his wife on the uneven days also; the sense of the instruction being that—when the man finds that by the use of aphrodisiacs and strengthening food he has become vigorous in his virility, and that his wife has, for some reason or other, become weak, then he should have intercourse with her, when desirous of getting a son.

The '*excess*' meant here is not that in *quantity*, but that in *virility*.

When the two are equal, there is born either a non-male, or a boy and a *girl, together.* '*Non-male*' stands for the hermaphrodite, according to some people.

Some people read '*sāmyē*;' and it means that 'in case of equality of both, a non-male is born.'

'*Or a boy and a girl*'—When the wind in the womb stirs up the mixed semen and ovula and divides it into two equal parts—a small quantity in one part, and an equal quantity in another part of the womb,—then twins are born; and in those two equal parts also, in that part where the woman's seed happens to be in excess the girl is born, while

in the other part, where the male's seed is in excess, the boy is born.

When the seed is weak—in virility—then '*there is failure*;' either non-conception, or the birth of a hermaphrodite.—(49)

VERSE L.

'BY AVOIDING WOMEN ON THE FORBIDDEN DAYS AND ALSO ON THE EIGHT OTHER DAYS, ONE REMAINS A "RELIGIOUS STUDENT" (OBSERVING THE VOW OF CONTINENCE), IN WHATEVER STAGE OF LIFE HE MAY HAPPEN TO BE."—(50)

Bhāṣya.

'*Forbidden days*'—*i.e.*, the six mentioned above.

'*Other eight days*'—which have not been forbidden.

He who avoids women on these days, and has recourse to her on the remaining two days—avoiding the sacred days—then '*he remains a religious student etc.*'—*i.e.*, he obtains the fruits of continence.

'*In whatever stage of life he may happen to be*,'—this is an exaggeration. Certainly, intercourse with women on two days could never be permitted for the Recluse; for the simple reason that it has been strictly enjoined that one should keep one's sexual organs in complete check, in all stages of life, except that of the Religious Student. As for the repetition (in the phrase, '*yatra tatra*'), this is explicable as occurring in an exaggerated statement.

The text does not mean that the fourteen days are to be avoided in the order in which they are mentioned; all that is meant is that one should not think that one may have intercourse whenever one chooses, only leaving off the sacred days; and it is in this sense that only two days have been permitted.

"What is the fruit of *continence*?"

Since we do not find any particular fruit mentioned (as resulting from continence), it must be taken to be Heaven. But in some places we find it asserted that 'the student observing the vow of continence never incurs sin;' which means that he is not tainted by sins accruing from minor transgressions.

SECTION (6)—RULES REGARDING MARRIAGE.

VERSE LI.

THE GIRL'S FATHER, IF WISE, SHOULD NOT ACCEPT EVEN A SMALL CONSIDERATION; BY ACCEPTING A CONSIDERATION, THROUGH GREED, THE MAN BECOMES A CHILD-SELLER.—(51).

Bhāṣya.

This verse prohibits the receiving 'of consideration' in connection with the 'Āsura' form of marriage; that this is so, is indicated by the fact that later on (in 54) the acceptance of a dowry for the bride is permitted.

'*Wise*'—*i.e.*, knowing the impropriety of accepting the gift.

The girl's father shall not accept even a small present; by accepting it, he becomes tainted with the sin of child-selling.

"What is it that is called '*Shulka*,' 'consideration?'"

It is what is received from the bridegroom on stipulation. When there is a bargaining, carried on in consideration of the good or bad qualities of the bride,—it is a case of pure 'selling;' (what is referred to here is the acceptance of even a small present—though the bride is possessed of most excellent qualities,—that also without any stipulation.

This (acceptance of unequal price) is not a condition of 'sale' proper; the act is only deprecated by being described as being of the nature of 'selling.'—(51)

VERSE LII.

THOSE RELATIONS WHO, THROUGH FOLLY, LIVE UPON THE BRIDE'S PROPERTIES—EVEN THE BRIDE'S CONVEYANCES AND CLOTHES—ARE SINNERS AND FALL INTO THE LOWEST STATE.—(52)

Bhāṣya.

This verse is supplementary to the foregoing verse.

'*Bride's properties*'—*i.e.*, those properties that are received from the bridegroom for the sake of the bride;

'*the relations*'—fathers and others— '*who, through folly, live upon*' them;—as described above (in verse 31)

'The' *property* here spoken of is that in the form of gold and silver.

'*Bride's conveyances*'—such as the horse and the rest.

'*Clothes*;'—even such paltry things as clothes and conveyances should not be lived upon,—what to say of more valuable properties?

The text proceeds to describe what befalls those who do live upon such properties,—they are '*sinners;*'—and by doing what is prohibited in the scriptures—'*they fall into the lowest state*'—*i.e.*, into hell.

Or, '*bride's properties*' may be taken in the sense in which it is going to be described in Discourse 9 below. Those who, through folly, live upon those properties;—the '*relations*,' in this case, would stand for the girl's father and his kinsmen, as also the husband and his relations. Similarly, with 'conveyances' and 'clothes;'—the '*clothes*' also those belonging to the bride; this connection being assumed on the basis of the proximity of the term '*bride*' (in the compound term 'bride's conveyances'); just as in the case of the use of expression, 'royal servant,' if some one asks, 'whose?,'—this is taken to mean 'of what *king*?'—(52)

VERSE LIII.

SOME PEOPLE DECLARE THAT THE BOVINE PAIR ARE THE "CONSIDERATION" (TO BE ACCEPTED) IN THE ĀRṢA FORM OF MARRIAGE. THIS IS NOT TRUE; FOR SMALL OR LARGE, THE ACT BECOMES A 'SELLING' ALL THE SAME.—(53)

Bhāṣya.

'*Bovine pair*'—*i.e.*, a cow and a bull.

Some people declare that this 'consideration' should be accepted.

Manu's opinion, however, is that '*this is not true*;' *i.e.*, it should not be accepted.

'*Small*'—*i.e.*, accomplished by small means; similarly with '*large*.' It is '*selling*' *all the same*.—(53)

VERSE LIV.

IN THE CASE OF GIRLS WHOSE RELATIONS DO NOT APPROPRIATE THE BRIDE'S GIFT, IT IS NOT "SELLING;" IT IS ONLY A MEANS OF HONOURING THE MAIDENS AND IS ENTIRELY HARMLESS. —(54)

Bhāṣya.

The question being—"Does the mere act of receiving gifts from the bridegroom make the marriage a *sale*?" —our answer is that it is not so; it is when the '*relations*' of the bride,—*i.e.*, those in charge of her—accept gifts for themselves, then alone it is 'selling.'

'*Means of honouring*':—The receiving of presents on behalf of brides becomes a means of honouring them; it raises the girls in their own estimation; they come to think that 'we are so good that we are being married after receiving proper presents;' they rise in the estimation of the people also, who look upon such brides as very 'handsomely fortunate.' Or, when out of the presents received ornaments are made for them, and they are decked in them, they look beautiful.

'*Harmless*'—it involves no sin; *i.e.*, there is not the slightest taint of sin in this act.

What this exaggerated statement indicates is that the accepting of presents on behalf of the bride is permitted.—(54).

VERSE LV.

THESE SHALL BE HONOURED AND ADORNED BY THEIR FATHERS AND BROTHERS, HUSBANDS AND BROTHERS-IN-LAW, WHO ARE DESIROUS OF THEIR OWN WELFARE.—(55)

Bhāṣya.

The bride's relations are not only to receive presents for her from the bridegroom; they themselves shall make presents to her.

'*Fathers*'—through association, the term 'father' here

includes the grandfather, uncle, etc., also ; hence the plural number; or, the plural number may be explained as referring to several individual brides.

Similarly, '*husbands*' may stand for father-in-law, &c. ; or, it may refer to several individual girls.

'*Brothers-in-law*'—the husband's brothers.

'*Shall be honoured*'—during rejoicings in connection with the birth of sons, &c., they should be invited, welcomed and received with honour and feasting.

'*Shall be adorned*'—should be decked with clothes, ornaments, unguents, and so forth.

The effect of all this is next indicated—'*welfare*,'—what is desirable, *i.e.*, being endowed with children, wealth, &c., good health, freedom from troubles, and so forth : Those who are desirous of all this—*i.e.*, of obtaining all this (should do what is said above).

The injunction contained in this verse has been set forth for the purpose of indicating this reward.—(55)

VERSE LVI.

WHERE WOMEN ARE HONOURED, THERE THE GODS REJOICE ; WHERE, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY ARE NOT HONOURED, THERE ALL RITES ARE FRUITLESS.—(56)

Bhāṣya.

'*The gods rejoice*'—are satisfied, pleased ; and being pleased, they bestow upon the master of the house desirable rewards.

'*Where they are not honoured, all rites are fruitless*'—sacrifices, libations and charities,—gifts made with the motive of pleasing the gods,—all such acts, though done, become fruitless.

This is a commendatory exaggeration.—(56)

[Verses 57 to 66 have been omitted by Medhātithi.]

SECTION (7)—DUTIES OF THE HOUSEHOLDER.

VERSE LVII.

IN THE MARRIAGE-FIRE THE HOUSEHOLDER SHOULD PERFORM THE 'GṚHYA' RITES; AS ALSO THE RITE OF THE 'FIVE SACRIFICES' AND THE DAILY COOKING.—(67)

Bhāṣya.

The section on Marriage is finished.

In the fire in which the marriage-rites have been performed, one should perform the 'Gṛhya rites,'—*i.e.*, rites that have been prescribed by the authors of *Gṛhyasūtras* as to be performed with the help of fire; *e.g.*, the *Aṣṭakā shrāddha*, the *Pārvaṇashrāddha*, Libations, and so forth.

'*Five sacrifices*'—to be described later on;—'*the rite,*' the performance of these—(should be done) in that same fire.

"Though the text speaks of the 'five sacrifices' without any specification, yet (among them) the Vaishvadeva-offering alone is to be made in the fire; in the offering of the water-libations, etc., there is no need for the fire. Why then should the text speak of the 'rite of five sacrfices' as to be performed *in the fire*?"

Some people explain that, though the locative ending is one only, yet it may be regarded as diverse in reference to the diversity in the objects; hence, in the present context, the term "five sacrifices' has been used in the sense of a part only of the five sacrifices.'

Or (another explanation is that), the phrase, '*in the fire,*' is not to be construed with the '*rite of the five sacrifices,*'—the Vaishvadeva-offering, which is made into fire, being already included in the preceding phrase ('*gṛhya* rite'). The construction in this case would be—'the Householder should perform the rite of the five sacrifices, and in the Marriage-fire he should perform the *gṛhya* or domestic rites, as also the daily cooking.'

The term '*gṛha*,' '*house*,' denotes *wife*; hence what is meant is that the '*householder*,' *i.e.*, one, who has married a wife, should perform the rites, in association with one's wife.

Some writers on the Gṛhyasūtras have declared that at marriage, fire should be produced by the friction of two sticks; while, according to others, one may bring burning fire from anywhere he likes and make his offerings into that.

The injunction that the domestic rites shall be performed in the marriage-fire implies that the fire kindled at marriage shall be kept up.

On this point some people make the following observations :—"The maintaining of the marriage-fire should be necessary for the *Shūdra* also; as for him also the performance of the '*Pākayajña*' has been ordained; nor does the present text specify any particular caste; all that is found is the general term 'householder,' and the *Shūdra* also is a 'householder,' the marrying of a wife being prescribed for him also. This is what has been declared elsewhere (in Yājñavalkya, *Āchāra*, 97)—'The householder should everyday perform the *smārta* rites in the marriage-fire.'"

Our answer to the above is as follows :—What has been declared is that 'Gṛhya rites are to be performed in the marriage-fire;' but there is no special rite named '*gṛhya*;' hence the name '*gṛhya*' should be taken as indirectly indicating the rites prescribed by writers on *Gṛhyasūtras*; and these writers have prescribed the rites for the three higher castes only, and not for the *Shūdra*. In fact, in the Gṛhyasūtras we find a summing up in the words—'The sacrificial rites have been described, we are now going to describe the Gṛhya rites;' and the purpose for which these words have been added is to imply that 'those persons only are entitled to the performance of the *Gṛhya* rites who are entitled to that of the *sacrificial* ones;' and it is not meant, as it has been explained by others, that the latter constitute the duty of others also. If this had been meant, then it would not have

been asserted that—'the times for *Prāduṣkaraṇa* and Homa are analogous to those of the *Agnihotra.*' Nor, again, is it right to take the term '*gṛhya*' to mean 'pertaining to the home' (domestic); for the term 'home' (*gṛha*) could only mean either 'house' or 'wife;' now, as a matter of fact, for no rite has the 'house' been specifically prescribed as the location, in view of which the rite could be prescribed for the householder in terms of the 'house.' Then, again, such rites also as are performed for the sanctification of one's house—such for instance, as the testing of the building-site, and so forth—have been prescribed for the three higher castes only, and not for the *Shūdra.* If, on the other hand, the term 'home' means the 'wife,' then the act meant having been already implied by the term 'householder,' the name '*gṛhya*' would be superfluous.

As for the statement in the other *Smṛti* (Yājñavalkya, *Āchāra* 97)—'The householder should every-day perform *Smārta* rites in the Marriage-fire, or in the fire set up at the time of partition, and the *Shrauta* rites in the sacrificial fires,'—here also, since it has not been specifically stated what the '*smārta* rites' are, the statement must be taken as qualified by some other statement; specially because, as a matter of fact, all *smārta* rites cannot be performed in fire; nor is there anything to indicate that the term refers to *Homa* (offerings into fire) only; nor, again, is it necessary that all *Homa*-offerings shall be made into fire.

From all this the term 'gṛhya' has to be explained as standing for the *rites prescribed by the* authors of *Gṛhyasūtras.* Both these *smṛti*-texts (the present one, and Yājñavalkya I, 97) only refer to what has been prescribed by the authors of *Gṛhyasūtras.* So that how could there be any setting up of the fire by a *Shūdra* ?

Further, Yājñavalkya's text lays down the additional fact that 'Shrauta rites are to be performed in the sacrificial fire;' and this must be taken as pertaining to the three higher castes only. Under the cir-

cumstances, if the former statement (regarding *smārta* rites) were taken as pertaining to all the four castes, and the latter (regarding the *shrauta* rites) to three castes only, then this would involve the incongruity of one and the same set of words having two different imports. And, so long as a uniform import can be found, there can be no justification for admitting such a diversity.

'*Daily*'—that which is done day after day; *e.g.*, the cooking that is done every day for one's own food ;—this also is to be done in the same fire.—(67)

VERSE LXVIII.

FOR THE HOUSEHOLDER THERE ARE FIVE SLAUGHTER-HOUSES : THE HEARTH, THE GRINDING-STONE, HOUSEHOLD IMPLEMENTS, MORTAR AND PESTLE AND WATER-JAR ;—BY USING WHICH HE BECOMES STRICKEN.—(68)

Bhāṣya.

This verse serves to indicate the occasion for the prescribing of the 'five sacrifices.'

'*Slaughter-houses*'—*i.e.*, it is as if they were slaughter-houses. Places where animals are killed for the purpose of their flesh being sold, or those where meat is sold, become sources of sin, by being used for the purpose of obtaining meat ; similarly, the hearth and other things also, being sources of sin, come to resemble the 'slaughter-house.'

As a matter of fact, there is no direct scriptural prohibition bearing specifically upon the 'hearth' and other things ; nor is there any general prohibition regarding them. It is not impossible for men to have a desire for the heat (provided by the hearth). We do not find any such *acts* as are accomplished by means of the hearth, etc., which could be prohibited by other texts. Nor can the prohibition be inferred from what is stated in the present text itself ; for the simple reason that it is clearly understood as to be construed along with the next verse (which is an *injunction*, not a *prohibition*); so that, if the present text were taken

as a prohibition, this would involve a syntactical split; and further (the use of the Hearth, etc., being prohibited by this verse) the occasion for the performance of the 'Five Sacrifices' would be afforded only when the acts that are done by means of the Hearth, etc., would be done by means of other things. Nor, again, have the peculiar characteristics (of such acts) have been described anywhere, the presence whereof would indicate the similarity of certain acts (to the acts accomplished by means of Hearth, etc.) and their consequent prohibition. And a further result of this being taken as the prohibition of the Hearth, etc., and as such having no connection with the injunction of the sacrifices, would be that the sacrifices would be performed by such men as would eat food cooked by others (and thus avoid the use of the Hearth), or would use water directly from the river and other reservoirs (thus avoiding the use of the water-jar). Then, again, if a prohibition of the Hearth, etc., were intended, then directly prohibitive words would have been used in the text; why should it have been left to be inferred? Direct assertion is always more forcible. If the prohibitive implication were admitted for the purpose of indicating the expiatory rites to be performed in connection with the acts,—then the right thing would have been to include it under Discourse XI (where expiatory rites are dealt with). Further, such a prohibition might lead to the abandoning of the particular acts; but the use of the Hearth cannot be avoided; hence there can be no prohibition of them; and there being no prohibition, wherefore would there be any expiatory rite?

From all this it follows that the 'Five Great Sacrifices' are not to be performed for the destroying of sins; but what is meant by saying that they serve to expiate,—destroy—the sin involved in the using of the Hearth, etc., which cannot be avoided for a single day—is that the daily performance of the sacrifices is absolutely essential and compulsory.

'*Becomes stricken*'—the first consonant is *v*; and the meaning is that 'he is stricken by sin, and is ruined in

regard to his body and belongings, etc. ;—or, (if we read *ba*) the meaning may be that 'he becomes connected with (tainted with) sin ;' the root (in '*badhyatē*') denoting *overpowering.*

'*Using*'—*i.e.,* employing for one's purpose. When a man employs the hearth and other things for such purposes as present themselves, he is said to 'use' them.

Hearth.—place of cooking ; the oven, etc.

'*Grinding-stone*'—the stone-slab, and the grinding piece.

'*Household implement*'—such things as the pot, kettle and such other household requisites.

'*Pestle and mortar*'—by which corn is thumped.

'*Water-jar*'—the pot containing water.—(68)

VERSE LXIX.

FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPIATING ALL THESE IN THEIR COURSE, THE FIVE GREAT SACRIFICES HAVE BEEN ORDAINED BY THE GREAT SAGES, FOR HOUSEHOLDERS (TO BE PERFORMED) DAILY.—(69)

Bhāṣya.

'*Of these*'—of the Hearth and the other 'slaughter-houses.'

'*For the purpose of expiating*'—*i.e.,* for the purpose of removing the evils proceeding from them.

'*Course*'—the 'course' meant are —*smearing* of the Hearth, *scraping* of the grinding-stone, and so forth.

'*Have been ordained by the great sages* ;'— have been declared as to be performed ;—'*the five great sacrifices,*' '*for householders*'—*i.e.,* for persons who have entered the householder's state—the term '*gṛhamēdha*' stands for the Householder's state.

'*Daily*'—as no particular period has been specified, we gather that they are to be performed throughout life ; and it is thus that their compulsory character becomes estsblished.

'*Great sacrifices*'—this is the name of the rites to be performed.—(69)

VERSE LXX.

TEACHING IS THE 'OFFERING TO BRAHMAṆA;' THE TARPAṆA IS THE 'OFFERING TO PITṚS;' THE HOMA IS 'OFFERING TO GODS;' THE BALI IS 'OFFERING TO ELEMENTALS;' AND THE HONOURING OF GUESTS IS 'OFFERING TO MEN.'—(70)

Bhāṣya.

This verse contains the injunction of the exact form of the Five Sacrifices.

The term '*teaching*' here includes 'learning' also; as will be explained in verse 74 below. The mere act of 'reciting' does not require any pupils. In the Vedic text describing the 'debts' of man, it has been stated in general terms that 'by means of Vedic study one pays off one's debts to the sages.' For these reasons, both 'teaching' and 'learning,' according to circumstances, constitute 'the offering to Brahmaṇa.'

'*Tarpaṇa*'—the offering of 'food or water,' as described below, in 82.

'*Homa*'—the offering into fire made to the deities to be described later on.

'*Bali*'—*i.e.*, offering made into receptacles other than fire, such as the wooden mortar and the like. This is the '*offering to elementals*;'—*i.e.*, the offering made in honour of the elementals. This is only the name of a particular rite.

The making of offerings has been prescribed under the name of '*bhūta*,' 'elemental,' in the text—'offerings made to elementals stalking during the day, etc., etc.;' and through association, the whole set of rites is expressed by the term 'offering to elementals.' Just as among the '*Chāturmāsya*' sacrifices, though the *Āmikṣā* is the only one substance that is offered to the Vishvēdēvas, yet the entire set of rites has been spoken of as '*Vaīshvadēva*,' in the injunction, 'one should offer the *Vaishvadēva* sacrifice.' The term '*bali*' is applied to

such *Homas* as are offered into receptacles other than fire; and they explain that '*bali* is offering to the gods.'

The '*honouring*'—*i.e.*, receiving—'*of guests*' constitutes the 'offering to men.'

"How can *Vedic study* be a 'sacrifice?' In it there are no offerings made to gods; nor has any deity been mentioned in connection with it; all that is done in it is that the letters of the Veda, without any sense, are recited; and it has been said in connection with the repeating of Vedic texts that some people say the words have no meaning."

True; the term 'sacrifice,' as also the term 'great,' are used (in this connection) only figuratively, and they are meant to indicate high praise. To the 'honouring of guests,' also the name 'sacrifice' is applied only figuratively. Though it is possible for the Guest to be regarded as a 'deity,' yet in the original injunction of the act, the injunctive verbs used are 'should feed,' 'should honour,' and not '*should sacrifice*' to guests. Just as we find in the expression '*puruṣarājāya karma vā*' (where the act done in honour of the king of men is also called 'sacrifice.')

These 'Five Sacrifices' are not to be performed simultaneously; because the occasion for all is not the same; in fact, a distinct occasion has been mentioned in relation to each. If the occasion for all were one and the same, then, even when three or four of them would be done, it would be as good as not done, till all the five were done. Just as in the case of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, which consists of the three sacrifices of the *Āgnēya*, the *Agnīṣomīya* and the *Upāmshu*, the performance of only one or two of these does not discharge the complete liability; and just as among the Domestic Rites themselves, the 'Vaishvadēva offering,' which extends up to the '*Sviṣṭakṛt*' offering, is not regarded as complete, so long as there is a break in the offering to any single deity. In fact, each of the five sacrifices has a distinct occasion

mentioned in relation to itself :—*e.g.* (1) 'one should be constantly addicted to Vedic study' (verse 75), (2) 'one should be constantly addicted to making offerings to the gods' (verse 75), and so forth; and the prescribed occasion being distinct for each, each is performed separately by itself; (3) as regards 'honouring of the guest,' the injunction for this appears quite distinctly (in 106), where the act is described as 'conducive to prosperity and fame.'

Further, of these five 'sacrifices,' the performance of four depends upon the man himself; while that of 'honouring the guest' is conditional upon the arrival of the guest. The guest is not to be invited; as in that case he would not be a 'guest' (in the proper sense of the term); as we shall explain later on that a person is a 'guest' only when he comes of his own accord (unexpectedly). Thus, then, from among the five, if one performs any one only and omits the rest,—one might incur the sin of omitting to do what one should do; but what he has done does not become as good as not done. It is for this reason that when a man has not set up his own fire, though he is not, on that account, entitled to the *Vaishvadēva Homa*, yet it is incumbent upon him to perform 'Vedic Study,' '*Tarpaṇa*,' and the rest. As for the setting up of one's own fire, other Smṛtis permit of this being done at other times also; it is not necessary to set it up along with marriage itself. Says the Smṛti—'the setting up of the Fire begins either with marriage or with succession.'

"The option of setting up the Fire at the time of succession may be regarded as applicable only to one who has not married at all."

This would be so if the setting up of the Fire were an end in itself. As a matter of fact, however, the 'setting up' is for the purpose of obtaining the Fire, and the Fire is for the purpose of performing rites; rites, again, have been laid down as to be performed by one only when he is associated with his wife, and not alone by

himself. It is true that some *Gṛhya*-writers have asserted that one should perform *shrāddhas* after having kindled the *Paramēṣṭhiprāṇa* Fire ; but this also pertains to the man as associated with his wife ; and this same also would be the time for his 'succession' also. Nor is the performance of *shrāddhas* impossible for one who has not set up the Fire; as it has been prescribed even for one who has not even been 'initiated', in whose case the use of the '*svadhā*' alone has been excepted ; and yet there is no setting up of the fire for him ; as it is only one who is 'learned' (in the Veda) that is entitled to it, and he is still without that learning (before Initiation). As for the performance of the *Shrāddha* (though this also presupposes knowledge of Vedic mantras), yet it has to be done by the uninitiated boy to the best of his ablity, in obedience to a direct injunction; this case being analogous to the performing of a sacrifice by the Niṣāda (Shūdra) in accordance with a direct injunction. In the event, however, of fire having been set up by his uncle or other relations, in view of a 'learned' performer being available, the uninitiated (and hence unlearned) boy is not entitled to the performance of *shrāddhas*. If the setting up of fire be found to be prescribed in the same context as *shrāddhas*, then one could set up the fire as an accessory to the *shrāddha*, after the completion of which it would be abandoned.

Some people have quoted the *Smṛti*—"The *Vaishvadēva Homa* may be offered in the ordinary fire also." Others, again, hold that it is to be performed by means of dry (uncooked) grains.—(70)

VERSE LXXI

HE WHO OMITS NOT THESE SACRIFICES, TO THE BEST OF HIS CAPACITY, ON ANY DAY, DOES NOT BECOME TAINTED BY THE SIN OF THE 'SLAUGHTER-HOUSE,' EVEN THOUGH LIVING IN THE HOUSE.—(71)

Bhāṣya

The necessity of performing the 'sacrifices' every day is what is enjoined here; the rest is all mere reiteration.

The meaning is that these sacrifices should be performed, even though in an imperfect manner,—to the best of one's ability; this also follows from the compulsory character of the acts; hence the text has added the phrase *'to the best of his capacity;'*—the *'tasi'* affix being added to the term *'shakti,'* which is included in the *'ādyādi'* group.

'Hāpayati'—This has the sense of the simple root (*'hā,'* to *abandon*), no significance being meant to be attached to the causal affix. Or, the word may be etymologically explained as derived from the nona *'hā'* (*omission*)—formed by the root *'hā'* with the *'kvip'* affix; *'hāpayati'* being explained as *'hām apayati,'* 'brings about omission;' *āp + kvip*, and then the nominal root formed by the addition of the affix *'ṇich.'* The meaning, in any case, is *'omits not.'*

Living in his own house—where the 'slaughter-houses' cannot be avoided—he does not become tainted with the sin resulting from them. This is said in praise of the sacrifices.—(71)

VERSE LXXII

HE WHO DOES NOT MAKE OFFERINGS TO THE FIVE—*viz.*, GODS, GUESTS, DEPENDENTS, PITṚS AND HIMSELF, — DOES NOT LIVE, EVEN THOUGH BREATHING.—(72)

Bhāṣya.

This verse praises the original injunction by deprecating its omission. Some people read this verse with the Dative ending—*'devatātithibhṛtyēbhyaḥ pitṛbhyashchātmanē tathā na nirvapati panchabhyaḥ.'*

'Offering' here stands for actual *giving away*, not merely *assignment*; hence, the Dative should be the right form.

He who does not make gifts to these,—even though he may be *'breathing,'*—carrying on the function of inhaling and exhaling air,—*'does not live;'* *i.e.*, is as good as dead, his living being absolutely fruitless.

The term *'dependents'* here should be taken as standing for 'old parents' and others mentioned below (in 11.10);

it does not stand for *servants*; as gifts to these latter are made in return for services rendered. Or, it may be taken as indicating such born slaves as become incapable of rendering further service, on account of old age. We shall also explain later on that it is necessary to feed old bulls, etc. Gautama also has declared that 'decrepit people, and those devoid of livelihood, should be supported by him' (10. 61).

The 'offering' to the gods consists of (*a*) pouring libations into fire, (*b*) throwing 'bali'-offerings on prepared altars; for what other 'offering' could there be, except these?—which is what is found in other cases also;—*e.g.*, those of the offerings made to the Vishvēdēvas and other deities of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, where the offerings are made with such *mantras* as '*Agnayē tvā juṣṭam nirvapāmi*;' where also mere relationship (with the gods) is what is meant. It is for this reason that the 'elementals' (to whom the *bali*-offerings are made) become included under 'gods,' and hence not mentioned separately.

'*Himself*' has been added by way of illustration; the sense being—"just as, without eating, one's own living is not possible, and for that purpose the use of food is absolutely necessary, in view of one's life being a very desirable thing,—specially according to the direct injunction that 'one should guard oneself against all things'—so also is the feeding of gods and the rest absolutely essential."—(72)

VERSE LXXIII

'THEY ALSO CALL THESE FIVE SACRIFICES—(1) "AHUTA," (2) "HUTA," (3) "PRAHUTA," (4) "BRĀHMYA-HUTA," AND (5) "PRĀSHITA."'—(73)

Bhāṣya.

In certain Vedic texts, it is these sacrifices that have been enjoined under these names; hence the present verse mentions these names, with a view to show that the injunction of these is based upon the Veda itself.

What is meant also is that the rites that have been mentioned in the Veda by the names '*Ahuta*' and the rest, are

also included here, though not mentioned by the same names. This is another purpose that the author had in view in mentioning these other names; just like the names '*brahmayajña*,' '*shrāddha*,' '*udvāha*,' '*parikriyā*,' and so forth.—(73)

VERSE LXXIV

(1) JAPA IS 'AHUTA,' (2) OFFERING INTO FIRE IS 'HUTA,' (3) OFFERING TO ELEMENTALS IS 'PRAHUTA,' (4) THE HONOURING OF BRĀHMAṆAS IS 'BRĀHMYA-HUTA,' AND (5) WATER-OFFERING TO PITṚS IS 'PRĀSHITA.'—(74)

Bhāṣya.

The sacrifice that has been described as 'Ahuta' is the same as '*Japa*.' '*Japa*' here should be taken as standing for *Vedic study*, in view of the assertion that 'by Vedic study one should worship the sages.' Or, it may be taken in the sense of the mental operation of 'recalling to the mind' (of Vedic texts). The root '*japa*' has been held to be denotative of both acts—that of loudly reciting, as well as that of silently recalling to the mind.

The offering into fire is called '*Huta*.'

The offering to elementals is 'Prahuta.' Though this also is a kind of '*Homa*,' yet, in view of the fact that the term 'Homa' is generally restricted to offerings made into fire, people might think that the offering to elementals is not '*homa*;' hence (with a view to preclude this notion) it has been given the name of '*Prahuta*,'—the act being praised as *an excellent* (*pra*) *homa* (*huta*).'

'*The honouring of Brāhmaṇas is Brāhmya-huta*.'—It is the receiving of guests that is spoken of here as '*honouring of Brāhmaṇas*.'—(74)

VERSE LXXV

ONE SHOULD BE CONSTANTLY ENGAGED IN VEDIC STUDY, AS ALSO IN ACTS IN HONOUR OF THE GODS; ONE WHO IS ENGAGED IN ACTS IN HONOUR OF THE GODS UPHOLDS THE WORLD, MOVEABLE AS WELL AS IMMOVEABLE.—(75)

Bhāṣya.

It has been said above that the occasion for each of the

Five Sacrifices is distinct, and all of them do not form an aggregate ; this same idea is made clear by this verse.

When, by reason of poverty or some other cause, the necessary supplies being not available, the honouring of guests and such other acts be not possible, then one should be constantly engaged in Vedic Study.

'*In acts in honour of the gods*'—the offering made in fire to the Vaishvadēva gods are 'acts done in honour of the gods.' Though the 'sacrifice to elementals' and 'sacrifice to Pitṛs' are all 'in honour of gods,' yet from the context it is clear that it is the offering in fire that is meant by the term 'acts done in honour of gods.'

A commendatory exaggeration is added—'*He who is engaged in*'—*i.e.*, busy with—'*acts in honour of the gods, upholds*'—*i.e.*, supports—'*the moveable and immoveable;*'—*i.e.*, he becomes the means of sustenance of the entire world. —(75)

VERSE LXXVI

AN OBLATION DULY THROWN INTO THE FIRE REACHES THE SUN ; FROM THE SUN PROCEEDS RAIN FROM, RAIN FOOD, AND FROM FOOD, THE CREATURES. —(76)

Bhāṣya.

'*Into the fire being thrown*'—by the sacrificer.

'*Oblation*'—cooked rice, cakes and such other things, when thrown into the fire, are called 'oblation.'

'*Reaches the sun*'—in an invisible form. The sun absorbs the essence of all things ; hence the essence of the oblation is described as reaching the sun. This essence, evolving in the sun's rays, becomes in time developed into rain. From that proceeds '*food*'—in the shape of *Vrīhi* and other grains. From that proceed '*creatures*,'—all living beings.

Thus, by throwing an oblation into the fire, the sacrificer continues to help on the world-process.

What is stated here is only a commendatory supplement to the foregoing injunction, and it is not meant

to be literally true. If it were literally true, then only one who desires rain would be entitled to the performation of the act referred to; but no such thing has been asserted anywhere. Nor is there any occasion for assuming such an assertion, when it is possible to take the verse as supplementary to the principal subject-matter of the context.—(76)

VERSE LXXVII

JUST AS ALL CREATURES SUBSIST BY DERIVING SUPPORT FROM AIR, SO DO THE OTHER STATES SUBSIST BY DERIVING SUPPORT FROM THE HOUSOHELDER.—(77)

Bhāṣya.

The present verse proceeds to indicate, in another way, the necessity of performing the Great Sacrifices.

All creatures subsist by desiring support from '*Air*'—*i.e.*, from life-breath; no one can live without the life-breath; in fact, the act of 'living' consists in the bearing of the life-breath.

The term '*creatures*' stands for all living beings.

The epithet '*all*' has been added with a view to the fact that the subsistence of even gods and sages, who are endowed with superior powers, is dependent upon Air.

Similarly, the Householder is like Air for persons in all other states. Hence, what the Injunction means is that the Householder should act in such a manner that all others may derive their subsistence from him.

Though the presence of the term '*other*' would indicate that persons other than householders were meant, yet the text is not meant to exclude the householder from the said support, specially because the making of gifts to guests and others has been specially prescribed for the *Snātaka*. Hence the term '*other*' is meant to indicate that the other states are on the same footing as the state of the Householder. Nor has it been declared anywhere that the Householder should not support himself, or should not take steps for the

supporting of the members of his family [and all this would be excluded from his support if 'other states' stood for states other than that of the Householder.]

The compound '*itarāshramāḥ*' is to be expounded as a *Karmadhāraya* compound.—(77)

VERSE LXXVIII.

BECAUSE MEN IN ALL THE THREE STATES ARE SUSTAINED BY HOUSEHOLDERS ONLY, WITH KNOWLEDGE AND FOOD, THEREFORE THE HOUSEHOLDER'S IS THE HIGHEST STATE.—(78)

Bhāṣya.

'*Because men in all the three states are sustained*'—*i.e.*, *helped*—'*with knowledge*'—*i.e.*, knowledge brought about by the expounding of the meaning of the Veda—'*and food*,' by the Householder,—therefore, '*the Householder's state is the highest*'—best.

If we read '*gṛhī*' for '*gṛham*,' the compound '*jyēṣṭhāshramaḥ*' should be expounded as a *Bahuvrīhi*; while with reading '*gṛham*' it is *Karmadhāraya*.

Here also the specification '*by Householders only*' serves only to re-iterate what is right and proper, and it does not mean that persons in the state of the Recluse and others are not to do the work of teaching. In fact, for the Recluse the work of teaching has been specially enjoined in the verse—'he should perform these great sacrifices, etc.' (below, 6. 5). As for the Renunciate, it is true that the according of any help to anybody has been prohibited by the rule—'he should take no part in injuring or helping' (*Gautama* 3. 24-25); but the expounding of the meaning of the Veda has been actually enjoined among the duties of the Mendicant. Further, for the Recluse and the Renunciate, much effort would not be needed in the expounding of the Veda, as they are required to cultivate a high degree of knowledge, dispassion, thought-power and practice. As for the Religious Student, the work of teaching would interfere with his own proper work (of study); and as

for the gift of food, how could this be possible for him, when he himself has been advised to live on alms?

Thus, since it is for the Housholder alone that the two are generally possible, the text has used the phrase '*by Householders only.*'—(78)

VERSE LXXIX.

THAT STATE, WHICH CANNOT BE MAINTAINED BY MEN WITH WEAK ORGANS, SHOULD BE KEPT UP WITH CARE BY ONE DESIRING IMPERISHABLE HEAVEN AND ALSO UNDYING HAPPINESS IN THIS WORLD.—(79)

Bhāṣya.

'*That state*'—*i.e.*, the Householder's.

'*Should be kept up with care*'—should be maintained by one who desires Heaven and one who is desirous of obtaining happiness in this world.

'*Atyantam,*' meaning 'that of which there is no end,' implies *permanence*.

'This state, *which cannot be maintained by men with weak organs.*'

The sense is as follows:—For the Householder, intercourse with women, eating of rich food and such other luxuries are inevitable; but if one were to become unduly addicted to such sensuous objects, one would be incurring sin; hence it is said that 'this has to be kept with greater care than the other states;' specially as in the Householder's state great restraint of the organs is called for; such for instance, as one should not have intercourse with one's wife, except during 'season,' he should not have recourse to other people's wives, he should eat only such food as has been left (after the offering to the gods and the feeding of guests). And Restraint, when the objects of enjoyment are within reach, is extremely difficult.

'*Imperishable heaven;*'—by this it is not meant that the attainment of Heaven is the result of performing all the duties of the Householder; because, as a matter of fact,

among the duties of the Householder some are compulsory (and as such not leading to any results), and for others other rewards have been mentioned. It is true that those acts in connection with which no rewards are mentioned are assumed to have their reward in the attainment of Heaven; but in the present context these duties only form subjects of *reference*; and hence, there would be no point in the specifying of any rewards in connection with them. Hence the phrase in question has to be taken merely as a reference to such *desirable results* as follow from the prescribed acts. Nor can the present text be taken as stating the desire for a definite result as constituting the occasion for the performance of certain fresh duties; because the same duties that have been prescribed as necessary throughout life might very well be spoken of as to be performed by one who is desirous of obtaining Heaven; specially as the mention of Heaven is clearly found to be on the same footing as 'desiring happiness in this world,' which is a reward that can have no connection with anything that is enjoined; for 'happiness in this world' can never be recognised as the reward of any religious act, specially as no particular form of happiness is specified; we do not find the happiness in any way specified as that proceeding from the acquisition of landed property, or of a son, and so forth. And if the happiness is not specified, it means the same thing as 'Heaven.' But Heaven cannot be said to belong to 'this world.' Hence this phrase should be taken as referring to the experiencing of perceptible (physical) pleasures. Men in the other 'states' are without homes, living either under trees or in the house of other people; and as such they live uncomfortably. Hence the phrase 'desiring happiness' has to be taken as a mere reiterative reference. And, consequently, the former phrase, 'desiring Heaven,' also, standing on the same footing, has to be taken as a re-iterative reference.—(79)

VERSE LXXX.

SAGES, PITṚS GODS, ELEMENTALS AND GUESTS HAVE EXPECTATIONS FROM FAMILY-MEN; ONE WHO KNOWS SHOULD FULFIL (ONE'S DUTY) TOWARDS THEM.'—(80)

Bhāṣya.

These '*have expectations from family-men*,'—*i.e.*, seek to obtain presents from them. '*Expectation*' means wishing for help and benefits.

For this reason, one should fulfil towards them—the gods, &c.—all that is enjoined, in the shape of offerings, &c.

'*One who knows*'—the ordinances of the scriptures.

'*Family*' stands for *wife*.

It is not right to disappoint the hopes cherished by even an ordinary man, what to say of the gods, etc.? This is a praise of the 'sacrifices.'—(80)

VERSE LXXXI.

ONE SHOULD WORSHIP, ACCORDING TO LAW, THE SAGES BY VEDIC STUDY, THE GODS BY HOMA-OFFERINGS, THE PITṚS BY SHRĀDDHA OFFERINGS, THE MEN BY FOOD AND THE ELEMENTALS BY THE OFFERING OF BALI.'—(81)

Bhāṣya.

What is meant by the words '*svādhyāyamadhīyīta*' ('one should study the Veda') is exactly what is meant by the words, '*one should worship the sages by Vedic Study.*'

As a matter of fact, what is called *worship* is done either (*a*) by means of faith and devotion, or (*b*) by means of offering water for the feet, garlands and sandal-paint. But the present verse is purely eulogistic; 'Vedic Study' cannot be the means of either of these two forms of 'worship' of the sages. As for the *mantras* of the Veda, those also contain praises of Agni and other gods (and not the sages). For all these reasons the statement that 'one should worship sages by Vedic Study' is purely eulogistic.

Or, the term '*sages*' may be taken as standing, not for *Marīchi* and other persons (generally known as 'sages'), but

for the *Vedas* themselves. The term '*svādhyāya*' (Vedic Study) here denotes an *action* ; it does not stand for the *Veda*, as it does in the sentence, '*svādhyāyo dhyĕtavyaḥ*' ('the Veda should be studied'). Hence what the passage means is that 'one should worship the Vedas by the act of study ;' *i.e.*, one should study them in the proper manner ; no other form of 'worship' being possible.

'*The gods by Homa-offerings*'—here also the 'worship' is figurative ; for in a Homa, the deity is not the most predominant factor,—being only a subordinate factor, tending to the fulfilment of the act.

'*The Pitṛs by Shrāddha offerings*'—here the Injunction is to be taken in its direct sense ; and this shall be explained under the section on '*Shrāddha*.'

'*The men*'—*i.e.*, guests, beggars, and so forth—'one should worship'—*i.e.*, give them food with due respect.—(81)

VERSE LXXXII.

ONE SHOULD DAILY OFFER SHRĀDDHA WITH FOOD, OR WITH WATER, OR WITH MILK, ROOTS AND FRUITS,—(THEREBY) BRINGING PLEASURE TO THE PITṚS.—(82)

Bhāṣya.

Should offer'—*i.e.*, should perform.

'*Daily*'—every day.

'*Shrāddha*'—this term indicates the duty by its proper name. '*Shrāddha*' is the name of the rite laid down as to be done in honour of one's ancestors, on the *Amāvasyā* day ; and the whole process of that rite is indicated by the name 'Shrāddha.'

'*With food*'—this is only a reiteration of 'sesamum, barley, &c.' (mentioned in 3.267) ; what is reiterated here being intended to be described later on.

'*With water* ;'—'*udaka*' is *water*, and '*payaḥ*' stands for milk.—(82)

VERSE LXXXIII.

AT THAT (SHRĀDDHA) WHICH FORMS PART OF THE FIVE SACRIFICES, ONE SHOULD FEED EVEN ONE BRĀHMAṆA IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS; AND ON THIS OCCASION HE SHALL NOT FEED ANY BRĀHMAṆA IN HONOUR OF THE VISHVE-DEVAS.—(83)

Bhāṣya.

Since the offering to the Vishvēdēvas has been enjoined under the name '*Shrāddha,*' it would follow that the entire procedure of the Shrāddha has to be gone through at that offering also; hence the present verse proceeds to preclude a certain portion of that procedure. '*On this occasion*'—of the daily *Shrāddha*—one should not feed any Brāhmaṇas in honour of the *Vishvēdēvas,*—*i.e.*, with reference to these.

On this point, some people make the following observations:—"Since feeding is already understood as forming part of the Shrāddha, the presence of the verb 'should feed' in this verse indicates that this feeding is something new (different from the feeding that forms an integral part of all *Shrāddhas.*) Hence the *Shrāddha* that is laid down in the present verse is to be regarded as consisting merely in the act of feeding one Brāhmaṇa, and there is nothing else to be done at it, in the shape of the offering of a vessel of water, oblations, and so forth; nor are the restraints relating to 'avoidance of sexual intercourse,' 'omitting of Vedic Study,' and so forth to be observed in this connection."

'*Should feed even one Brāhmaṇa*'—the number of Brāhmaṇas to be fed having been fixed at *three*,—and what is said (under 3·125) regarding the feeding of 'one at each of the two' not being of the nature of an Injunction—the number 'one,' which has not been indicated by any other authority, is what is distinctly enjoined here;—the sense being that 'one should feed even one Brāhmaṇa,—but also many, if possible.'

'*In honour of the pitṛs*'—*i.e.*, for the purpose of satisfying the pitṛs.

'*That which forms part of the Five Sacrifices*'—*i.e.*, that which is included among the Five Sacrifices; this term being used here in the sense of '*Shrāddha;*' what is spoken of as 'what forms part of the Five Sacrifices' is not the *Tarpaṇa*—offering (of water); but the combination of this *water—offering* and the *feeding* of the Brāhmaṇa. The optional alternative to this shall be described below, under 3·283.—(83)

VERSE LXXXIV.

OUT OF THE FOOD COOKED IN THE DOMESTIC FIRE, FOR THE VISHVEDEVAS, THE BRÂHMAṆA SHALL EVERY DAY OFFER, ACCORDING TO RULE, HOMA TO THESE DEITIES,'—(84)

Bhāṣya.

'*Vaishvadēva,*' '*for the Vishvēdēvas*'—*i.e.*, what is cooked for the sake of the Vishvēdēvas. Though the term '*vishvēdēva*' literally means 'all deities,' yet here it is indicative of only those to whom oblations are offered. Hence the term may be taken as standing also for what is cooked for guests and others.

'*Out of the food cooked, Homa should be offered to these deities*'—*i.e.*, to those going to be mentioned in the next verse. The term '*cooked*' implies that the offering is made out of what has been already cooked for all recipients, and that there is no special cooking for the deities only, done with the *mantra* '*Dēvasya tvā savituḥ, etc.*'

'*According to rule*'—this means that the Homa is to be offered in accordance with rules laid down in the *Gṛhyasūtras*; by which all such details of procedure become included as sweeping the spot, sprinkling water over it, and so forth.

The term '*Brāhmaṇa*' is for the purpose of indicating the fact of the three higher castes being entitled to the performance.

'*Every day*'—daily.

'*Deities*' (in the Dative) serves to indicate the necessity of using the syllable '*svāhā.*' If the genitive had been

used, then the words used (at the offering) would have been '*agnēḥ idam*' (not '*agnayē svāhā*). The use of the term '*dēvatā*' ('Deity'), however, makes the rule mean that 'all offerings to the gods should be made with the syllable *svāhā*.' As for the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*,' it is to be pronounced at the end of the '*Yājyā*' *mantras*, but never at a *Smārta Homa*; while the syllable '*svāhā*' is to be pronounced at all *Homas*; such being the case, the formula used should be '*agnayē svāhā*.'—(84)

VERSE LXXXV.

FIRST TO AGNI AND TO SOMA, THEN TO BOTH THESE TOGETHER, THEN TO THE VISHVE-DEVAS AND TO DHANVANTARI.—(85)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*first*' is a mere reiterative reference; that the offering to Agni is to be made first of all being already indicated by the order in which the names are mentioned. These two offerings are to be distinct (one to each); while the next is to the two together—the formula used being '*agnīsomābhyām svāhā*.' For the next, the formula is '*vishvēbhyo dēvebhyaḥ svāhā*.' Only one offering is to be made with the words, '*Dhanvantarayē svāhā*.'—(85)

VERSE LXXXVI.

TO KUHŪ, TO ANUMATI, AND TO PRAJĀPATI; THEN TO DYAUḤ—PṚTHIVĪ JOINTLY, AND FINALLY TO SVIṢṬAKṚT.'—(86)

Bhāṣya.

'*To Dyauḥ-Pṛthivī jointly*'—with the formula '*dyāvāpṛthivībhyām svāhā*.'

'*Finally to Sviṣṭakṛt*'—'*Sviṣṭakṛt*' (accomplisher of what is extremely desirable) is an adjective, the deity qualified by it being Agni. That this is so is indicated by the assertion in another *Smṛti* to the effect that 'this offering is to be made *to Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt*.' This offering to *Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt* has been prescribed in the Veda as to be made in the case of all *Homas*.

'*Finally*'—though this is already implied by the order in which the names have been mentioned, yet it has been reiterated (by means of the term 'finally') for the purpose of indicating that when, according to another *Smṛti*, a large number of oblations are offered conjointly under this head, that to '*Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt*' should come first.

"All these oblations forming a single act of *Homa*, the several deities mentioned should be treated as optional alternatives."

But whence does it follow that there is a single Homa? Verse 85, which speaks of oblations 'to Agni and to Soma, etc.,' is the originative Injunction of the Homas; and hence the *Homa*-offerings being severally qualified by the mention of several special deities, the Homas are clearly recognised as distinct.—(86)

VERSE LXXXVII.

HAVING THUS DULY OFFERED THE OBLATION INTO FIRE, HE SHOULD PLACE BALI-OFFERINGS IN ALL DIRECTIONS, PROCEEDING TOWARDS HIS RIGHT TO INDRA, ANTAKA, AP-PATI AND INDU, ALONG WITH THEIR FOLLOWERS.—(87)

Bhāṣya.

'*Duly*'—*i.e.*, with the mind bent upon the deity, and not wandering over anything else.

Having offered in the Fire the oblation to these deities—he should place '*in all directions, proceeding*,' in due order, '*towards his right*;' at first in the East, then in the South, and so forth, this being the 'movement towards one's right;' '*To Indra, Antaka, Ap-pati and Indu*'—in each direction.

Another writer remarks that 'Indu' has no share in the oblation (the offering being made to *Soma*). If this name is not to be used in making the offering, how could 'Indu' be spoken of (as he is in this verse) as a partaker of the oblation? And it has been explained that the 'placing of the *bali*' is nothing other than *Homa*.

As a matter of fact, no stress is meant to be laid upon the special form of the names used ; as they have been used only in view of the exigencies of metre ; so that, in actual usage, the names to be used should be those mentioned in other *Smṛtis*.

'*Along with their followers*'—'followers' stands for servants, attendants ; the formula used in such cases being '*Indrapuruṣēbhyaḥ svāhā,*' and so forth.—(87)

VERSE LXXXVIII.

SAYING "THIS TO THE MARUTS," HE SHOULD MAKE AN OFFERING AT THE DOOR ; ALSO ONE IN WATER, SAYING, "THIS TO THE APAS ;" AND HE SHOULD MAKE AN OFFERING ON THE PESTLE AND MORTAR, SAYING, "THIS TO THE VANASPATIS."—(88)

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*iti*' is meant to lay stress upon the exact form of the words to be used.

'*In water*'—this specifies the receptacle of the offering ; and '*to Apas*' indicates the deity to whom the offering is to be made.

'*Saying "this to Vanaspatis," on the pestle and mortar* ; the singular number in the Copulative Compound '*musalolūkhalē*' would indicate that the two things are not two optional alternative receptacles ; and, since two receptacles are mentioned, the right course would appear to be that there should be a repetition of the oblation, which is the principal factor ; specially, as it is not possible for the pestle and the mortar to be unified and then serve as a receptacle for the offering ; as the two will ever remain distinct ; they can never be mixed up like milk and water ; so that if the oblation is poured on the mortar, it is not poured on the pestle ; and if it is poured on the pestle, it is not poured on the mortar ; nor is it possible for the oblation

to be poured in parts (over the two receptacles); as the exact quantity of the oblation has been fixed by law. With all this, in view of the copulative compound, it appears best that the oblation should be poured on one of the two things mentioned (*i.e.*, either on the pestle or on the mortar).—(88)

VERSE LXXXIX.

HE SHOULD MAKE AN OFFERING TO SHRĪ ON THE "HEAD" AND TO BHADRAKĀLĪ ON THE "FEET;" FOR BRAHMAN AND VĀSTOṢPATI, HE SHOULD PLACE AN OFFERING IN THE CENTRE OF THE HOMESTEAD. —(89)

Bhāṣya.

'*Head*'—is the top-most place, known as the dwelling of the gods; on this he should make the offering to Shrī; and '*on the feet*'—*i.e.*, on the lower side of the house—'*to Bhadrakālī*;' the place of dwelling of this goddess being the East of the door.

Others have explained '*head*' to mean that side of the householder's bed where his head lies; and the '*feet*' to be the lower side of the same. According to this explanation, this oblation may be placed either on the bedstead or on the ground, on the spot where the householder's bed lies.

'*For Brahman and Vāstoṣpati.*'—Even though these deities have been coupled together in a copulative compound, yet the two oblations are distinct, one to Brahman and another to Vāstoṣpati. In cases where two gods together form the 'deities,'—as in the case of 'Agni-Soma'—the two are taken together or conjointly; for example (*a*) 'to the two together' (as mentioned in 85 above), and 'to Heaven and Earth conjointly' (as mentioned in 86 above). The two mentioned here are to be treated separately, as they are not known to be companions.

'*Homestead*' means the *house*; and it is in the centre of the house that the offering is to be placed.—(89)

VERSE XC.

THE OFFERING TO THE VISHVEDEVAS HE SHOULD THROW INTO THE SKY; AS ALSO TO THE ELEMENTALS ROAMING IN THE DAY AND TO THOSE ROAMING AT NIGHT.—(90)

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*eka*' indicates that there is only one oblation.

'*To the Vishvēdēvas*' the offering is to be thrown up into the sky—either within the house, or outside the house.

During the day, the offering should be made to the 'elementals roaming in the day,' and during the night it should be made to those 'roaming at night;'—'elementals' being construed both ways.

Some people explain that these two offerings pertain respectively to the morning and evening.

But this is not right, as the evening-oblation is to be offered without any words, as is going to be mentioned below (verse 121).

"But what is mentioned there may mean simply that the articulate dedication of the offering is forbidden; but what is there to prevent the mental (silent) dedication? In fact, without some such dedication the offering would not be an 'offering' at all."

But what you have got to explain is—from where you have learnt this distinction. If it is one that has been made by authors of the *Gṛhyasūtras* themselves;—then it may be as you say.—(90)

VERSE XCI.

THESE OFFERINGS ONE SHOULD MAKE IN THE UPPER DWELLING, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACQUIRING ALL KINDS OF FOOD. THE ENTIRE REMNANT OF THE OFFERINGS HE SHOULD OFFER TOWARDS THE SOUTH, TO THE PITṚS.—(91)

Bhāṣya.

What is said here is supplementary to the two offerings spoken of in the latter half of the foregoing verse; and the

first half of this verse prescribes the receptacle for those two offerings.

The dwelling on the top of another dwelling is called the '*upper dwelling.*' In the case of a single-storied house, it means the *roof*. There one should make the offering to the 'roamers at night' and 'roamers during the day.'

'*Sarvānnabhūtayē*'—'*for the purpose of acquiring all kinds of food*';—the Dative ending has the sense of 'for the purpose of,' 'with a view to,' and not that of 'recipient;' for no oblations have been laid down as to be offered to any such deity as *Sarvānnabhūti*; specially, as the term 'offering' in the present verse is supplementary to the preceding verse, and the offerings prescribed in the preceding verse require the mention of a receptacle for them. Even in other *Smṛtis* no such deity as '*Sarvānnabhūti*' has been mentioned in connection with the '*Vaishvadēva*' offerings. Hence, what the word means is that 'the act is to be done *for the purpose of acquiring all kinds of food*;' *i.e.*, 'when this offering is made, all kinds of food are obtained.' And when the etymological signification of a word is found compatible with the context, there can be no justification for assuming a signification for the word as a whole (irrespectively of its etymology.) So that, if the word ('*Sarvānnabhūti*') were to be taken as signifying a deity, an absoluteley unknown denotation will have to be attributed to it.

'*The remnant of the offerings*;'—the use of the term 'remnant' implies that the offering material has to be collected in a vessel and then offered, and that the oblations are not to be taken out of what is contained in the cooking pot.

'*Towards the South*'— *i.e.*, in the southerly direction; *i.e.*, the man should face the south.

'*Entire*'—*i.e.*, all that has been taken out in the vessel.—(91)

———

VERSE XCII.

HE SHOULD GENTLY PLACE ON THE GROUND FOOD FOR DOGS, OUTCASTS, CHĀṆḌĀLAS, PERSONS AFFLICTED WITH FILTHY DISEASES, BIRDS AND INSECTS.—(92)

Bhāṣya.

Having taken up some food in a vessel, he should place food on the ground, with a view to benefit the dogs and the rest.

'*Persons afflicted with filthy diseases*'—Lepers, consumptives, and so forth.

'*Vayāmsi*'—birds.

'*Gently*'—*i.e.*, in such a way that the food does not become mixed with the dust raised from the ground.

The '*ground*' has been mentioned, not with a view to preclude the use of a vessel, but simply to indicate that food for the Chāṇḍāla, the outcast and the leper should not be given in their hands.

What the present verse prescribes is the *according of help*; that is why the verse contains the Genitive, not the Dative, ending.

For the birds, food should be placed on a spot where they can eat it without being scared away by dogs, &c.

For *insects*, the food should be placed on a spot where they are likely to be present.—(92)

VERSE XCIII.

THE BRĀHMAṆA WHO THUS DAILY HONOURS ALL BEINGS, BECOMES ENDOWED WITH A BODY OF LIGHT, AND GOES TO THE HIGHEST PLACE, BY THE STRAIGHT PATH.—(93)

Bhāṣya.

This sums up what has gone before.

The epithet '*all*' indicates that one should help with food the deer, the cock, the cat and such other animals as grow in the villages.

'*Honour*' here denotes *help*, not *worship*; as worship could not apply to dogs, &c. In fact, what is meant is the

forbidding of ill-treatment; and it is with this view that the author has not used the term 'help.'

'*Highest place*'—*i.e.*, he reaches Brahman.

'*By the straight path*'—*i.e.*, he has not to wander through an endless series of births as different animals.

Question—"Is this verse meant to lay down the reward (to be obtained)?"

We say—*no*. For it has already been explained that the injunction of the offerings is an obligatory one; and if a reward happen to be mentioned in connection with an obligatory act, it can only be taken as a commendatory description. Nor is any injunctive word found in the verse; the word used is '*goes*,' in the present tense.

'*With a body of light*'—*i.e.*, with a body made up of light only; he is no longer tramelled with a body made up of the five elemental substances; *i.e.*, he becomes of the nature of pure Consciousness. Or, the term may be taken as connoting *freedom from sin*; the meaning being that he becomes pure of character. The act done is one of helping all beings; and when the man does not transgress any scriptural injunctions, he incurs no sin; and hence it is only right that he should be *pure*. If it were otherwise, then *sin* being an impurity, he could never have a *body of light*. There being no sin in him, it is only natural that the man should reach the highest place, which consists in a state free from all pain and suffering.—(93)

VERSE XCIV.

HAVING PERFORMED THIS RITE OF OFFERINGS, HE SHOULD FIRST FEED HIS GUEST AND THEN GIVE ALMS IN THE PROPER FORM, TO ONE WHO IS MENDICANT AND A 'BRAHMACHĀRIN'—(94)

Bhāṣya.

The right definition of the 'guest' shall be given later on (in 102); when such a guest has arrived, he shall feed him *first*,—*i.e.*, before all others that may be near the house and may be going to eat.

'*Alms to one who is a mendicant*'—*i.e.*, he should give it to a person that asks for it. The term '*alms*' stands for the gift of a small quantity of food; it has been said that 'it is a handful that constitutes *alms*;' and this is well known among housewives.

'*In the proper form*,' to '*a Brahmachārin*'—to others even to a beggar that may be a disguised heretic, alms may be given,—but not in the proper form; but to the Brahmachārin it should be given '*in the proper form*;' *i.e.*, the giving is to be preceded by the syllable '*svasti*' by the *recipient*; this is the 'form' referred to.

Or, the term '*bhikṣu*,' 'mendicant,' in the text may be taken in the sense of the *Parivrāṭ*, the Renunciate,—and the term '*brahmachārī*' in that of one who is still in the first stage of *Studentship*. The particle '*cha*' occurs in the wrong place on account of exigencies of metre; it should occur after '*brahmachāriṇē*.'

But under this explanation, no alms would ever be given to the Recluse (the person in the third stage.) Hence the right view appears to be to take the term '*bhikṣu*' (mendicant) in the sense of 'one who begs,' and the term '*brahmachārin*' (*chaste*) as a qualification of the former. And in this way the giving of alms to persons in all the three stages becomes regularly sanctioned. As for heretics, they are to be treated like outcasts (*vide* 92),—and the mention of 'all' (in 93) has already enjoined the helping in the form of giving food, according to one's means, to all living beings.—(94)

VERSE XCV.

THE TWICE-BORN HOUSEHOLDER, GIVING ALMS, OBTAINS THE SAME REWARD FOR MERIT WHICH REWARD FOR MERIT ONE OBTAINS BY GIVING A COW, IN THE PROPER FORM, TO HIS TEACHER.—(95)

Bhāṣya.

That one should always give food to one in want of it, according to his means—(having been declared in the preceding verses), the present verse supplies another incentive.

The reward that one obtains by giving a cow to the Teacher is obtained by giving alms ; *i.e.*, it does not differ in any way from that of the giving of a cow. In another *Smṛti*, the giving of the cow has been described as buying 'all rewards,' and also as 'freeing from all sins.' Whenever a text declares that same rewards follow from the rendering of small help and of greater help, we should understand that there will be a difference in the quantity, as there is in ordinary life. That is, the same reward is obtained, but it does not continue for an equally long time. [There must be some such difference] for there is the well-known maxim—'what wise man will buy with ten pice a thing that can be obtained for only one ?' If the results in the two cases were really *equal* in all respects, then there would be no use in undertaking the work that requires a greater effort.

Some people read '*gāndatvā guryathāvidhi*' ('by the person without cows giving a cow') ; and in this case, the negative particle (in the compound '*aguḥ*,' 'without cows') means *few* ; *i.e.*, one who possesses only a few cows.

'*Merit*' is meritorious act ; the reward of this.—(95)

VERSE XCVI.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCRIPTURAL INJUNCTIONS, ONE SHOULD MAKE OVER TO THE BRĀHMAṆA KNOWING THE TRUE MEANING OF THE VEDA EVEN ALMS AND A WATER-POT, AFTER HAVING HONOURED HIM.—(96)

Bhāṣya.

It has been said above that the alms is to be given 'in the proper form ;' and this form is now described.

The mention of the 'water-pot,' which has not been referred to in this context before, is meant to indicate that in all cases one need not always give *alms* only.

'*Having honoured*,'—after having worshipped.

'*Vidhipūrvakam*,'—'*in accordance with scriptural injunctions*'—means 'that which has scriptural injunctions for its precedent ;' the term 'precedent' meaning *reason* ; the

compound therefore means that what is here stated is on the basis of scriptural injunctions.

Or, the term '*vidhi*' may stand for *method*; the sense being that the right method should be adopted first; the method being that 'he should be honoured,' as already mentioned.

'*The true meaning of the Veda*'—the real, the undoubted, sense of the Veda; he who knows this meaning—to such a Brāhmaṇa one should 'make over' the things.

The term '*to the Brāhmaṇa*' restricts the gift to the particular caste; and the term '*knowing, &c.*' restricts it to persons possessing a certain qualification. Hence, in connection with the act of giving, three things are enjoined here—(*a*) 'whatever is to be given should be given to the Brāhmaṇa,' (*b*) 'to a Brāhmaṇa who knows the meaning of the Veda,' and (*c*) 'only after having honoured him.' And this multiplicity of injunctions (in a single verse) (though inadmissible in a Vedic text) may be admissible in the work of a human author.

The next verse proceeds to point out the danger in connection with the act of 'giving' enjoined above.—(96).

VERSE XCVII

RITES IN HONOUR OF THE GODS AND THOSE IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS PERFORMED BY IGNORANT MEN BECOME LOST, WHEN THEY ARE PRESENTED BY THE GIVERS, THROUGH FOLLY, TO ASH-LIKE BRĀHMAṆAS.—(97)

Bhāṣya.

The preceding verse has described the person to whom presents are to be made; the present verse proceeds to prohibit the giving of presents to unqualified persons.

'*Become lost*'—become fruitless.

'*Rites in honour of the gods*'—Such acts as the feeding of Brāhmaṇas and the like, which are done in honour of the gods.

'*Rites in honour of the Pitṛs*'—those that form part of the acts done in honour of one's ancestors; *i.e.*, *Shrāddhas.*

'*Ash-like*;'—those who hav *become ashes* are called '*bhasmabhūta.*' Or, the term '*bhūta*' may mean *similarity*; hence the word '*bhasmabhūta*' means '*ash-like*:' just as in the compound '*kāṣṭhabhūta.*'

"What is the point of similarity between *ash* and the *Brāhmaṇas*?"

The meaning is that, just as the ash is of no use, and is mere refuse and deserves only to be thrown away, so the Brāhmaṇa in question is to be removed from all religious functions.

'*Made by ignorant men*'—this is to be construed with '*become lost.*'

'*Presented by givers through folly*'—'ignorant' and 'folly' are only re-iterations. Anything that is prohibited in the scriptures is done only through folly.

The next verse describes what sort of Brāhmaṇas are not 'ash-like.'—(97)

VERSE XCVIII.

AN OBLATION THROWN INTO THE MOUTH-FIRE OF BRĀHMAṆAS, EFFULGENT WITH LEARNING AND AUSTERITIES, SAVES FROM TROUBLE, AND ALSO FROM GREAT SIN.—(98)

Bhāṣya.

Brāhmaṇas effulgent with learning and austerities, being unlike those described above, are not ash-like. '*Effulgence*' connotes superior excellence; and persons are said to be 'effulgent with learning and austerities' when they possess great learning and perform great austerities. Though the 'learning and austerities' belong to the *entire man*, yet here they are co-ordinated with '*mouth*,' which is only a part of the entire man; and such co-ordination is based upon indirect connection [the mouth being connected with the man, who is connected with learning and austerities.]

In the compound '*vipramukhāgni*,' the *mouth* is likened to *fire*; hence the compound falls within the '*vyāghrādi*' group (*vide* Pāṇini 2. 1. 56).

Just as an oblation thrown into the fire bears fruit, but when it is thrown on ash, it is fruitless; similarly, 'oblation' in the shape of food thrown into the Brāhmaṇa's mouth. This *food* by being called 'oblation' is meant to be highly eulogised; sacrifice, oblation and such acts are well-known as bearing important fruits; hence the lesser known act (feeding of Brāhmaṇas) has been likened to the said well-known acts.

'*Saves from trouble*;'—'*trouble*' stands for the advent of illness, enemies, suffering at the hands of the king, and so forth; from this it '*saves*,' protects; *i.e.*, the man is not affected by it.

'*Also from great sin*;'—*i.e.*, it saves also from falling into hell, &c.

It is not only the gifts made in connection with auspicious rites that are to be given to the recipient described; gifts in connection with expiatory rites also should be given to Brāhmaṇas possessing the same qualifications.—(98)

VERSE XCIX.

TO THE GUEST THAT HAS HAPPENED TO COME, HE SHOULD OFFER, ACCORDING TO RULE, WATER AND SEAT, AND ALSO FOOD PREPARED TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY.—(99)

Bhāṣya.

'*That has happened to come*'—*i.e.*, who has come of his own accord, and has not been invited; one who has been invited is not a 'guest.' The proper place where the guest is to arrive shall be described later on—'where the wife and the Fires are, &c., &c.' (103).

'*Water and seat he should offer*;'—first of all he should offer water for the washing of his feet, and then the seat; '*and also food*.'

'*Prepared to the best of his ability*;'—this qualifies 'food.' The meaning is that he should prepare the food with special care and then offer it—feed him with it.

'*According to rule*'—*i.e.*, that offering which is preceded —supported—by injunction; *i.e.*, that which is sanctioned by scripture.—(99)

VERSE C.

A BRĀHMAṆA STAYING UNHONOURED (IN ONE'S HOUSE) TAKES AWAY ALL HIS MERIT, EVEN THOUGH HE BE ONE WHO SUBSISTS BY GATHERING HARVEST-DROPPINGS, OR OFFERS OBLATIONS INTO THE FIVE FIRES.—(100)

Bhāṣya.

Even for one who is extremely poor it is not right to omit the honouring of the guest.

'*Harvest-droppings*'—Ears of corn dropped in the fields after harvesting.

'*Gathering*'—Collecting.

This is meant to indicate difficulty of livelihood in general.

'*Offers oblations into the five fires.*'

What is meant by this is that, even if the householder is one who obeys all the injunctions of the scriptures, and he is also poor, and (therefore) does not honour, with food &c., the guest that happens to arrive,—then the said strict observance of the laws of livelihood becomes fruitless. Hence (it is said) that the guest '*takes away all his merit*'—*i.e.*, nullifies it;—if he '*stays unhonoured.*' Hence one should honour the guest—this is the meaning of the injunction.

The term '*stays*' indicates that the injunction pertains to one who arrives in the evening.

The '*five fires*' are—the '*Trētā*' (Three Sacrificial Fires), (4) the '*Gṛhya*' (Domestic Fire) and (5) the '*Sabhya*' (Social Fire).

"What is the fire called '*sabhya*,' Social'?"

They offer the following explanation:—When one goes to another village, and cooks his food in the ordinary fire;—or, in the house of a rich man fire is lighted in

several rooms for the alleviation of cold,—this is what is called the '*sabhya*,' 'social', 'fire'.

"In that case, what is the *oblation* that would be offered in such a fire? Since the rule is that 'the *gṛhya* oblations are to be offered in that fire (which is set up after marriage or after succession)' [*Gautama* 5·7 & 8]".

On the strength of the present verse itself they say that, when the man is away from home, he may offe. the Vaishvadēva oblations in the ordinary fire also; and they quote the Smṛti-text—'wherever one happens to see a well-lighted flaming fire, he should offer into it oblations of dry paddy, or of *vrīhi* and *yava*.'

Our revered teachers, however, offer the following explanation:—It is in the Upaniṣads that the 'science of the Five Fires' has been described; these five forms of fire have been assumed; and what is called 'oblation' here is the act of recognising the fire and worshipping it in those forms. This worshipping has been recognised as leading to results superior to those accomplished by means of all the *Shrauta* rites. In connection with this, it has been declared that—'the theft of gold, the drinking of wine, having intercourse with the teacher's wife and one who kills the Brahmaṇa,—all these four are fallen, as also one who has relations with these [and even these sins are purified by the knowledge of the science of Five Fires].'

The result of all these five becomes lost if the guest is not honoured and is sent away; this exaggerated praise is meant to convey the idea that the said honouring of the guest is absolutely necessary.

In connection with the morning breakfast also there is the rule that the guest should be fed; but the omission of it in the evening entails the penalty of a higher expiatory site.

Some people do not take the phrase 'to the best of his

ability' in the preceding verse as applying to the 'food; and they assert the meaning to be that 'guests should be honoured to the best of one's ability—*i.e.*, one or two or many (as many as one can).'—(100)

VERSE CI.

GRASSES, PLACE, WATER AND KIND WORD AS THE FOURTH,—EVEN THESE NEVER FAIL IN THE HOUSE OF GOOD PEOPLE.—(101)

Bhāṣya.

If, through poverty, one is unable to provide food,—even then one should not entertain such thoughts as these—'feeding is the chief factor in the honouring of a guest; this is not possible in my case; why then should I let him enter my house?' Because for one who is incapable of doing anything else, even the providing of 'grass,' &c., would constitute the act of 'honouring the guest.' Or, the meaning may be that the providing of food alone does not constitute the full compliance with the injunction of 'honouring the guest;' one has to provide bedding, &c., also.

'*Grasses*'—stands for *bedding*.

'*Place*'—*i.e.*, space for sitting, sleeping and moving about.

'*Kind words*'—*i.e.*, words, sweet as well as wholesome; in the form of conversation and stories, &c.

In the absence of food, '*even these never fail*'—*i.e.*, are always provided—'*in the house of good people.*'—(101)

VERSE CII.

A BRĀHMAṆA STAYING FOR A SINGLE NIGHT HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE A "GUEST" (ATITHI). BECAUSE HIS STAY IS NOT LONG, THEREFORE HE IS CALLED "ATITHI" (GUEST).—(102)

Bhāṣya.

Inasmuch as the meaning of the term '*Atithi*' (guest) is not well-known among men, the author provides a definition of the same.

One becomes a 'guest' by staying in another man's house for one night; and this character belongs only to a Brāhmaṇa, to none else.

Whether the next day also the guest should be honoured or not, depends upon the wish of the Householder; it is not obligatory. It being done by persons desiring prosperity, the incentive to it is something totally different (from that of the obligatory honouring during the first night). Says Apastamba (2.7.16)—'One should lodge him for one night;' whereby he wins the regions of the earth; by keeping him on the second night, the regions of the sky; and on the third night, the regions of Heaven"—which shows that the incentive to the entertaining of the guest on the second and following nights consists in the desire for particular rewards.

For the purpose of lending strength to the above explanation, the author provides the etymological meaning—'*His stay is not long;* which means that the word '*atithi*' is derived from the root '*sthā*' (to stay), preceded by '*ati*;' the term being formed somehow by the addition of an *Uṇādi* affix.—(102)

VERSE CIII.

ONE SHOULD NOT REGARD AS "GUEST" A BRĀHMAṆA WHO LIVES IN THE SAME VILLAGE OR WHO IS A COMPANION. HE SHOULD REGARD HIM AS SUCH WHEN HE ARRIVES AT HIS HOUSE, OR WHERE THE WIFE AND THE FIRES ARE AT THE TIME.—(103)

Bhāṣya.

One who lives in the same village is not a 'guest,' even though he may happen to come just at the time of the 'Vaishvadēva' offerings.

'*Companion*'—a fellow-student, other than one's 'friend;' the rule regarding the entertaining of the latter will come later—'the Vaishya and the Shūdra and one's friend, &c., &c.' (Verse 110).

It appears right to take the term '*sāṅgatika*' as excluding the man who is in the habit of meeting all men on terms of

equality, entertaining them with jokes and stories,—even though he be such as has never been met before.

For the Householder, when away from home, no one can be a 'guest,' even though he may fulfil all the conditions of one; one is to be regarded as such only when he '*arrives at one's house*;' *i.e.*, to the place where one lives permanently, that which is called his 'abode.' But even when the man is away from home, if his wife and Fires happen to be there, then the Brāhmaṇa arriving will be his 'guest,' even though he himself may not be there. Hence the householder should provide for the entertaining of guests during his absence, in the same manner as he does for the maintenance of the Fires and the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇmāsa* and other periodical sacrifices.

The term 'or' implies that (*a*) when the man goes on a journey taking his wife and the fires with him, then, even during his stay in another village, if some one arrives, he should be treated as a 'guest;'—(*b*) that the same is the case at his own house, during his absence, if his wife and Fires are there;—(*c*) that hence, when one goes out with his wife, but leaves the Fires at home, the rule regarding the entertaining of guests does not apply.

The term 'or' is to be construed with 'should regard' not as between the 'wife' and the 'fires.'—(103)

VERSE CIV.

THOSE FOOLISH HOUSEHOLDERS WHO WAIT UPON THE FOOD COOKED BY OTHERS, BECOME, AFTER DEATH, ON THAT ACCOUNT, CATTLE BELONGING TO THE GIVERS OF FOOD.—(104).

Bhāṣya.

'*Waiting upon*' means attending repeatedly. Some Brāhmaṇas wander from house to house with a view to the fact that at such and such a house the guest is sure to be fed; and it is this that is deprecated in the present verse.

One who is in the habit of waiting upon the food cooked for others,—and not one who happens to do it only once by the

way,—'*on that account*'—by reason of that act—'*after death, cattle*,'—are born as a bull, &c., in the house of the '*givers of food*;' *i.e.*, are born as his elephant, mule or horse.

This is a defect only in the Householder, who has established his own domestic hearth.—(104)

VERSE CV.

THE GUEST BROUGHT BY THE SUN IN THE EVENING SHOULD NOT BE DRIVEN AWAY BY THE HOUSE-HOLDER. ARRIVED IN TIME, OR NOT IN TIME, HE SHALL NOT STAY IN HIS HOUSE WITHOUT TAKING FOOD.—(105)

Bhāṣya.

'*Evening*'—is the time of sunset, the beginning of night. At that time if a guest arrives, he '*should not be driven away*,' he should not be refused admission; *i.e.*, he should be entertained with food, bed, seat, and so forth.—"By whom?"—'*By the householder*'—'*mēdha*' means *sacrifice*; '*gṛhamēdha*' is the name applied to the Five Great Sacrifices; one who is entitled to these is the '*gṛhamēdhin*,' the Householder.

'*Brought by the sun*'—this is purely laudatory. '*Brought*'—made to arrive—'*by the sun*.' Being brought by a god, he certainly deserves honour.

'*In time*'—*i.e.*, the second part of the day; the time at which the Vaishvadēva offerings are made. '*Not in time*'—in the evening; after breakfast has been finished.

'*He should not stay in his*'—the householder's—'*house, without taking food*.' If there is any food left, that should be offered to him; if not, food should be cooked afresh.—(105)

VERSE CIV.

HE HIMSELF SHOULD NOT EAT WHAT HE DOES NOT OFFER TO HIS GUEST. THE HONOURING OF GUESTS IS CONDUCIVE TO WEALTH, FAME, LONGEVITY AND HEAVEN.—(106)

Bhāṣya.

Soup, butter, curds, sugar, and such other rich food, he

himself should not eat, so long as he does not offer it to the guest that may have arrived. As for gruel and such other bitter medicinal drinks, he shall not offer these to him, if he does not desire it; there is no harm in the man taking these without offering them to the guest. All that this means is that he should not himself eat rich food and offer to the guest poor fare.

'*Conducive to wealth*'—procures, brings, wealth. Similarly, '*conducive to fame*,' and so forth.

All this is purely laudatory; because the honouring of guests is a compulsory duty, if he happen to be there, and also because what is here said is clearly supplementary to the foregoing injunction (of guest-honouring). And so long as a passage can be taken as purely laudatory, there is no justification for taking it as putting forward another incentive.—(106)

VERSE CVII.

HE SHOULD OFFER SEAT, ROOM, BED, FOLLOWING AND ATTENDANCE OF THE BEST KIND TO SUPERIORS, OF THE INFERIOR KIND TO INFERIORS AND OF THE EQUAL (ORDINARY) KIND TO EQUALS.—(107)

Bhāṣya.

When several guests of several grades—superior, inferior and equal—arrive at the same time, then the seat, &c., that are offered to them should not all be of the same quality; they should be in accordance with their relative merits.

'*Seat*'—the mat, and so forth.

'*Room*'—place for resting.

'*Bed*'—bedstead, &c.

'*Following*'—going after him when he goes.

'*Attendance*'—keeping near him and entertaining him with conversation.

All this should be '*of the best kind, to superiors*,' &c.,—*i.e.*, the superior guest should be followed to a great distance; the medium guest, not very far; and the inferior, only a few steps.—(107)

VERSE CVIII.

ON THE VAISHVADEVA HAVING BEEN FINISHED, IF ANOTHER GUEST SHOULD HAPPEN TO ARRIVE,—FOR HIM ALSO HE SHOULD PROVIDE FOOD TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY; BUT HE SHALL NOT MAKE ANY OFFERING (OUT OF THAT FOOD).—(108)

Bhāṣya.

Food cooked for all is referred to here by the term '*Vaishvadēva*;' on this being '*finished*,'—*i.e.*, all persons having eaten, and the food having been exhausted,—if another guest should arrive, then for him also he shall provide cooked food; but out of this latter food, he shall not make the offering that is made out of food that is cooked in the household.

The oblation into the fire also—and not only the *offering*—is not to be made (out of this food); because oblations and offerings have been laid down as to be made out of the food cooked in the morning and evening, and not out of the intervening cookings; as is going to be asserted below (in verse 121). So that, if one happens to cook several times during the day, he should not repeat the *Vaishvadēva* offering with each cooking.

'*To the best of his ability*'—*i.e.*, with elaborate seasonings or otherwise.—(108)

VERSE CIX.

A BRĀHMAṆA SHOULD NOT ADVERTISE HIS FAMILY AND GOTRA FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING A MEAL. BRAGGING ABOUT THESE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING A MEAL, HE COMES TO BE CALLED A "FEEDER ON FILTH" BY THE WISE.—(109)

Bhāṣya.

This verse contains an advice offered, by the way, to the guest.

Seeking for food, he shall not say—'I belong to such and such a family, I am the son of so and son; in this fashion he shall not advertise his 'family or *gotra*.' The '*family*' consists of his father, grandfather, and so forth;—'*gotra*'—may stand either for such Ṛṣi-

names as '*Garya*,' '*Bhārgava*,' etc. ; or for one's *name*. That the term '*gotra*' means *name* also is shown by such usage as 'mistake in names,' '*gotraskhalita*,' which term is used in the event of a man pronouncing a name other than the one he intended to pronounce.

His 'learning' also he should not advertise ; as this also has been prohibited in another *Smṛti*.

The Text adds a declamatory assertion :—'*For the purpose of obtaining a meal*'—*i.e.*, with the motive that by advertising my family and *gotra* I shall succeed in obtaining a meal, if one brags about these—*family and gotra*,—he is called by the wise '*Vāntāshin*,' '*feeder on filth*,'—he who swallows what has been vomitted.—(109)

VERSE CX.

IN A BRĀHMAṆA'S HOUSE, THE KṢATTRIYA IS NOT CALLED A 'GUEST;' NOR THE VAISHYA OR THE SHŪDRA, NOR HIS FRIENDS OR RELATIONS, OR HIS TEACHER.—(110)

Bhāṣya.

Even though a *Kṣattriya*, during his travelling, happen to arrive at the Brāhmaṇa's house, at the time of breakfast,—he is not a "guest." Hence it is not incumbent upon the Brāhmaṇa to offer food to him.

Similarly with the *Vaishya* and the *Shūdra*.

The '*friend*' and the '*relation*' are one's *equals*, not *guests*.

The '*Teacher*' has to be served as the master ; as described in the text—'the act of cooking should be done after having offered to the Teacher' (*Gautama* 5-26).—(110).

VERSE CXI.

IF A KṢATTRIYA SHOULD HAPPEN TO COME TO ONE'S HOUSE IN THE CHARACTER OF A GUEST, ONE MAY FEED HIM ALSO, AFTER THE BRĀHMAṆAS HAVE EATEN.—(111)

Bhāṣya.

The 'character' of the guest consists of—(*a*) having run short of food during the journey, (*b*) being in a strange

village and (c) arriving at the time of eating. In this character, if a *Kṣattriya* happen to come to one's house, then the householder shall feed him also.

By specifically mentioning 'feeding,' the other factors of the 'honouring' of guests become precluded; but the addressing of agreeable and wholesome words has been generally enjoined as to be addressed equally to everyone coming to one's house. The proper time for feeding him is this:—he should be fed after the Brāhmaṇas—guests as well as such non-guests as are entitled to eat first—have eaten.

'*May*'—this shows the absence of compulsion; the sense being that what is here laid down is voluntary, not obligatory. And since the reward has not been mentioned, it follows that Heaven is the reward, as it is in the case of all those acts whose rewards are not specifically mentioned. Or, we might connect with this the phrase 'conducive to wealth, fame, etc.' (of verse 106).—(111)

VERSE CXII.

THE VAISHYA AND THE SHŪDRA ALSO, WHEN ARRIVED IN THE FAMILY IN THE CHARACTER OF GUESTS, HE SHOULD FEED, ALONG WITH HIS SERVANTS,—SHOWING HIS COMPASSIONATE DISPOSITION. —(112)

Bhāṣya.

Those that have the character of guests are said to arrive '*in the character of guests*;' the 'character of the guest' has been already described.

'*Family*'—House.

'*Arrived*'—Come.

He should feed the *Vaishya* and the *Shūdra* also, like the *Kṣattriya*. The time for feeding them is after the guests, relations and friends have eaten, but before the Householder and his wife.

'*Along with*' means simply 'at the same time.'

'*Compassionate disposition*'—sympathy, pity.

'*Showing*'—providing proof of, having recourse to.

This last clause has been added with a view to show that those here mentioned are not objects of respect. It is one who is to be kindly treated that deserves compassion, and not one who is to be worshipped. Towards persons deserving kindly treatment, if help can be accorded, this is done by everyone who desires his own welfare. But its omission does not mean ill-treatment of the guest. What is meant is that the merit derived from helping the person deserving compassion is not similar to that derived from entertaining the guest; it is inferior to this latter.—(112)

VERSE CXIII.

OTHERS ALSO, FRIENDS AND THE REST, THAT MAY COME TO HIS HOUSE OUT OF AFFECTION, HE SHOULD FEED ON FOOD SPECIALLY PREPARED, TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY, TOGETHER WITH HIS WIFE.—(113)

Bhāṣya.

'*Friend*'—Companion; they of whom the friend is the first. The term '*and the rest*' connotes *kind*, and includes relations, associates, class-fellows, and so forth;—all except the Teacher.

'*That may come out of affection,*'—The context pertaining to the *guest*, the term '*affection,*' has been added with a view to preclude that character.

'*He should feed them.*'

'*Specially prepared*'—Having cooked the food with special care.

'*To the best of his ability;*'—the term '*ability*' is meant to be merely illustrative; the meaning is that the cooking and the seasoning should be in accordance with the man's own ability, and also according to what each guest may deserve.

'*Together with his wife*'—the time for the wife's eating is the same as the husband's; no time being laid down specifically for the wife; all that is said is that 'the husband and Wife should eat the remnant' (verse 116). In the Mahā-

bhārata, however, it is shown that the wife eats after the husband: In the course of conversation between Draupadī and Satyabhāmā, Draupadī, describing the duties of the wife, has said—'after all my husbands have eaten, I eat what is left'. The eating of food left by the husband is among the wife's duties. Hence, what is here laid down is not that the Friend and others should eat at the time that the wife eats; nor does the phrase '*along with*' mean that they are to eat out of the same dish. All that is, meant is that they should not be fed alone; the housewife also should eat there. This might go against the rule that 'the husband and wife should eat what is left.' What is meant is that if some respectable person is to be waited for, or if the husband feels disinclined to eat, then the husband may not eat with the Friend, etc., and in his place his wife should eat; this will bear testimony to his friendly feelings towards the diners.—(113)

VERSE CXIV.

NEWLY MARRIED GIRLS, MAIDENS, SICK PERSONS AND PREGNANT WOMEN,—THESE HE SHOULD, WITHOUT HESITATION, FEED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE GUESTS.—(114)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*Suvāsinī*' stands for newly married girls, daughters as well as daughters-in-law. Others have held that 'girls whose father-in-law and father are both living are called *Suvāsinī*, even after they have given birth to children.'

'*These......immediately after the guests*'—in continuation of them—'*he should feed.*' That is, as soon as the guests have commenced eating, they should be fed at the same time.

Others read '*agrē*,' '*before*' (the guests).

'*Without hesitation*'—*i.e.*, he should not entertain any doubt as to the propriety of feeding youngsters before the guests have eaten.—(114)

VERSE CXV.

THE FOOLISH MAN, WHO EATS BEFORE GIVING FOOD TO THESE, DOES NOT UNDERSTAND, THAT, IN THUS EATING, HE IS HIMSELF DEVOURED BY DOGS AND VULTURES.—(115)

Bhāṣya.

'*Before giving food to these*'—*i.e.*, to those just mentioned, beginning with the guest and ending with the servant—'*the foolish man*'—who does not know the law—'*eats*'—is devoured, after death, by dogs and vultures.

This '*being devoured*'—being eaten—by them, he does not understand. The foolish man simply feels that 'I am eating now,' and he does not understand that his eating in this manner means the eating of his own body by dogs and vultures. This latter is the result of such eating ; hence it has been thus described.—(115)

VERSE CXVI.

AFTER THE BRĀHMAṆAS, HIS OWN PEOPLE AND SERVANTS HAVE DINED,—THE HUSBAND AND WIFE SHOULD AFTERWARDS EAT WHAT IS LEFT.—(116)

Bhāṣya.

'*Brāhmaṇas*'—*i.e.*, guests.

'*His own people*'—people of the same caste, and so forth. When all these have eaten, then 'what is left by them,' the husband and wife should eat.

'*Afterwards*'—this is added with a view to perclude the notion that a portion of the food having been assigned to the guests and others, and kept aside, the remainder might be called 'what is left,' and as such might be eaten by the householder and his wife, even before the guests, &c.

Half of this verse is meant to be the injunction of the time for the husband and wife to eat; the rest of it is a purely descriptive reference.—(116)

VERSE CXVII.

HAVING WORSHIPPED THE GODS, SAGES, MEN, THE PITṚS AND THE HOUSEHOLD DEITIES, THE HOUSEHOLDER SHALL EAT AFTERWARDS WHAT REMAINS.—(117)

Bhāṣya.

This is a mere reiteration of the foregoing injunction of the performance of the Five Sacrifices, and of the time for the Householder's eating.

Others, however, have explained this verse as actually laying down something different: The former verse has laid down the eating of remnants by both husband and wife; while this verse leaves aside the woman and lays down the eating by the man alone. And from this it would follow that the wife should eat before the servants and before also the husband. In this way, this becomes reconciled also with what has been said before (113) regarding 'the feeding of friends, &c., together with the wife.' Otherwise, if we assumed the latter to mean that the wife should not eat with them, we would be abandoning the most palpable construction of the sentence. As for what has been described in the *Mahābhārata* (regarding Draupadī eating *after* her husbands), that is a mere description, not an injunction. Even if it were an injunction, it could only be regarded as laying down an option.

This, however, is not right; as the present verse is a mere reiteration.

Nor is there any incompatibility of the singular number in '*householder*' (with the idea that both husband and wife are meant); because in all things the Husband and wife operate conjointly; so that their *companionship* being the prime factor, the use of the Dual member does not become necessary. Just as in the text, 'the Brāhmaṇa should set up the fire,' even though the husband and wife have got to perform the rite jointly, yet there is no incongruity in the singular number. And why so? Because

one of the two is the principal and the other is subordinate ; and the subordinate cannot impose its number. Hence it is that the principal being one only, though the wife also comes in in fulfilment of her husband's purpose, yet the singular number is the right form to use. The single word 'householder' denotes the *wife* also ; and this is in view of the joint functioning of the husband and wife ; and this is possible only when both are conceived of jointly, and not if either both are regarded as *principal*, or both are regarded as subordinate. From all this it follows that the wife is not to eat before her husband ; which establishes the conclusion that this verse is only a re-iteration, intended to lend strength to the conviction (arising from the foregoing injunctions).

Some people have explained that, in the clause, 'he should worship the household deities,' the term 'deities' is only a laudatory re-iteration ; and on account of its connection with the injunctive verb 'should worship,' the sentence contains an injunction of the worshipping as a subordinate factor. And they argue thus—"The primary denotation of the term 'deity' is not compatible with the act of worshipping ; as the 'deity' in the primary sense can only be related to the acts of *sacrificing* and *hymning*. It is for this reason that the text has added the epithet '*household*,'—which means *those in the house* ; and these can only be in the form of images. As those to whom sacrifices are offered can have no connection with the house."

For these people also what is to be taken in the secondary sense is the '*deity*,' not the 'worshipping.'

But why all this ? The simple explanation is that the deities to whom sacrificers offer sacrifices are called '*household* deities'—(117)

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VERSE CXVIII.

HE WHO COOKS FOR HIMSELF EATS ONLY SIN; FOR THE EATING OF GOOD MEN HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS THE EATING OF THE REMAINS OF SACRIFICES.—(118).

Bhāṣya.

'*He eats only sin*'—*i.e.*, he accumulates sin in his heart; he places that in his stomach, and not even a morsel of food;—'*who cooks*'—gets food prepared—'*for himself*'—for his own eating; giving such directions as—'I am hungry, and I prefer such and such food; hence cook these.' Hence one should not have food cooked for himself, except when he is in distress. When one is in distress, then it is incumbent upon him—in accordance with another injunction—to maintain his body, even at the risk of disobeying a certain injunction; specially in view of the law that 'one should guard oneself against all.'

Such is the meaning attributed to this verse by some persons. But this is not right; being contrary to another *Smṛti* text, which says—'whatever may be best liked in this world, and whatever may be most loved in the house, that should be given to the qualified person, by one who wishes that thing to be inexhaustible.' Now, if what is best liked by the householder were not cooked, how could it be given to others?

What the text means, therefore, is as follows:—So far as the daily cooking is concerned, it is not with special reference to any person; it is only when friends and relations turn up that special things are cooked for them. If it were not so, then there would be no force in the injunction of giving food to guests and others out of the food that has not been cooked for any person in particular. What is meant is that the evil mentioned in the verse attaches to one who eats food without offering it to the guest, &c.;—or that, in the event of all the food cooked being eaten up by the guest and others, the

Householder shall not have more food cooked only for himself. Vashiṣṭha has declared—'the Husband and wife should eat the remnant ; if the whole has been eaten, cooking should not be done again.' (11-11-12).

'*The eating of the remains of sacrifices*;'—this is only laudatory of the 'eating of what is left,' enjoined above (in 117). '*Sacrifice*'—the Jyotiṣṭoma and the rest. '*Remains*'—what is left after use.—The '*eating*' of this is called '*yajñashiṣṭāshanam*'. Equal to this in its effects has been described the eating—of what remains after the feeding of the guest and others,—of all good householders, who are intent upon the obeying of the scriptures.—(118)

VERSE CXIX.

HE SHOULD RECEIVE, WITH THE "HONEY-MIXTURE," THE KING, THE PRIEST, THE ACCOMPLISHED STUDENT, THE TEACHER, THE SON-IN-LAW, THE FATHER-IN-LAW AND THE MATERNAL UNCLE,—COMING AGAIN AFTER A YEAR.—(119)

Bhāṣya.

In course of the entertaining of guests, the Text proceeds to lay down the special form of honouring of a few other respected persons also.

'*King*'—stands here for the annointed king of men, and not for the mere *Kṣattriya* in general. The honour here prescribed is a very great one, and every *Kṣattriya* does not deserve it. Nor would it be right to speak of an ordinary *Kṣattriya* along with the 'accomplished student' and the 'teacher;' for there can be no similarity between the honour accorded to the Teacher and to an ordinary *Kṣattriya*. There are Vedic texts also indicative of the same conclusion. For instance, in the *Ātithyēṣṭi-Brāhmaṇa* we read—'the guest is like a *king of men* arrived ;' and in connection with the rule of killing a cow for the offering of 'Honey-mixture,' we find the guest spoken of as 'the killer of cows;' all which goes to show that the said offering is meant for the *king of men*. Hence the honour

here mentioned is to be paid to a king of men, irrespective of his being a *Kṣattriya* or not. But so far as the *Shūdra* king of men is concerned, no honours are to be paid to him which are accompanied by the recitation of Vedic Mantras.

"All that is prohibited is the uttering of *mantras* by the *Shūdra*; there is no prohibition of the reciting of *mantras* by the Brāhmaṇa and others at an offering made to the *Shūdra*."

This does not affect our position; as the persons honoured have also got to recite certain *mantras*, such as '*bhūtēbhyastvā*, &c.'

"But in the *Mahābhārata* we read of the Honey-mixture offered by the *Shūdra* also: 'He himself offered to the Blessed Lord a seat fit for him, as also the Honey-mixture and the cow,'—where Vidura is described as offering it to Vāsudēva."

In such cases, the term 'honey-mixture' is used figuratively in the sense of *curd*, which is one of the ingredients of that mixture; and, in common usage, the name of a thing is applied to another when the latter helps in the bringing into existence of the former; when, for instance, Butter is spoken of as 'longevity' itself.

From all this it is clear that the term '*king*' here denotes the *king of men*, and not the mere *Kṣattriya*.

The term '*priya*' has been declared to mean the *son-in-law*.

'*Accomplished student*'—*i.e.*, accomplished, not in learning and observances both (but only in learning, still keeping up the observances). If it had stood for one who has accomplished and finished *both*, then, since the 'Teacher' and the 'Priest' also would be such 'accomplished students' (there would be no point in mentioning these separately). As for people in the other states (of the Recluse, etc.), for these feeding on alms has been prescribed, and not eating in the manner of 'guests.' Or,

the term *'snātaka,' 'accomplished student'* may stand for one who has only recently completed his course of Vedic Study.

'He should receive'—honour—all these.

The term *'honey-mixture'* is the name of a rite ; and the exact form of this rite is to be learnt from the *Gṛhyasūtras.*

'Parisamvatsarān,' 'coming after a year,'—qualifies the King and other persons to be honoured. The term means 'over whom one year has passed.' The meaning is that they are entitled to the honour of the 'honey-mixture,' if they come after a year, not before that.

Some people explain the verse to mean that if they, happen to come before the year, then, even though the full year may not have elapsed since the last offering was made, yet they are to receive the offering. But others hold that the honouring here prescribed is an annual function : and not as often as they may come ; and under this view, the mere fact of their coming before the year is entirely out cannot be an obstacle to the honour being offered.

Another reading is *'parisamvatsarāt ;'* which means that the honour is to be held in abeyance for a year ; after that they should be honoured.—(119)

VERSE CXX.

THE KING AND THE LEARNED MAN SHOULD BE HONOURED WITH THE HONEY-MIXTURE, AT THE APPROACH OF A SACRIFICIAL PERFORMANCE,—NOT IF THERE IS NO SACRIFICE (GOING TO BE PERFORMED).—(120)

Bhāṣya.

Some people hold that this verse serves to prescribe the honouring even before the lapse of a year, if the persons happen to arrive in connection with a sacrifical peformance. Others, however, take it as completing what has been said in the preceding verse ; and if it be not taken in this sense, then the statement 'not if there is no sacrifice' remains inexplicable.

The term '*learned man*' here may be taken as standing either for the person spoken of above as 'accomplished student,' or for the Priest; it is for the latter that the offering of 'Honey-mixture,' when the sacrifice is going to be performed, has been laid down. Though one would perform the Soma-sacrifice several times during the year, yet the Priests would help in the performance only if they have been duly honoured. Thus it is only if taken in this sense that the text comes to have a well-established basis (in the Veda). In any other sense, it will have to have its basis assumed.

Others, however, take the term '*learned man*' as referring to the Priest and all the rest of them (mentioned in the preceding verse). In fact, Gautama has said this in a general way: Having said that 'the honey-mixture is to be offered in the reception of the priest, the father-in-law, the paternal uncle and the maternal uncle, (5-25), he says 'before the sacrifice and the marriage' (5·27). And from this it is clear that at the time that a sacrifice is going to be performed, all those who deserve to be honoured should be honoured even before the lapse of the year.

'*Not if there is no sacrifice;*'—this prohibition applies to the honouring before the year is over, and not that which comes after it.

In connection with the second foot of the verse, there are several readings:

Some people read '*tatē yajñē upasthitau,*' 'who arrive when a sacrifice has commenced;' and they explain this to mean that 'the honey-mixture' is to be offered to them only if they come, by invitation, when the performance of the sacrifice *has commenced*, and not when it is only *going to be commenced.*

This view is objected to by some persons: In view of the general rule that 'the person initiated for sacrifice should not offer anything,' all offering is prohibited for the initiated sacrificer; so that, if the offering of honey-mixture

were now permitted, this would be contrary to the said general rule. It will not be right to argue (in answer to this that—" this is not an *offering*, since the injunction is that he *should honour them*, so that it is *honouring* that is enjoined;" because in the rite of the 'Honey-mixture,' there is an actual *offering* of curd, as also of meat and food. If it be said that "the man eats what belongs to another person (without the latter *offering* it),"—in that case, the act would involve the sin of theft. It may be argued that, "in view of the direct assertion permitting such an act, it could not be regarded as *theft*." But in that case, the act of *giving* is there; in fact, the *giving* or *offering* also is actually enjoined in such texts as 'should offer the honey-mixture.' Hence the act would be contrary to law. "The offering would be contrary to the law that 'the Initiated Sacrificer should not offer anything,' only if the term 'Sacrifice' always stood for the *Soma-sacrifice* (in connection with which we have the said prohibition); as a matter of fact, however, the term stands for the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices also; and the present injunction may be taken as pertaining to these latter." This also will not be right; as, in this case, it will be contrary to usage; as a matter of fact, cultured people do not offer the Honey-mixture to honoured persons at any other sacrifice except the Soma-sacrifice; and Usage always follows the Veda.

For all these reasons, the right reading is '*yajñakarmaṇyupasthitē*' (as we have explained already). As a matter of fact, it is only when an honoured person arrives when the sacrificial performance is going to commence that cultured persons receive him with the Honey-mixture; and not after the performance has commenced. For this reason we do not even stop to consider the point that the prohibition (of offering by the Initiated Person) pertains to the act of *giving* in general, and not to that act of *offering or giving* which has been enjoined in connection with the sacrifice itself.

The compound '*yajñakarma*' is to be expounded as the *Karmadhāraya* compound; when this performance is approaching—going to be performed.—(120)

VERSE CXXI.

OUT OF THE FOOD COOKED IN THE EVENING THE WIFE SHOULD OFFER THE BALI-OBLATION, WITHOUT SACRED FORMULAS. THIS IS THE "VAISHVADEVA" RITE WHICH HAS BEEN ENJOINED FOR BOTH MORNING AND EVENING.—(121)

Bhāṣya.

The first cooking has been described; the second cooking is now described.

'*Evening*'—end of day, the advent of night; out of the food cooked at that time all the rites pertaining to the 'Fire Sacrifices' have to be repeated, with the exception of the '*Brahmayajña*' (Vedic Study) and the '*Pitṛyajña*' (*Shrāddha*).

"All that the text says is that she should offer the 'Bali-oblation;' and in ordinary usage it is only the '*Bhūtayajña*' (the offering to elementals) that is called '*bali*.' So that, whence do we get (out of the words of the Text) either the pouring of libations into fire, or the offering of food to guests &c.? In answer to this the following might be urged—'The offering prescribed in the verse is spoken of by the name *Vaishvadēva*, and the term, *Vaishvadēva*, denotes that the offering is meant *for all*, being prescribed for *all gods* (*vishvē dēvāḥ*). In fact the term, *both morning and evening*, clearly indicates that the offering in the evening is to be precisely similar to that in the morning; it is for the purpose of conveying this sense that the term *morning* has been used. If it were not so, then, since the *morning*-offering has been already prescribed before, why should it have been necessary to say here that it has been enjoined for both *morning and evening*?" But in that case, the *Brahmayajña* and the *Pitṛyajña* also should have to be performed (in the evening also)."

Our answer to the above is as follows :—The phrase '*out of the food cooked*' clearly indicates the doing of that alone which can be done with the *food*,—and not of the *Brahmayajña*, which is done by means of *Vedic Study*, nor of '*Tarpaṇa*' (*Pitṛyajña*), which is done with *water*. We construe the words of the Text as follows :—'*out of the food cooked, the Bali-oblation should be offered*, and this rite, called Vaishvadēva, is prescribed as to be done out of the food cooked, both morning and evening.' That such is the meaning we deduce from the use of the term '*food*' and that of the term '*vaishvadēva*.'

'*Without sacred formulas*;'—what is interdicted is the use of expressions containing the names of the deity and ending with the syllable '*svāhā*;' such expressions, for instance, as '*agnayē svāhā*,' and the like ; no other sacred formulas have been prescribed in connection with the *Vaishvadeva* offerings ; the said expressions are called 'sacred formulas' (*mantra*) only with a view to eulogise them ; the real character of '*mantra*' cannot belong to any expressions not occurring in the Veda ; all students of Veda accept that only as '*mantra*' which forms part of the Veda, either in the form of *Ṛk*, *Yajuṣ* or *Sāman* ; and the meaning of words is ascertained from usage only. Those expressions with which the *Bali* and other oblations are made are not found in the text of any Veda ; all that the *Shruti* says is that 'oblations should be offered to Agni and other deities ;' the use of the syllable '*svāhā*' also in the offering of all oblations is enjoined in another text, which says that 'oblations are offered to gods either with the syllable *svāhā* or *vaṣaṭ* ;' but the use of the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*' has been restricted to the end of the '*yājyā*' *mantras* only by the declaration 'one should pronounce *vaṣaṭ* at the end of the *yājyā*.' In connection with the syllable '*svāhā*,' the grammatical rules lay down the use of the Dative affix. Thus it is that it becomes necessary to use such verbal expressions as '*agnayē svāhā*,' and the like, because every secrificial offering is aimed for a deity,

and it is only by means of words that we know for which deity it is aimed.

"Under the circumstances, as the use of these expressions is prohibited, how can the sacrifice be regarded as accomplished? For so long as the gift is not completed by the assertion 'this is for you, it is no longer mine,' the sacrifice cannot be regarded as accomplished. Merely giving up a thing, without special reference to a recipient, cannot be called a 'sacrifice."

This is true; the verbal reference to the gods being prohibited, the wife shall make the reference mentally. Just as when the *Shūdra* pronounces the syllable '*namaḥ*,' the use of the Mantra being replaced in his case by that syllable—as declared by Gautama, who says 'For the *Shūdra* the syllable *namaḥ* has been ordained as the *mantra*' (10.64); and the utterance of the name of the deity is not permitted for him. And yet it has been declared that even in this case the offering to the Deity becomes duly accomplished. The revered teachers, however, have declared that it is only the syllable '*svāhā*' that is to be replaced by the syllable '*namaḥ*,' and that the utterance of the name of the Deity has not been prohibited.

Question:—"Who is the real performer of the Vaishvadēva offering in the evening?"

Answer:—It has been already asserted that it is the wife, who will make the offering without mantras; and this because she will be near by.—(121)

SECTION VIII.—SHRĀDDHAS.

VERSE CXXII.

MONTH AFTER MONTH, ON THE MOONLESS DAY, THE BRĀHMAṆA WITH THE FIRE SHALL, AFTER HAVING PERFORMED THE PITṚYAJÑA, OFFER THE "PIṆḌĀNVĀHĀRYAKA."—(122)

Bhāṣya.

The shrāddha described here is the compulsory one, as distinct from the *Vaishvadēva-shrāddha*, which is optional.

'*On the moon-less day*'—on the *Amāvāsya* day. There also not at any and every time, but only '*after having performed the Pitṛyajña.*' That is, after having performed that *Ptṛiyajña* which has been prescribed in the *Shruti*. Thus the time for the *Shrāddha* in question comes to be the same as that for this latter; and in connection with this it has been laid down that the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* is to be performed on the *Amāvāsya* day, in the afternoon.'

Even for one who has not set up the fire, the performance of such offerings is essential; as it is declared—'the person who has not set up the fire having made the necessary offerings &c.'

'*The Brāhmaṇa with the fire*'—*i.e.*, he who is keeping up the marriage-fire, or who has set up the fire since succession to his property. No significance is meant to be attached to the mention of the '*Brāhmaṇa*,' since the *shrāddha* in question is meant to be performed by the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* also; hence it is that other *smṛtis* have prescribed this *shrāddha* without special reference to any particular caste.

'*Piṇḍānvāhāryakam*;'—this is the proper name of this *shrāddha*; the etymological explanation is that 'that which is offered along with balls of food, *Piṇḍas*, is *piṇḍānvāhāryaka*.'

'*Month after month*,'—in one month, and also in another month. The compound word connotes monthly repetition; thus the meaning is that the *shrāddha* is to be performed every month. Thus it is that its compulsory character becomes established. Though the term '*anumāsa*' alone

signifies repetition, and the second term '*māsa*' is superfluous, yet prolixity (and redundance) is not minded in a metrical treatise.—(122)

VERSE CXXIII.

THE MONTHLY SHRĀDDHA TO THE PITṚS THE WISE CALL "ANVĀHĀRYA;" AND IT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY PERFORMED WITH SUCH MEAT AS HAS BEEN COMMENDED.—(123)

Bhāṣya.

'*Anvāhārya*' is the name of the fee paid to the priests officiating at the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; and the monthly *shrāddha* offered to the Pitṛs is the 'Anvāhārya fee' for the Ancestors; and the sense of the metaphor is that the Pitṛs are as much pleased on receiving the *shrāddha*-offerings as the Priests are on receiving the fee. This name serves to indicate that the *shrāddha* is performed for the Pitṛs. But the relation in which the Ancestors stand to the *shrāddha* is not the same in which the Deities stand to the *Darsha* and other sacrifices; as the *shrāddha* is performed for their benefit; and it is in this sense that we have the genitive case in '*pitṛṛṇām*'; if the Pitṛs were the 'deities,' then there would be no reason for the omitting of the Dative affix.

Another reading giving a totally different sense is '*piṇḍānām māsikam.*'

'*The wise call Anvāhārya*'—This also indicates the obligatory character of the *Pitṛ-yajña* (which is as necessary as the sacrificial gift); but with this difference that it is not a mere subordinate factor (as the sacrificial fee is).

It should be performed with such meat as has been comended'—*i.e.*, not prohibited, or particularly recommended; as in 268, where it is said 'with the meat of fish the Ancestors remain satisfied for two months, etc., etc.'

This is the principal method; in the absence of meat, curds, butter, milk, cakes, etc., shall be offered, as is going to be prescribed later on.

The meat, however, is only the sauce for the seasoning of such food as cooked rice and the like ; it does not constitute a food by itself, since the text is going to describe 'such subsidiaries as soup and vegetables, etc.' (226), and also 'on what kinds of food, etc.' (next verse).—(123)

The question that arises now is that the *shrāddha* consisting of the several acts of (*a*) oblations in fire, (*b*) feeding of Brāhmaṇas, (*c*) offering of balls of food, and so forth,—are they all equally principal and expressible by the name '*shrāddha* ?' Or, some are principal and some secondary ? The answer is that, in view of such expressions as—'one should feed Brāhmaṇas in *shrāddha*,' 'this man has eaten at the *shrāddha*,' and so forth, where 'feeding' and '*shrāddha*' are spoken of as synonyms,—the 'feeding of Brāhmaṇas appears to be the principal factor.' To the same end our Author says—

VERSE CXXIV.

I AM NOW GOING TO DESCRIBE FULLY WHICH AND HOW MANY BRĀHMAṆAS SHOULD BE FED AT IT, AND ON WHAT FOOD,—AS ALSO THOSE THAT SHOULD BE AVOIDED.—(124)

Bhāṣya.

'*At it*'—at the *shrāddha* ;—those Brāhmaṇas that should be fed,—as also those that should be avoided ;—'*how many*' —what number ; as is going to be pointed out that 'two should be fed at the offering to the gods, and so forth' (125);—'*on what food*,'—'on sesamum, barley, etc.' (267) ;—all this '*I am now going to describe*,'— listen to it.

This (feeeding of Brāhmaṇas) is the chief thing to be accomplished ; for without this the *shrāddha* is as good as not done. As for the subsidiary factors,—those that help in the performance directly, as well as those that help indirectly,—even if these are not duly accomplished, the *shrāddha* is done,— only it is not quite complete in its details. Hence it is that the subjects have been propounded again, for the purpose of indicating their predominant character.—(124.)

VERSE CXXV.

EVEN THOUGH WEALTHY, ONE SHOULD FEED TWO AT THE RITE PERFORMED IN HONOUR OF THE GODS, AND THREE AT THAT IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS; OR ONE ONLY AT EACH OF THE TWO RITES. HE SHOULD NOT INDULGE IN LARGE COMPANY. —(125)

Bhāṣya.

Though as a rule each subject should be propounded in the same order in which it has been mentioned before,—and according to this the *persons to be fed* should have been described first,—yet the present verse describes their *number* first, because there is very little to be said on this point.

With reference to the gods, one should feed two Brāhmaṇas, and at the rite performed in honour of the Pitṛs he should feed three; '*or one at each of the two*'—*i.e.*, one at the rite in honour of the Gods and one at that in honour of the Pitṛs.

Though the word used in the Text is '*pitṛ*,' which shows that the entity to whom the offering is to be made is the *Father*, yet, as a matter of fact, the offering is to be made to the Father, grandfather and great-grandfather. Hence, at the *shrāddha*, one should feed one Brāhmaṇa for each of these three,—and not one only for all three; because each of them constitutes a distinct 'recipient of offering.' Says the author of the *Gṛhyasūtra* (Āshvalāyana, 4. 7.2-4)—'Not only one for all; it has been explained by means of the balls;' that is, just as only one ball is not offered to all, so only one Brāhmaṇa should not be fed for all. Here also the author will say later on—'he should invite at least three;' and the invitation there spoken of is for the purpose of feeding them, and not for the purpose of any merely transcendental result. It is for this reason that at the rite in honour of ancestors one should feed three,—that is, three times three, specially as it has been declared that 'one should not feed the least number.' This same

explanation applies also to what is said below (in 129) regarding the feeding 'even one learned person at each;' which means that one for each of the three ancestors.

Further, the words '*or only one at each of the two*' does not contain an injunction; it is only a reiteration made for the propose of introducing the prohibition of 'large company;' just as we have in the statement—'eat poison, do not eat in his house.'

"If that be so, then the assertion 'he should feed two at the rite in honour of the gods' also may not be an injunction; as this also could be explained as subservient to something else. If, however, this be regarded as an Injunction, on the ground that what it says is not knowable from any other source,—then, why cannot the statement 'one at each' also be an Injunction?"

The answer to this is that neither of the two statements may be regarded as an Injunction.

"Whence, then, could we know the number (to be fed)?"

From the assertion—'he should invite at least three.'

"But in that passage there is no mention of the rite in honour of the gods."

Well, in that case, we can learn the number from another *Smṛti*:—'an odd number, according to one's enthusiasm,' 'an even number at the rite in honour of the gods' (Yājñavalkya, *ācāra*, 227).

Further, if the present verse contained an Injunction of the number to be fed, then, since there would be no possibility of any idea arising regarding the 'large company,' the prohibition of it would be absolutely uncalled for.

From all this it follows that only so many Brāhmaṇas should be fed, by feeding whom one would not fall into those difficulties that might arise from the feeding of too many men. That is, at the rite in honour of the ancestors, an odd number, and at that in honour of the gods, only two.

Even when the man is extremely wealthy,—very rich,—'*he should not indulge in large company.*'—(125)

This prohibition of feeding a very large number is not with a view to any transcendental result. In fact—

VERSE CXXVI.

RESPECTFUL TREATMENT, PLACE AND TIME, PURITY AND THE QUALITIES OF BRĀHMAṆAS,—A LARGE COMPANY HAMPERS THESE FIVE; THEREFORE ONE SHALL NOT SEEK A LARGE COMPANY.—(126)

Bhāṣya.

Since 'large company' entails all these defects, therefore 'large company' is not considered desirable. When, however, respectful treatment and the rest are found feasible, then one might act according to one's enthusiasm.

'*Respectful treatment*'—careful preparation of the food.

'*Place*'—ground sloping to the south, and so forth (which has been recommended for *Shrāddhas*), as one going to be described below (in 207).

'*Time*'—the afternoon; laid down in such texts as 'when the sun has just passed the meridian, &c.'

'*Purity*'—of oneself, of the Brāhmaṇas invited, and of his own servants.

'*Qualities of Brāhmaṇas*'—the obtaining of qualified Brāhmaṇas.

All these advantages are such as must be secured; and these are hampered by having a large company; hence large company becomes a drawback; and this is involved in inviting too many Brāhmaṇas. Hence '*one should not seek*'—bring together—'*a large company.*'—(126)

VERSE CXXVII.

THIS RITE NAMED "PITRYA," PERFORMED ON THE MOONLESS DAY IS KNOWN AS BENEFICIAL TO THE DEAD. TO HIM WHO IS INTENT ON PERFORMING IT, THERE ALWAYS ACCRUES BENEFIT AFTER DEATH, OFFERED ACCORDING TO HUMAN ORDINANCES.—(127)

Bhāṣya.

'Rites performed for the gods' are not regarded as conferring any benefit on the gods; such, however, is not the case with this rite which is named '*Pitrya.*' "What then?" It

is '*known*,' among people learned in the Vedas as '*beneficial to the dead*'—as conferring a benefit on the dead.

'*On the moonless night*'—on the day on which there is no moon; *i e.*, the *amāvasyā* day. Another reading is '*vidhikṣayē*.' But the most faultless reading is '*vidhukṣaye*.' The meaning of the former would be that the rite named *Pitrya* is one that has been prescribed as to be done in the house.

'*Upon this*'—upon this rite,—'*he who is intent*'— he who is busy with its performance. To him there '*always accrues*,' '*benefit after death*;' *i.e.*, for him also benefit after death is conferred by his sons performing the *shrāddha* and other rites for him.

What this means is that the continuity of the lines of one's descendants—sons and grandsons—is the reward of performing *shrāddhas*. But this reward is not the incentive to its performance; as the rite has already been described as an obligatory one.

Others, however, have regarded this as indicating another incentive, for one desiring continuity of his line.

'*Offered according to human ordinances*';—*i.e.*, this rite is performed according to rules laid down in the *Smṛtis*.—(127)

VERSE CXXVIII.

FOOD OFFERED TO THE GODS AND THAT OFFERED TO THE PITṚS ARE TO BE GIVEN TO THE MOST DESERVING BRĀHMAṆA LEARNED IN THE VEDAS. WHAT IS GIVEN TO HIM IS CONDUCIVE TO GREAT RESULTS.—(128)

Bhāṣya.

'*Learned in the Veda*,'—he who recites the entire Vedic text, Mantras as well as Brāhmaṇas; to him;—'the food offered to the gods'—*i. e.*, those articles of food that are offered, in connection with *Shrāddhas to the Vishvē-devas*;—'*should be given*;'—as also '*the food offered to the Pitṛs*.'

'*Most deserving*;'—'desert' here stands for *respectability* and *ability*. It is a person born of a noble family that

is respected; and a person born of a noble family is generally equipped with learning and character.

'*What is given to him*,'—even things other than the *Shrāddha*-offerings,—'*is conducive to great results.*' The meaning is that—'gift made to the unlearned is fruitless; that made to a person learned in the Veda, but devoid of nobility and other good qualities, is conducive to some slight results; and that to the most deserving is conducive to great results.'—(128)

VERSE CXXIX

BY FEEDING AT LEAST ONE LEARNED BRĀHMAṆA EACH AT THE RITE PERFORMED IN HONOUR OF THE GODS AND THAT PERFORMED IN HONOUR OF THE ANCESTORS,—ONE OBTAINS A FULL REWARD; AND NOT BY FEEDING EVEN MANY MEN IGNORANT OF THE VEDA.'—(129)

Bhāṣya.

What has been said above in regard to the '*most deserving Brāhmaṇa*' is further explained.

'*By feeding at least one learned Brāhmana, one obtains a full reward*;—what is meant by 'learning' has already been explained; it consists in knowing the Veda and its meaning; that this is so, is also shown by what follows in the text: '*not by feeding even many men ignorant of the Veda*;' the term '*mantra*' here stands for the *Veda*.

In the absence of *five* Brāhmaṇas learned in the Veda, one should feed at least one;—such is the meaning of the present injunction.

'*Full*'—great, large.—(129)

VERSE CXXX

FROM FAR OFF ONE SHOULD EXAMINE THE BRĀHMAṆA THOROUGHLY VERSED IN THE VEDA; SUCH A ONE IS THE PROPER CHANNEL FOR OFFERINGS TO GODS AND PIṚT AND IN THE MATTER OF GIFTS HE HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE THE GUEST.—(133)

Bhāṣya.

One is not to be fed simply because he is thoroughly versed in the Veda; in fact, he should be examined '*from*

far off;' *i.e.*, one should carefully ascertain the purity of his father's and mother's families. It has been declared that persons should be regarded as real Brāhmaṇas on both sides, only when it is found that everyone of their ancestors on the father's and on the mother's side up to ten degrees were accomplished in learning and austerities and their acts were virtuous ; this is what constitutes 'examination from far off ;' similarly, the man's own learning and knowledge of practical details should be ascertained.

'*Vedapārayaḥ*,'—he who has gone to the end of the Veda ; *i.e.*, one does not become respected by reading the *Saṁhitā* only, or the *Brāhmaṇa* only. Because we find this term used here, we conclude that the term '*shrotriya*' is applied to one who may have learnt only a portion of the Veda.

'*Such a one is the channel for offerings to gods and Pitṛs ;*' —'*channel*' means *like a channel*. The 'channel' is that whereby people descend to the water ; hence what is meant by the metaphor is the eulogium that 'just as people seeking water get it only if they go to it by the right channel, similarly, the offerings reach the gods and ancestors only through the aforesaid *Brāhmaṇa*.'

In connection with gifts and charities also the Brāhmaṇa is the 'guest.' To the guest that arrives by himself, gifts are offered freely, and thus given, they bring about great results ; and, in the same manner, to the said Brāhmaṇa the offerings to gods and ancestors should be given freely ; and when thus given, they become conducive to great results.—(130)

VERSE CXXXI

WHERE ONE THOUSAND PERSONS IGNORANT OF THE VEDA EAT, ALL THOSE A SINGLE MAN LEARNED IN THE VEDA, ON BEING SATISFIED, ABSORBS, IN POINT OF MERIT.—(131)

Bhāṣya.

'*Anṛichām*', '*Ignorant of the Veda*,'—those who do not know the meaning of the Vedic verses.

This is only by way of illustration; since there is no possibility of persons ignorant of the Veda being fed; because of the restriction that the food shall be offered only to one learned in the Veda. The affix at the end of this compound has been dropped because of the term being Vedic, and also because of the exigencies of metre. They say—'one had better read *maṣa* in place of *māṣa* rather than distort the metre.'

Or, we may read '*anṛchā*' in the Nominative Plural; the construction being 'thousand persons ignorant, &c.;' just as we have the phrase 'thousand bulls.'

'*A single man learned in the Veda*'—knowing the meaning of the Veda—'*on being satisfied*'—*i.e.*, fed—'absorbs all those' ignorant persons; *i.e.*, becomes identified with them; and in face of this identity, the result that might accrue from the feeding of those thousands would be obtained by the feeding of a single learned man; this is the sense got at from the text.

This deprecation of the ignorant person is meant to be a praise of the learned man; and it does not really mean that the feeding of a single man produces results equal to those produced by feeding a thousand. Further, inasmuch as the scriptures lay down the feeding of the learned only, there is no possibility of the ignorant ever being fed. It may be that people might think that, in the absence of the fully learned man (thoroughly versed in the Veda), the feeding of the man 'learned in the Veda' (who is comparatively *ignorant*) laid down in verse 128 above permits, under certain conditions, the feeding of ignorant persons also; and in view of this, for the purpose of preventing the prohibition of feeding a 'large company' from applying to the case of ignorant persons also, the present text may be taken in its direct sense (whereby the feeding of thousands of ignorant persons is permitted).—(131)

VERSE CXXXII.

OFFERINGS FOR GODS AND PITṚS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ONE WHO IS DISTINGUISHED BY KNOWLEDGE; FOR HANDS SMEARED WITH BLOOD ARE NOT CLEANSED BY BLOOD.—(132)

Bhāṣya.

One who is '*distinguished*'—who excels—'*by knowledge*'—in learning; to such a one '*should be given*,' '*the offerings for gods and Pitṛs*.'

The sense of the metaphor of the '*hand smeared with blood*' is as follows:—'Hands smeared with blood when washed with blood only become all the more reddened, and they are not cleansed; similarly, the ignorant *Brāhmaṇa*, when fed, only carries the ancestors to still worse hells.'—(132)

VERSE CXXXIII.

AS MANY MOUTHFULS AS THE PERSON IGNORANT OF THE VEDA SWALLOWS OUT OF THE OFFERINGS TO GODS AND PITṚS, SO MANY FLAMING SPIKES, SPEARS AND IRON-BALLS DOES THE MAN SWALLOW AFTER DEATH.—(133)

Bhāṣya.

Even though it is the *shrāddha* that forms the subject-matter of the present context, yet the present verse describes the evil results occurring to the eater; it is to this effect that it has been declared that 'for this reason should the ignorant person fear the acceptance of gifts from this and that person.'

'*Spikes and spears*' are the names of particular weapons. Such a person is made by the attendants of the Lord of Death to eat red-hot iron-balls.

According to Vyāsa's view, the evil result accrues to the person offering the food, and not to the eater, nor to the ancestors. Because it cannot be right to connect the dead ancestors with the evil arising from the disobeying, by another person, of the prohibition (of the feeding ignorant persons); as in that case, there would be the absurdity of a man suffering

what he has not earned. If an ignorant person has been fed by the *son*, what fault is there of his dead ancestors ?

"But by this same reasoning the benefit also of the *shrāddha* should not accrue to the ancestors."

It would certainly not accrue to them, if the shrāddha-offering had not been distinctly enjoined as being for their benefit. In the present case (of feeding Brāhmaṇas), however, there is no such injunction as that 'this should be done by one who desires to confer a benefit on one's son,' as there is in the case of the *Shyēna* sacrifice. Then, as regards the words of the present text, they can fit in also with the person offering the food ; the construction in this case being—'that man, at whose performance of the *shrāddha* such a person eats, obtains such and such a result.' What forms the subject-matter of the present context is the prohibition of the feeding of ignorant persons ; and the disregarding of this prohibition would render the rite defective ; and this defect in the Rite would lead to the evil result that the man would no longer be entitled to the performance of that rite [and this would pertain to the *giver*, not *eater*, of the food] ; and since the ancestors derive benefit from the *shrāddha*, for this reason also the transgressing of its injunction should involve guilt on the part of the son.

"What are the precise words of Vyāsa (on this subject) ?"

[They are]—'As many mouthfuls as an ignorant person swallows out of a man's offerings, so many spikes does he swallow on going to the abode of Death.'

In place of '*prēto*' some people read '*prētya* ;' where also the term 'having died' pertains to the *eater* ; and the sense of the text is that 'the ignorant man shall not eat of the offerings made to gods and ancestors.'—(133)

VERSE CXXXIV

SOME TWICE-BORN PERSONS EXCEL IN LEARNING; OTHERS EXCEL IN AUSTERITIES; SOME OTHERS EXCEL IN AUSTERITIES AND VEDIC STUDY, AND OTHERS AGAIN EXCEL IN RITES.—(134)

Bhāṣya.

The text proceeds to divide the qualities of men, for the purpose of indicating the superiority of *learning*; and this also for the purpose of pointing out the propriety of making gifts to the learned.

Persons possessing excellence in 'learning'—knowledge—are said to 'excel in learning,'—*i.e.*, devoted to learning. The sense desired to be conveyed justifies the Bahuvrīhi compound even between non-appositional terms. Persons, who have studied the Veda and its meaning and are always intent upon it, are said to '*excel in learning.*'

This same explanation applies to all the terms ending with the term '*niṣṭhā.*'

The compound '*tapassvādhyāyaniṣṭhāḥ*' is *Bahuvrīhi*, containing within itself a copulative compound. '*Austerities*'—such as the *Chāndrāyaṇa*, and the rest;—'*vedic study*,' is learning of the Veda.

'*Rites*'—*Agnihotra*, and the rest.

It has to be borne in mind that all these qualities are meant to coexist together; the presence of any one of them only, in the absence of the others, does not make a man a fit recipient of the gift; all that the text describes is the fact of some men excelling in one and some in another. That such is the meaning is indicated by the fact that the term '*niṣṭhā*,' which denotes *finishing*, is indirectly indicative of *excelling*; and when a person excels in, is intent upon, some one quality, he is said to 'excel' in that. When a man is possessed of all the good qualities, but one of those is possessed in a superior degree, and the others in lesser degree, then also the man is a fit recipient; but if he does not possess anyone quality in a superior degree, even though he may possess all the qualities, he is not a fit recipient.

That a combination of all the qualities is necessary, is shown by what has been said in the second discourse to the effect that 'one who is devoid of learning cannot rightly perform any rites.'

Others have explained the term '*jñānaniṣṭha*' to mean the *Renunciate*, on the ground that 'devotion to self-knowledge' has been specially prescribed for him after he has renounced the performance of all rites; (under this explanation) the term '*taponiṣṭha*' would stand for the *Recluse*; he being called '*tāpasa*' (devoted to austerities); as in such assertions as 'during the summer the Recluse should perform the five austerities' (6. 23);—and the term '*tapaḥsvādhyāyaniṣṭha*' would stand for the *Student*;—and '*karmaniṣṭha*' for the *Householder*. According to this explanation, the persons whose feeding is prohibited are those that are outside the pale of the four 'stages;' say the Paurāṇikas—'the Shrāddha should not be offered to persons outside the pale of the four stages.'—(134)

VERSE CXXXV.

THE OFFERINGS TO THE PITṚS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY PRESENTED TO THOSE EXCELLING IN LEARNING; AND THE OFFERINGS TO GODS TO ALL THE FOUR, ACCORDING TO LAW.—(135)

Bhāṣya.

The author now proceeds to show the purpose why he has provided a classification of the qualities.

Offerings made to the Pitṛs are called '*Kavya*;' these should be '*presented*'—given—'*to those excelling in learning.*'

'*Carefully*'—implies that if one does not take special care, these also, like the offering to gods, should be given to all the four.

For the offerings to Pitṛs the best recipients are those excelling in learning,—it having been declared that 'he is the recipient among recipients.'

What the verse means is that food in general should be given to all the four, without any distinction.

'*Law*'—Rule laid down in the scriptures.—(135)

VERSE CXXXVI

IF A FATHER HAPPEN TO BE IGNORANT OF THE VEDA, WHOSE SON IS THOROUGHLY VERSED IN THE VEDA,—AND IF THE SON HAPPEN TO BE IGNORANT OF THE VEDA AND THE FATHER IS THOROUGHLY VERSED IN THE VEDA;—(136)

Bhāṣya.

This verse is intended to propound a doubt (as to which of the two is superior).—(136)

VERSE CXXXVII

'OF THESE TWO ONE SHOULD REGARD HIM AS SUPERIOR WHOSE FATHER IS LEARNED IN THE VEDA; WHILE THE OTHER DESERVES HONOUR FOR THE SAKE OF THE VENERATION DUE TO THE VEDA.—(137)

Bhāṣya.

Having raised the question as to which is superior of the two—one whose father is illiterate, but he himself is '*thoroughly versed in the Veda*,' *i.e.*, who has read the Veda along with the subsidiary sciences,—and the other whose father is thoroughly versed in the Veda, but he himself is illiterate,—the author now sets forth the established conclusion.

'*Of these two*'—between one who is himself learned in the Veda, but his father is illiterate, and one who is himself illiterate, but his father is learned in the Veda—one should know him to be 'superior'—more praiseworthy—who is himself illiterate, but his father is learned in the Veda.

'*The other......for the sake of the veneration due to the Veda*'—He is to be honoured, not because he is a Brāhmaṇa, but because he has learnt the Vedic Mantras, which have to be honoured; and since the honouring of the Veda has not been prescribed in connection with *Shrāddhas*, such a person does not deserve to be fed at these.

What the author does by means of these two verses, propounding as they do a question and its answer, is to indicate, through a laudatory description, that what entitles

a man to eat at *Shrāddhas* is the fact of his father being learned in the Veda, and that of himself being learned in the Veda (the two combined). The mere fact of he himself being learned in the Veda, does not entitle him to the eating, nor the fact of his father being learned in the Veda, while he himself is illiterate.

It is with reference to this that it has been said above (in 130) that 'one should examine the Brāhmaṇa from far off etc.;' and the examination of '*learning*' there mentioned refers to enquiries concerning the learning of both father and son; while those relating to *caste* and *qualifications*, these have to be extended to higher ancestors also. And since it is this distinction that is sought to be brought out in this verse, it cannot be regarded as a needless repetition.—(137)

VERSE CXXXVIII

AT A SHRĀDDHA ONE SHOULD NOT FEED A FRIEND; HIS ACQUISITION SHALL BE MADE BY MEANS OF RICHES. AT A SHRĀDDHA ONE SHOULD FEED HIM WHOM HE REGARDS NEITHER AS FRIEND NOR AS FOE.—(138)

Bhāṣya.

Even when endowed with the aforesaid qualifications of 'Vedic learning' and the rest, the man shall not be fed on account of his being a friend; this is the prohibition contained in this verse.

'*A friend*'—one whose happiness and unhappiness are the same as one's own, and who is in no way different from himself,—'*one should not feed at a Shrāddha.*'

'*By means of riches*'—by means of other kinds of gifts—'the acquisition' of the friend should be made; his friendship obtained; or the benefit of 'friendship' may consist in *non-separation*.

It is not only the friend that one shall not feed; the enemy also should not be fed. '*Him whom he regards neither as friend nor as foe,*'—towards whom one entertains feelings of neither affection, nor aversion; in regard to

whom there could be no suspicion of any relationship due to affection or any other motive; the mention of the 'friend or foe' being only illustrative. It is on account of the suspicion of such relationship that the maternal grandfather and others have been mentioned (in 147, 148 below) as secondary alternatives.

"There is possibility of the enemy being fed only where one wishes make a friend of him; hence he also being included under 'friend' (should not have been mentioned separately)."

The separate mention is expected to make the matter clearer.—(138)

VERSE CXXXIX

HE AT WHOSE SHRĀDDHAS AND SACRIFICES, THE FRIEND FORMS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR,--FOR HIM, AFTER DEATH, THERE IS NO REWARD, EITHER FOR SHRĀDDHAS OR FOR SACRIFICES.—(139)

Bhāṣya.

This verse supplies the commendatory supplement* to the foregoing prohibition.

The term '*friend*' is used here in the abstract sense; hence the meaning is 'in which friendship enters as the prime consideration.' And this includes both friend and foe.

The term '*sacrifice*' stands for (1) gifts given with reference to gods and (2) the feeding of Brāhmaṇas with a view to some transcendental result.

'*Prētya phalam nāsti*' ('after death there is no reward')—

"No construction is possible of this clause; since the nominative of the root '*pra + iṇ*' (of the act of *dying* denoted by the word '*prētya*') is the person performing the *shrāddha*, whereas of the verb '*na + asti*' ('is not') the nominative is '*phala*,' 'reward' [and as a rule, the nominative of the participle '*prētya*' and the finite verb '*nāsti*' should be one and the same]."

In answer to this, some people explain that the term '*prētyā*' is an independent word, an indeclinable noun, denoting *the other world* [and is not a participle at all].

Another explanation is that of the root *pra* + *in* also 'reward' is the nominative; the meaning of the participle in this case being '*even though arriving near*,' 'it does not come about,'—*i.e.*, it fails to be enjoyed.—(139)

VERSE CXL

THE MAN WHO, THROUGH FOLLY, MAKES FRIENDSHIPS BY MEANS OF SHRĀDDHAS,—THAT MEANEST OF TWICE-BORN MEN, HAVING THE SHRĀDDHA FOR HIS FRIEND, FALLS FROM THE REGIONS OF HEAVEN. —(140)

Bhāṣya.

'*Friendships*'—friendly relations—he '*who makes*' '*by means of Shrāddhas*,' '*through folly*'—*i.e.*, being ignorant of what is contained in the scriptures,—'*falls from heaven*,'—*i.e.*, never reaches heaven; the root 'fall' being used in the sense of *want of connection* in general; the sense being 'just as a man on reaching heaven and falling from there loses all connection with it, so this man also.' What is meant is that the man does not obtain the reward for performing the *shrāddha*. In this sense alone can the passage have any connection with all that has gone in the present context.

'*Having the shrāddha for his friend*;'—the *shrāddha* is spoken of as his friend, on account of its being the means of his acquiring a friend. It is in this sense that we have the Bahuvrīhi compound in '*shrāddhamitra*.'

'*The meanest of twice-born men*;'—the 'twice-born men' have been mentioned only by way of illustration; in reality, the *Shūdra* also should not feed friends at *shrāddhas*.

"The mere fact of the Shūdra being a *non-Brāhmaṇa* makes it impossible for him to feed a friend at *shrāddhas* (where only Brāhmaṇas are fed)."

But who has laid down the rule that Brāhmaṇas cannot be the friends of Shūdras?

"As a matter of fact, it is only persons of the same caste that are regarded as *friends*; so that there could be no friendship between persons, one of whom belongs to the higher and the other to the lower caste."

This also is not true ; since Shvētakētu, the son of Aruṇi, is declared to have said—'In the Pañchāla country, there is a *Kṣattriya* friend of mine.'

Then again, it has already been explained that the term 'friend' in the present context has been used as connoting *relationship* in general. And Brāhmaṇas also come to have pecuniary relations with *Shūdras* ; and to the *Pārashava-shūdra* (the Shūdra born of a Brāhmaṇa father and a *Shūdra* mother), Brāhmaṇas bear even blood-relationships.—(140)

VERSE CXLI

THIS CONVIVIAL DINNER HAS BEEN CALLED BY TWICE-BORN PEOPLE THE "GIFT OF DEVILS." IT REMAINS IN THIS WORLD ALONE, LIKE THE BLIND COW TIED IN A SINGLE ROOM.—(141)

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*sam*' (in '*Sambhojanī*') connotes *conviviality* ; and the term '*sambhojanī*' means that at which men dine together ; such convivial dinner is possible only among friends. Or, the word '*sambhojanī*' may be taken as standing for a social dinner of several people.

The making of friendships by Shrāddhas is a custom with 'devils,'—the term 'devil' here standing for highway robbers.

This gift '*remains in this world alone*'—*i.e.*, it is not capable of bringing rewards in the other world; just as the blind cow, which remains tied in a single room, so this gift also remains in this world only,—*i.e.*, the only result it brings about is the goodwill of friends,—and it does not bring any benefit to the ancestors.

The term '*dakṣiṇā*' here stands for *gift*.—**(141)**

VERSE CXLII

JUST AS HAVING SOWN THE SEED IN BARREN SOIL, THE SOWER REAPS NO HARVEST,—EVEN SO, HAVING GIVEN THE OFFERINGS TO ONE IGNORANT OF THE VEDA, THE GIVER OBTAINS NO REWARD.—(142)

Bhāṣya.

'*Barren soil*'—Unproductive ground. That plot of land is called 'barren' on which if seed is sown, it does not sprout; there the '*sower reaps no harvest.*'

'*Even so,*' '*to the person ignorant of the Veda,*'—'*having given the offerings*'—made to gods and ancestors,—'*the giver obtains no reward.*'

The term '*anṛchē*' is with the Locative ending; and the term '*ṛk*' stands for the *Veda* in general.—(142)

VERSE CXLIII

THE PRESENTING OF THE GIFT, ACCORDING TO RULE, TO THE LEARNED MAKES THE GIVERS AND RECEIVERS PARTAKERS OF REWARD, HERE AS WELL AS AFTER DEATH.—(143)

Bhāṣya.

That the gift that is presented to the learned person makes the *givers* partakers of reward is only right; but what is the reward obtained by the receivers? If it be held that they obtain some transcendental result,—that cannot be right: because the act of *receiving* gifts has not been so enjoined, and also because the receiver is prompted to accept the gift only with a view to the perceptible reward. If, on the other hand, the reward to the *receiver* be held to be something perceptible, —then such a reward is found to be obtained by the ignorant person also."

True; but what is stated here is mere praise; the sense being that—'the presenting of offerings to the learned man is so effective that the *receiver* also comes to partake of the imperceptible reward, in addition to the perceptible one,—what to say of the *giver.*'

'*After death*'—in heaven.

'*Here*'—the reward is in the form of fame; the man being praised by men as doing things in exact accordance with the scriptures.

'*According to rule*;'—this is a mere reiterative reference to the injunction that 'gifts should be made to persons posessing such and such qualifications.'—(143)

VERSE CXLIV

ONE MAY ENTERTAIN A FRIEND AT SHRĀDDHAS, BUT NEVER A FOE, EVEN THOUGH QUALIFIED. THE OFFERING EATEN BY THE ENEMY BECOMES FUTILE AFTER DEATH.—(144)

[Medhātithi takes no note of this verse].

VERSE CXLV

WITH GREAT CARE ONE SHOULD FEED AT A SHRĀDDHA THE ADHERENT OF THE ṚGVEDA WHO IS THOROUGHLY VERSED IN HIS VEDA, OR THE ADHERENT OF THE YAJURVEDA WHO HAS FINISHED THE ENTIRE RECENSIONAL TEXT, OR THE ADHERENT OF THE SĀMAVEDA WHO HAS REACHED THE END OF IT.—(145).

Bhāṣya.

The three terms—'*thoroughly versed in the Veda,*' '*who has finished the entire recesional text*' and '*who has reached the end of it*'—are synonymous; everyone of them denotes *persons who have learnt the whole recensional text, including the Mantra as well as the Brāhmaṇa*; not those who have learnt either the *Mantra*-text alone or the *Brāhmaṇa*-text alone, or only a portion of these. The name '*shrotriya,*' 'learned in the Veda,' is applied to even those who have learnt only a part of the Veda; hence the three terms in the present verse have been used for the purpose of excluding the mere '*shrotriya.*' In regard to this latter, it has been said (in 128) that 'the offering should be given to the *shrotriya*;' the term '*shrotriya*' means 'one learned in the *Veda*;' and the term '*veda*' denotes the entire recensional text, including the *Mantra* and the *Brāhmaṇa*, as also a part of these. Consequently, for the purpose of referring to one who has learnt

the *entire* recensional text, the Text has used the terms in question.

"It has been laid down above (134-135) that one shall feed only such persons as belong to one or the other *stage*; and until one has learnt the entire Vedic text, it is not possible for one to enter upon the state of the Householder; as it has been asserted that 'the entire Veda should be learnt' (2.165)."

But even so, it would be open to one to feed the Student who has begun to learn the Veda,—even before he has finished it. Hence all the three synonymous terms—'thoroughly versed in the Veda,' 'who has finished the entire recensional text,' and 'who has reached the end of it'—indicate that the *whole* Veda should have been learnt.

Though only one of these words would have sufficed for the purpose, yet the Author has made use of several forms of the same expression in view of metrical exigencies.

'*Vedapāragaḥ*,' '*Thoroughly versed in the Veda*,'—who has *gone through* the entire Veda.

'*Shākhāntagaḥ*' '*who has finished the entire recensional text*,'—the end of the recensional text.

'*Samāptikaḥ*,'—'who has reached the end of it.'

'*Adhvaryu*,' '*adherent of the Yajurveda*'—one who has studied the Yajurveda; this term is not used here as the name of one of the principal sacrificial priests. '*Ādhvaryava*' is the name given to the act of reciting; hence the person connected with this act is called '*Adhvaryu*.'

'*Chhāndoga*,' '*adherent of the Sāmaveda*,'—one who studies the Sāmaveda.

In another *Smṛti*, it is the person who has learnt the 'three thousands' that has been called '*samāptika*;' and the term 'thousand' here denotes the *Sāmaveda*, by reason of its being related to a thousand musical forms; and one whose learning consists of *three* of these '*thousand*' is 'one who has learnt the three thousands;' the *three* forms being (1) the

'*Tāṇḍava*' (Texts relating to Dancing), (2) the '*Aukthikya*' (Texts relating to the *Ukthas*) and (3) the '*Sāmagāna*' (the singing of Sāma verses); these are the three 'sciences' of the Sāmaveda, of which there are a thousand recensions.

The '*Ṛgveda*' stands for the Samhitā text of ten *Maṇḍalas* divided into sixty-four *adhyāyas* and the Brāhmaṇa.

Others have explained this verse as excluding the adherents of the Atharva Veda from being fed. (They argue that) if the author had intended to include all the Vedas, he would have simply said—'one should feed that Brāhmaṇa who has learnt the entire recensional text of the Veda.'

"The same argument might be urged against the verse being taken as excluding the adherent of the Atharva Veda: if this exclusion had been intended, the Author could have simply said—'the adherent of the Atharva Veda shall not be fed.' Such a statement would be very much simpler and a more direct way of laying down the exclusion."

There is no force in this; as Manu's way of teaching Dharma is diverse: sometimes he leaves the negation to be implied by means of an affirmation, and at others he puts the negation directly in its own words.—(145).

VERSE CXLVI

IF ANY ONE OF THESE SHOULD DINE, DULY HONOURED, AT THE SHRĀDDHA PERFORMED BY A CERTAIN PERSON, THERE WOULD BE EVER-LASTING SATISFACTION FOR HIS ANCESTORS, LASTING TILL THE SEVENTH DEGREE (OF DESCENDANTS).—(146)

Bhāṣya.

Some people might argue as follows:—"It has been asserted that 'at the rite performed in honour of ancestors one should feed three Brāhmaṇas;' and in the preceding verse the learners of several recensional texts have been mentioned; so that there is no possibility of one's own companions in study being fed."

And it is with a view to set aside this notion that the author puts forward the present verse.

Of these three—the adherents of the three Vedas—anyone may be fed.

That is to say, one may feed either persons professing the same recensional text as oneself or those professing other several texts.

'*Duly honoured*'—worshipped, approached, with offerings of water, etc.

'*Satisfaction to the seventh degree*'—*i.e.*, the satisfaction continues till the seventh degree of descendants. The prolonging of both vowels in the term '*sāptapauruṣī*' is in accordance with Pāṇini 7.3.20. This epithet has been added for the purpose of indicating great length of time; the meaning being that 'the satisfaction of the ancestors lasts for a long time.' The meaning is that 'by the feeding of the said Brāhmaṇa, the satisfaction secured to the ancestors is such as lasts till such time as his sons and grandsons to the seventh degree are born.'

'*Everlasting*,'—*i.e.*, it does not cease, and then appears again; it remains there always.—(146)

VERSE CXLVII

THIS IS THE FIRST COURSE TO BE ADOPTED IN THE PRESENTING OF THE OFFERINGS MADE TO GODS AND PITṚS. THIS (FOLLOWING) IS TO BE REGARDED AS THE SECONDARY COURSE ALWAYS ADOPTED BY THE GOOD.'—(147)

Bhāṣya.

Beginning with verse 122, twenty-five verses have gone before; and the upshot of them all is as follows: (a) Shrāddhas should be performed on the moon-less day;—(b) the person fed should be learned in the Veda, highly educated, of right behaviour, belonging to a known family, the son of a person learned in the Veda and not bearing any relationship to the person offering the *Shrāddha*. The rest of it all is only commendatory.

'*This*'—what has been just described,—is '*the first*'—the primary—'*course*'—procedure at *Shrāddhas*; *viz.*, that the

food shall be presented to one who is not related to the performer.

'*This*'—what is going to be described—'should be regarded as '*the secondary course*'—which is to be adopted only in the event of the primary course being not possible. This course is called '*anukalpa*,' 'secondary course,' by the 'law of substitutes' (propounded in *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* 3.6.37 *et. seq.*).

'*Always adopted*'—this is purely commendatory.—(147)

VERSE CXLVIII

ONE MAY FEED THE MATERNAL GRANDFATHER, THE MATERNAL UNCLE, THE SISTER'S SON, FATHER-IN-LAW, THE TEACHER, THE DAUGHTER'S SON, THE SON-IN-LAW, A RELATIVE, THE PRIEST AND HIM AT WHOSE SACRIFICES THE PERFORMER OFFICIATES.—(148)

Bhāṣya.

'*Svasrīyaḥ*'—the sister's son.

'*Viṭpatiḥ*'—the son-in-law; the term '*viṭ*' meaning *child*. According to others, '*viṭpati*' is the *guest*, he being the 'lord of all men;' in ordinary parlance also, one who comes to one's house is called '*viṭ*.'

'*Bandhuḥ*'—the wife's brother, the cognate kinsman, and so forth.—(148)

VERSE CXLIX

AT THE RITE IN HONOUR OF THE GODS, THE MAN KNOWING THE LAW SHALL NOT EXAMINE THE BRĀHMAṆA. BUT WHEN THE RITE IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS COMES TO BE PERFORMED, HE SHALL EXAMINE HIM CAREFULLY.—(149)

Bhāṣya.

This verse is not meant to be prohibitive of the examination of Brāhmaṇas (to be invited) at the rite performed in honour of the gods; what is meant by it is the permitting, at certain times, of the feeding, at rites in honour of gods, of such persons as are one-eyed, suffering from elephantiasis, and so forth.

'*At the rite in honour of the Pitṛs*'—*i.e.*, when the time for *Shrāddha* has arrived, one should do the examination with great care; not so at the rite performed in honour of the gods. At the latter, one may sometimes even feed those going to be mentioned. Who are those that are permitted to be fed, we shall show later on.

According to others, however, this verse has been introduced for the purpose of enjoining the strict exclusion of those going to be mentioned; and not for that of permitting the feeding of those at the rites in honour of gods.—(149)

VERSE CL

MANU HAS DECLARED THOSE BRĀHMAṆAS UNDESERVING OF (RECEIVING) THE OFFERINGS TO GODS AND PITṚS WHO ARE THIEVES, OUTCASTS AND EUNUCHS, AS ALSO THOSE THAT HAVE THE BEHAVIOUR OF ATHEISTS.—(150)

Bhāṣya.

'*Thieves*'—stealers.

'*Outcast*'—one who commits any one of the five 'great sins.'

'*Eunuch*'—emasculate, having the marks of both man and woman, unvirile, impotent.

'*Atheists*'—Materialists and others; those whose firm conviction is that 'gifts are nothing, oblations are nothing, there is no other world;' the behaviour of those is unbelief; 'those whose behaviour is like the behaviour of atheists' are called 'having the behaviour of atheists,'—this being an instance of the compound that drops its last term. The word 'atheist' by itself would be sufficient; the term 'behaviour' has been introduced for the purpose of filling up the metre.

Or, the term '*nāstikavṛttayaḥ*' may be taken to mean 'those who derive their livelihood from atheists.'

These Manu has declared to be undeserving of the offerings made at the rites performed in honour of gods and Pitṛs.

The name of 'Manu' has been added for the purpose of lending force to the prohibition; as, in reality, all duties have been described by Manu.—(150)

VERSE CLI

ONE SHOULD NOT FEED, AT A SHRĀDDHA, ONE WITH BRAIDED HAIR, WHO IS NOT LEARNED, ONE WHO IS HAIRLESS, THE GAMBLER, AND THOSE WHO SACRIFICE FOR HOSTS.—(151)

Bhāṣya.

'*One with braided hair*'—*i.e.*, the Student; this arranagement of the hair has been laid down as an optional alternative for him—'he should either shave his head or wear his hair in braids' (2-219); the 'braided hair' is mentioned here only as an indicative of the Student; hence the present verse includes also that student who may have shaved his head. And the student whose feeding is prohibited here is only *one who is not studying.*

"In view of what has been said above in regard to the propriety of feeding one who is learned in the Veda* (128), there can be no possibility of anyone feeding a man *who is not studying* (why then should his feeding be specially prohibited?)"

The prohibition is necessary, as otherwise one might feed the student who began his study, but did not carry it on and did not learn the Veda.

"But it has been said above (145) that one should feed him who is '*thoroughly versed in the Veda*;' where, then, could there be any possibility of the admission of one who had only made a beginning of study?"

In that case, we shall take the prohibition as applying to that student who may have read through the Veda, without having made it all his own.

Or, the phrase '*who is not learned,*' may be taken as added to guard against the contingency that, on the strength of what is said (in 3. 234) regarding the propriety of feeding the daughter's son, even though he be still in the state of

studentship, some people might be led to think the only necessary qualification consisted in the person invited being the 'daughter's son,' and 'learning' was not an essential condition at all. And when the student 'who is not studying' becomes precluded, it naturally follows that the student who is studying is entitled to be fed.

'*Durvāla*;'—this term may mean either one whose hair have fallen off, or one who is red-haired, or one who is without hair in his private parts. In this sense, they explain the etymology of the word as follows:—'mere grass suffices for his clothing, he is covered by mere grass, having no clothing, he hides his private parts with mere grass.'

'*Gambler*'—who is addicted to gambling.

'*Who sacrifice for hosts*'—for groups of men. The collective performance of the *Vrātyastoma* for a number of *Vrātyas* has been prescribed; and officiating at such sacrifices has been prohibited under II. 197.

Our explanation, however, is that the phrase applies to one who may sacrifice, even by turns, for many persons; *i.e.*, who undertakes service as priest very frequently:—such a person also shall not be fed. Says Vashiṣṭha—'He who sacrifices for many men, and he who initiates many persons.'

Some people hold that, since the present verse specifies the '*Shrāddha*,' the interdict herein contained pertains only to rites in honour of the Pitṛs, not to those in honour of the gods.

This, however, is not right. Because the rites in honour of the gods (*Vishvēdevas*) are also a part of the '*Shrāddha*,' which latter term therefore can be used in connection with these also.—(151)

VERSE CLII

HEALERS, TEMPLE-ATTENDANTS, MEAT-SELLERS AND THOSE LIVING BY TRADE,—THESE SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT RITES PERFORMED IN HONOUR OF GODS AND PITṚS.—(152)

Bhāṣya.

'*Healers*'—physicians.

'*Temple-attendants*'—those who attend upon idols.

These two are prohibited only as means of living. Healing and serving idols, when done entirely with a righteous motive (and not as a means of living), are not reprehensible.

'*Meat-sellers*'—Butchers.

If we read these words with the Accusative ending, then they have to be construed with the verb of the preceding verse.

'*Those living by trade,*'—*i.e.*, by improper trade; improper merchandise shall be described under Discourse 10,—those who live by such trade.

'*Should be avoided*'—at both kinds of rites.

Meat-selling is reprehensible, even when done with a righteous motive. For instance, when one man has got meat and another man has need for it;—the former man who has got the meat stands in need of butter for oblations; and he exchanges his meat with the other man's butter; this exchange is done 'with a righteous motive,' and *exchange* also is called 'selling;' hence those also become excluded who do such meat-selling, even with a righteous motive.—(152)

VERSE CLIII

THE SERVANT OF A VILLAGE AND OF THE KING, ONE WITH DEFORMED NAILS, ONE WITH BLACK TEETH, THE OPPOSER OF HIS SUPERIOR, ONE WHO HAS FORSAKEN THE FIRE AND THE USURER.—(153)

Bhāṣya.

'*Servant*'—one who carries out orders; one who is sent by the village-people hither and thither, on business.

Similarly, '*the servant of the king,*' '*one who has deformed nails,*' '*one who has black teeth.*'

'*Opposer of his teacher,*'—he who, in conversation and other things, remains against and in opposition to his superior.

'*One who has forsaken the Fire*'—*i.e.*, out of the Three Fires and the Domestic Fire, one who has given up even one.

'*Usurer*'—one who, even though he has other means of living available, lives upon interest. Though 'Usury' has been defined as 'the accumulating *of grains* by interest,' yet this definition can be accepted as authoritative only within the limited scope of the subject dealt with by the Smṛti in which it occurs; in fact, grammarians apply the term 'usurer' to persons making a living by interest, in connection with things other than grains also; and, in the matter of words and their meanings, grammarians are more authoritative than others; because they make these the subject of careful study. —(153)

VERSE CLIV.

THE INVALID, THE CATTLE-TENDER, ONE WHO HAS SUPERSEDED HIS ELDER BROTHER, HE WHO NEGLECTS THE GREAT SACRIFICES, ONE WHO IS INIMICAL TO BRĀHMAṆAS, HE WHO HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED BY HIS YOUNGER BROTHER, AND ONE WHO IS MEMBER OF A COMPANY.—(154)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*yakṣmī*' stands here for the *invalid* in general. Some peope take it as standing for *one suffering from consumption.*

'*Cattle-tender*'—he who, stick in hand, tends cattle as a profession.

'*Nirākṛti,*' '*who neglects the Great Sacrifices,*'—one who, though entitled to perform the Great Sacrifices, fails to perform them. Even now-a-days, one who fails to perform the Great Sacrifices, and is, on that account, regarded as 'incapable of being served,' is called '*Nirākṛti.*' Thus we

read in the *Shatapatha*—'one who worships neither gods, nor ancestors nor men.'

Some people quote the definition that—'the man devoid of Vedic study, learning and wealth is called *Nirākṛti*;' but these people are ignorant of the right meaning of words; because the person mentioned in this definition can have no connection with the present context, which deals exclusively with 'persons learned in the Veda.' If the term '*Nirākṛti*' is taken in the sense of 'the derider, *Nirākartā*, of gods, etc.,' then there is some compatibility with the literal signification of the root; and even though the term ends with the abstract affix, '*ktin*,' and as such is an abstract noun denoting a *quality*, yet its use in the sense of the person having that quality may be justified on the principle that there is no difference between the *quality* and *one possessing the quality*.

Then again, the root in the term '*Nirākṛti*,' when preceded by '*ni*,' signifies *exclusion*; people who are excluded are said to be '*Nirākṛta*;' as we find in such expressions as '*Nirākṛta*, excluded, from dinner,' '*Nirākṛta*, excluded, from title,' and so forth. Thus *non-exclusion* would be '*ākṛti*,' 'invitation;' and one from whom this has been set aside, would be '*Nirākṛti*.'

Further, '*ākṛti*' also means *configuration*; the prefix '*ni*,' having the sense of *reprehensibilty*, the term may be taken as excluding the ill-figured person. It has been declared that (one should feed) 'one who is endowed with speech, beauty, age and character;' here 'endowed with speech' means *eloquent, of powerful speech*; but the man who is garrulous should not be fed; '*endowed with beauty*' means *having a beautiful body and limbs*; 'endowed with age' means what Gautama (15.10) has said in regard to 'the feeding of older men before youths.'

Lastly, the term '*Nirākṛti*' may be taken as ending in '*ktich*,' and being a proper name,

'*One who is inimical to Brahman*'—one who hates Brāhmaṇas, or the Veda; the term '*Brahman*' denoting both (Brāhmaṇa and Veda); when, for instance, it is said that 'the Brāhmaṇa also is called *Brahman.*'

'*Company*'—corporation; those, who subsist conjointly upon one means of livelihood, are spoken of by the name '*company;*' and those Brāhmaṇas who are members of such a company.

'*One who has superseded his elder brother*' and '*one who has been superseded by his younger brother*'—these are going to be described later on.—(154)

VERSE CLV.

AN ACTOR, ONE WHO HAS BROKEN THE VOWS OF CONTINENCE, THE HUSBAND OF A SHŪDRA WOMAN, THE SON OF A RE-MARRIED WOMAN, ONE WHO HAS ONLY ONE EYE, AND HE IN WHOSE HOUSE LIVES THE PARAMOUR.—(155)

Bhāṣya.

Bards, dramatic performers, dancers and singers are called 'actors.'

'*One who has broken the vows of continence*'—necessary for the student.

The term '*vṛṣalī*' stands for the *shūdra* woman; her '*husband.*' People think that this refers to a case where there is no other wife; the meaning being 'he who is the husband of the Shūdra woman alone, he who has no wife of any twice-born caste.'

"Whence is this sense got at?"

In another connection, we find a recapitulation of reprehensible practices, where we read—'these are men addicted to reprehensible practices' (167); the mere marrying of a *Shūdra* woman, which is sanctioned by all, is not 'reprehensible;' but it has been sanctioned only for one who has already married a wife of the same caste as himself. Hence, what is excluded here is that husband of the Shūdra woman who has no wife of the same caste as himself.

'*The son of a re-married woman*;'—'*punarbhūḥ*' is the remarried woman; described under Discourse 9, in the verse 'she who has been abandoned by her husband, etc.' (9.175).

'*Who has only one eye*'—whose one eye is maimed.

'*He in whose house lives the paramour*,'—*i. e.*, the paramour of his lawfully wedded wife. Such a man is despised by reason of his tolerating such a thing. It is said below (8-317)—'The abortionist transmits his guilt to him who feeds him, and the misbehaved wife transmits hers to her husband.'—(155)

VERSE CLVI.

ONE WHO TEACHES FOR A STIPULATED FEE, HE WHO IS TAUGHT BY ONE WHO TEACHES FOR A STIPULATED FEE, THE PUPIL AND ALSO THE TEACHER OF A SHŪDRA, ONE WHO IS REPREHENSIBLE IN SPEECH, THE SON OF AN ADULTERESS AND THE SON OF A WIDOW.—(156)

Bhāṣya.

'*One who teaches for a stipulated fee*,'—one who teaches only while he is engaged on a fee; one who undertakes the work of teaching after having made the stipulation that 'if you pay me so much, I shall teach you the Veda,' is called 'one who teaches for a stipulated fee.' Such is the form of payment known among bearers and others. If, however, without having verbally stipulated that one would receive a certain amount of money, one does the work of teaching and receives payment afterwards, then such a teacher is not 'one who teaches for a stipulated fee.' In fact, teaching in return for payment of an amount not previously stipulated, has been actually sanctioned.

Similarly, '*one who is taught by one who teaches for a stipulated fee*;' this is the name given to one who *himself*, like Satyakāma, pays a stipulated fee and then reads with the teacher. The boy, however, who, in the absence of any other teacher, is put by his father and others under the tuition of one who is paid a stipulated fee, is not regarded as 'of reprehensible practice.' Because it is for the father to save the

boy from all that is prohibited. It has been declared (in 8·317)—'The pupil and the sacrificer transmit their guilt to the Teacher.'

'*The pupil of a Shūdra*'—in the learning of Grammar and other Sciences.

'*Teacher*'—of the Shūdra. Though the term '*shūdra*,' forms the subordinate factor in the compound '*shūdrashiṣya*,' yet it is construed with the following word; such construction being permissible in works on *Smṛti*. Then again, the condition of being 'reprehensible practice' is a qualification that governs all that is said here, and it is only the teaching of the Shūdra that is reprehensible, not the teaching of any other higher caste.

'*Reprehensible in speech*'—*i.e.*, rude and untruthful of speech. Others explain this to mean 'one who is accused of a serious offence.'

'*The son of an adulteress and the son of a widow*'—to be described later on (174).—(156).

VERSE CLVII.

THE FORSAKER, WITHOUT CAUSE, OF HIS MOTHER, FATHER AND SUPERIOR; AND HE WHO HAS FORMED A CONNECTION, THROUGH THE RELATIONSHIP OF EITHER VEDA OR MARRIAGE, WITH OUTCASTS.—(157)

Bhāṣya.

He who, in the absence of any cause, forsakes his Mother, Father and Preceptor. The term '*guru*,' 'superior' here being used in its general sense, includes the Teacher also.

Some people argue that—"in that case (if 'guru' stands for the *superior* in general), the Father and the Mother need not have been mentioned, these also being included under the term '*guru*;' for this reason, this term '*guru*' should be taken as standing for the Preceptor only."

This, however, is not right. If the 'father' and 'mother' were not specifically mentioned, then the term 'superior'

would stand for the father only, by the law of the 'natural and artificial' [*i.e.*, where both are possible, the *natural* one is to be given the preference, and the Father is the *natural* superior, while the Teacher is only an *artificial* one]. When, however, these two are mentioned separately, then it becomes clear that the term 'superior' has been used in its most general sense; specially in view of what other scriptures have said regarding the Teacher being 'the best of superiors.'

Reasons for forsaking these superiors are such as are mentioned in the text—'one should forsake one's father, if one has injured the king,' and so forth.

The 'forsaking' of one's parents means omitting to wash and shampoo their feet and to do such other services, *i.e.*, being inattentive to their service. Similarly, with the Teacher, in whose case going for study to another teacher, while one's teacher is capable of teaching one, also constitutes 'forsaking.'

'*Who has formed connection with outcasts*'—*i.e.*, established relationship with them.

'*Through the Veda*'—*i.e.*, by officiating at their sacrifices, by teaching them, and so forth.

'*Through marriage*,'—*i.e.*, by giving his daughter in marriage to them, and so forth.

"The man who forms such connection, would himself become an outcast; and it would be as an outcast himself that he would be avoided at rites."

In answer to this, some people say, in view of what is said below (290) regarding a man becoming an 'outcast' by associating with outcasts *for one year*, that the present prohibition should be taken as pertaining to the time before the lapse of the twelve months.

"What is this peculiar form of expression—'*formed a connection through relationship?*'"

As a matter of fact, the term '*samyoga*,' '*connection*' is not used here in the sense of 'conjunction,' according to the

usage of the *Vaishēṣikas* ; it is the *act* itself that is called 'connection,' by reason of its being the *cause* of connection. In connection with the acts of 'officiating at sacrifices' and the like, the term 'connection' indicates and stands for mere relationship in general.—(157)

VERSE CLVIII.

THE HOUSE-BURNER, THE POISONER, ONE WHO EATS THE FOOD OF AN ADULTERESS' SON, THE SELLER OF SOMA, THE SEA-VOYAGER, THE BARD, THE DEALER IN OILS, AND THE PERJUROR.—(158)

Bhāṣya.

The burner of houses.

'*Garada*'—one who gives to others the *gara-poison* ; the mention of '*gara*' is merely indicative ; it includes all kinds of poison.

He who eats the food of the adulteress' son; similarly, he who eats the food of the widow's son; the former being meant to be purely indicative.

He who sells Soma ; 'Soma' is a particular kind of *herb* ; he who sells this *herb*, for use either at sacrifices or for medicine.

Others have explained the term 'Soma' (in the expression 'seller of Soma') to mean the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices performed with the Soma. Though the actual 'selling' of these sacrifices is not possible,—because an *act* is purely incorporeal,—yet, as a matter of fact, the practice of 'selling' sacrifices is found to be current among illiterate people; hence the present prohibition. Illiterate people are found making such assertions in oath as—(*a*) 'whatever good I have done, may be yours' (where they mean to transfer the merit acquired by their good deeds), and (*b*) 'that night in which you were born and that in which you are dying, leaving these two, all your charities and performances, all your good deeds, your life and offspring I might destroy, if they injure me' (An oath). And just as they make use of such oaths, so also they practice the *Giving* and *Selling* (of acts) by

means of words; and he who does this, is avoided (at *Shrāddha*-feedings). It is from this that we infer the impropriety of uttering such oaths and the doing of such verbal givings and sellings.

'*Sea-voyager*'—one who goes out to the sea.

'*Bard*'—one who sings the eulogia of men.

'*Dealer in oils*'—one who presses sesamum and other oil-seeds.

'*Perjuror*'—one who tells a lie when giving evidence. —(151).

VERSE CLIX.

ONE QUARRELLING WITH ONE'S FATHER, THE KEEPER OF A GAMBLING HOUSE, THE DRUNKARD, ONE AFFLICTED WITH A FOUL DISEASE, ONE ACCUSED OF SINS, THE HYPOCRITE, AND THE DEALER IN ESSENCE.—(159)

Bhāṣya.

He who quarrels with his father; *i.e.*, talks rudely to him; and goes to court against him as party to a suit instituted for partition. Says Gautama (15-19)—'Those who separate from their Father, without reason.'

"Why should this be asserted here, which appears to be a repetition of what has been mentioned above (153) as the 'opposer of his Teacher'?"

Opposing is one thing, and *quarrelling* is something different. When the superior wants a certain thing, if one were to say rudely, 'How can this be got !,'—this is 'opposing;' so that one is an 'opposer, by obstructing his acquisition of a thing that belongs to him. Further, under 153 '*pratirāddhā*' is another reading (for '*pratiroddhā*'), which means 'doing direct injury,' *i.e.*, striking the superior with slaps, &c. And with this reading what has gone before (in 153) is clearly different from the 'quarrelling' mentioned here.

'*Keeper of a gambling house*'—the gamester who makes other people gamble; he who is himself a gambler has been already excluded before (in 151).

Some people read *'Kēkara'* (for *'Kitava'*), reading the text as *'Kēkaro madyapastathā ;'* and *'Kēkara'* is the man with a squint.

Others, again, read *'Kātara,'* which means 'one, the pupils in whose eyes are like the parrot's feather, green.'

'*Drunkard*'—one who drinks wines of kinds other than the '*Surā*' (wine distilled from grains); such, for instance, as the '*Ariṣṭa,*' and the like ;—the drinker of '*Surā*' being already precluded as an 'outcast.'

'*One afflicted with a foul disease*'—*i.e.*, the leper ; he being very much despised among people, it is only right that he should be spoken of as 'afflicted with a foul disease.'

It is on account of the present prohibition that the term *yakṣmi* (in 154) has been taken (by some people) not as the 'invalid' in general, but one who is suffering from consumption ; if the 'invalid' in general were meant, then all invalids being included there, the author would not have mentioned 'one afflicted with a foul disease' in this verse.

'*Accused of sins.*'—one who is known among people as having committed sins, great and small ; even without its being known for a certain.

'*Hypocrite.*'—one who deceitfully performs religious acts, with a view to gaining popularity, not because he thinks it his duty to do so.

'*Dealer in essence.*'—*i.e.*, the seller of poison ; it is poison that is called 'Essence.' In several places, we find the *poisoner* spoken of as '*rasadaḥ*' 'giver of *essence.*' —(159)

VERSE CLX.

THE MAKER OF BOWS AND ARROWS, HE WHOSE WIFE DALLIES WITH ANOTHER PERSON AND HE WHO MAKES LOVE TO HIS BROTHER'S WIDOW, HE WHO INJURES A FRIEND, HE WHO SUBSISTS BY GAMBLING AND HE WHO HAS HIS OWN SON FOR HIS TEACHER.—(160)

Bhāṣya.

He who, as a professional artisan, makes bows and arrows.

'*Agrēdidhiṣūpatiḥ ;*'—the term '*didhiṣū*' is connected

both ways, like the single eye-ball of the crow operating in both sockets. Such a construction is permissible, because the text belongs to the category of a '*smṛti-shāstra.*' Even (meaningless) lines and clods of earth are made to yield some meaning, in consideration of the requirements of *Smṛtis* ; and they come out useful too. For this reason, the objection need not be raised as to how a single term occurring in the middle of a compound can be construed with two different terms. In fact, Gautama (15. 16) has expressly prohibited both (the '*agrēdidhiṣū*' and the '*didhiṣūpati*'), and this indicates the plausibility of the above construction ; and the compound really contains two terms. Further, there is no such person as '*agrēdidhiṣūpati.*' The definition of these two ('*agrēdidhiṣū* and *didhiṣūpati*') will be supplied later on.

'*Who injures a friend*'—who puts obstacles in a friend's business.

'*Who subsists by gambling*'—The man for whom gambling is the means of subsistence.

"Such a person has already been mentioned in the preceding verse."

But the person who helps people to gamble (the 'keeper of a gambling house, mentioned before) is not necessarily one who makes a living by it ; in fact, it is one who himself does not know gambling, or who does not do it through fear of his elders ; but, being addicted to it as an amusement, he always makes others gamble ; and it is for excluding this kind of man that we had the second '*Kitava*' (in the preceding verse ; the word '*Kitava*' having been first included in verse 151).

Or, the term '*dyūtavṛtti*' may stand for those who, without any money themselves, are constant dummy visitors at gambling places.

He whose son is his *teacher* ; it is not possible for the son to be his father's '*āchārya*' in the real sense of this term.—(160)

VERSE CLXI.

AN EPILEPTIC, ONE HAVING A STRING OF SCROFULOUS SWELLINGS, ONE WHO SUFFERS FROM LEUCODERMA, THE BACKBITER, THE LUNATIC, THE BLIND MAN, AND THE DERIDER OF THE VEDA—ALL THESE SHOULD BE AVOIDED.—(161)

Bhāṣya.

The words here used signify particular diseases.

'*Bhrāmarī*'—is an epileptic.

'*Gaṇḍamāti*'—on whose cheeks and throat there appear swellings in the form of a string.

'*Shvitra*'—is white leprosy, leucoderma.

'*Pishuna*,' '*backbiter*,' is one who betrays other people's secrets, and accuses them on the sly.

'*Lunatic*'—whose mind is unsettled, either when there is derangement of his humours or when he is obssessed by a ghost, and he says and does things at random.

'*Blind man*'—who is without eyes.

'*Derider of the Veda*'—"The *derider of the Veda* has been already mentioned before by the term '*brahmadviṭ*' 'who is inimical to Brahman,' where the term '*brahman*' has been explained as having several meanings (signifying the *Brāhmaṇa* as well as the *Veda*)."

Not so; *deriding* is something totally different from being *inimical*; being *inimical* is a property of the mind, while *deriding* is speaking ill, of one by words expressing disregard.—(161)

VERSE CLXII.

THE TAMER OF ELEPHANTS, BULLS, HORSES OR CAMELS, ONE WHO AT SUBSISTS ON SRS, BIRD-KEEPER AND THE TEACHER OF WARFARE.—(162)

Bhāṣya.

'One who trains elephants, etc., is called their 'tamer,' he who trains them in various gaits.

'*One who subsists on stars*,'—the term 'stars' stands for the science of Astrology; and he who lives by that is the astrologer.

The keeper of birds,—he who keeps them for the purposes of chase.

'*Teacher of warfare*'—one who teaches the science of archery.—(162)

VERSE CLXIII.

HE WHO DIVERTS WATER-COURSES, HE WHO IS ADDICTED TO OBSTRUCTING THEM, THE HOUSE-PLANNER, THE MESSENGER AND THE TREE-PLANTER.—(163)

Bhāṣya.

'*Water-courses*'—the sources of water ;—'*he who diverts*' these ; *i.e.*, having cut the embankments, takes the water to irrigate his field, &c.

'He who is addicted to obstructing them'—*i.e.*, the water-courses. '*Obstructing*' means *covering up* ; hence the meaning is that 'he who closes the source from which the water flows.'

The person who advises regarding the position of houses ;—one who lives by the science of architecture ; *i.e.*, the architect, the mason, and so forth. One who plans his own houses is not meant here.

'*Messenger*,'—the king's servant ; who is employed by him as a slave. He is one who is employed in business relating to peace and war.

He who plants trees for payment. Planting them as a righteous act is not reprehensible ; because such an act would not be 'reprehensible practice ;' in fact, the planting of trees has been actually enjoined, as we learn from such assertions as 'he who has planted ten mango-trees goes not to hell.'—(103)

VERSE CLXIV.

HE WHO SPORTS WITH DOGS, THE FALCONER, THE DEFILER OF VIRGINS, THE CRUEL MAN, HE WHO DERIVES HIS SUBSISTENCE FROM SHŪDRAS, AND HE WHO SACRIFICES TO THE GAṆAS.—(164)

Bhāṣya.

'*He who sports with dogs*'—*i.e.*, keeps dogs for sporting purposes.

'*Falconer*—he who lives on falcons,—*i.e*, by buying and selling them. The '*bird-keeper*' mentioned before (162) is one who keeps them in cages.

He who makes a virgin cease to be a virgin is called 'the defiler of virgins.'

The '*cruel man*' is one who takes delight in killing animals.

He who derives subsistence from serving the Shūdras.

'*Vṛṣalaputraḥ*' is another reading (for '*vṛṣalavṛttiḥ*'), which means 'he who has only *Shūdra* children;' 'having only Shūdra children' being a 'reprehensible act.'

He who sacrifices to the deities called '*gaṇas*.' '*Gaṇayāgas*' are well known.—(164)

VERSE CLXV.

ONE DEVOID OF RIGHT CONDUCT, THE MAN WITHOUT VIGOUR, THE CONSTANT BEGGAR, HE WHO LIVES BY AGRICULTURE, ONE SUFFERING FROM ELEPHANTIASIS, AND HE WHO IS SPOKEN ILL OF BY GOOD MEN.—(165)

Bhāṣya.

'*Right conduct*' stands here for the ordinary acts of courtesy, such as offering worship to persons coming to one's house, and so forth;—he who is devoid of this.

'*Without vigour*'—*i.e.*, with very little energy; who has lost all enthusiasm for doing his duties.

'*Constant beggar*'—one who is always begging, he who teases people by his begging; it is in the very nature of things that begging should displease the person begged from. The term '*yāchanakaḥ*' is formed with the '*yu*' affix, according to Pāṇini 3.1.134, and then the reflexive '*ka*' added to it.

'*He who lives by agriculture*'—by doing the cultivating himself; or even by the cultivating done by others, if other means of living are available.

'*One suffering form elephantiasis*'—whose one leg is thicker than the other.

'*He who is spoken ill of by good men*'—the unfortunate man, who is despised by good men, even without doing anything wrong.—(165)

VERSE CLXVI.

THE SHEEP-DEALER, THE BUFFALO-KEEPER, THE HUSBAND OF A WOMAN WHO HAD ANOTHER PREVIOUS HUSBAND, THE CARRIER OF THE DEAD—ALL THESE SHOULD BE AVOIDED WITH CARE.—(166)

Bhāṣya.

'*Urabhra*' is *sheep*; one who 'deals' in these,—*i.e.*, carries on the business of buying and selling them; it may also mean 'one whose chief wealth consists in sheep.'

Similarly, the '*buffalo-keeper.*'

'He who has had another man for her former husband;—the husband of such a one; *i.e.*, one who marries again the woman who has been previously given to—or married by—another man; he who 'again' (*punaḥ*) '*becomes*' (*bhavati*) the husband; such a husband is called '*paunarbhava*' by the scriptures.

He who carries the dead—*i.e.*, carries the dead bodies. These '*should be avoided with care.*'—(166)

VERSE CXLVII.

THE LEARNED BRĀHMAṆA SHOULD AVOID AT BOTH (RITES) THESE LOWEST OF TWICE-BORN MEN, WHO ARE OF REPREHENSIBLE CONDUCT AND WHO ARE UNWORTHY OF COMPANY.—(167)

Bhāṣya.

These men, whose '*conduct*'—line of action—is 'reprehensible.' The 'blind' and the rest having their previous misconduct indicated by these disabilities; while the 'thief,' etc., have their misconduct actually perceptible in the present.

'*At both*'—rites for gods and pitṛs.

'*Should avoid*'—should exclude.

'*Unworthy of company*'—*i.e.*, they do not deserve company. The '*ḍhak*' affix denoting *presence*. *Absence from company indicates unworthiness.* That is, he does not deserve to eat in the company of other Brāhmaṇas. It is for this

reason that such persons have been called 'defilers of company;' the meaning being that those who sit at dinner with them become defiled.—(167)

VERSE CLVIII.

THE UNLEARNED BRĀHMAṆA BECOMES QUENCHED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE FIRE OF DRY GRASS. THE SACRIFICIAL OFFERING SHOULD NOT BE PRESENTED TO HIM; AS NO LIBATION IS POURED UPON ASHES.—(168)

Bhāṣya.

This is re-iterated in the present verse, in order to indicate that, just as the thief and the rest are 'defilers of the company,' so equally blameworthy is the unlearned Brāhmaṇa also.

Others offer the following explanation:—The present verse is intended to indicate the occasional admissibility, to the offerings for gods, of such blind and other disabled, but learned, Brāhmaṇas as happen, at some particular time, to be free from any reprehensible practice; the sense of the text being—'The unlearned Brāhmaṇa should be avoided, but why should not the offering be not presented to one who is learned?' It is for this reason that the text mentions the 'offering *for gods*.' So that what is meant is that, at the offering to gods, it is only the *unlearned* Brāhmaṇa that should be excluded, while those whose practices are reprehensible, and are on that account distinctly debarred by a direct prohibition, should be excluded from *both* the offering to gods and that to pitṛs,—and only from that to ancestors. Vashiṣṭha has said: 'If a person learned in the Veda happen to be stigmatised by such bodily defects as are regarded as defiling the company, such a person Yama declares to be unblameworthy; in fact, such a person is a sanctifier of the company.'

'*Becomes quenched in the same manner as the fire of dry grass;*'—The fire of dry grass cannot cook the sacrificial offerings, and it becomes quenched as soon as the offering is

thrown into it, and also becomes extinguished; anything offered into it does not become burnt to ashes; and hence such an offering becomes futile; since it has been laid down that 'one should not pour libations into fire that is not burning brightly, the fire embodies all deities;'—exactly of the same nature as the fire of dry grass is the unlearned Brāhmaṇa. This is what the text means by the words—'*As no libations are poured on ashes;*' just as the fire of dry grass becomes turned into ash before (burning the offerings), and people do not pour libations into such fire, similarly, the unlearned Brāhmaṇ is not fed.—(168)

VERSE CLXIX.

I AM GOING TO DESCRIBE FULLY THE RESULTS THAT AFTERWARDS ACCRUE TO THE GIVER FROM GIVING, OUT OF THE OFFERING TO GODS AND TO PITṚS, TO ONE WHO IS UNWORTHY OF THE LINE.—(169)

Bhāṣya.

The author states the result of the prohibitive injunction just put forward.

'*Paṅktya*' means 'those who are worthy of the line;—those who are not so, are '*apaṅktya*;' the '*yat*' affix being added by virtue of the term '*paṅkti*' occurring in the '*daṇḍādi*' group.

The results that accrue, from giving to such persons, to the giver,—all that I am going to describe; do listen with attention.—(169)

VERSE CLXX.

DEMONS INDEED CONSUME THE FOOD THAT IS EATEN BY BRĀHMAṆAS DEVIOD OF SELF-RESTRAINT, BY SUCH AS THOSE WHO HAVE SUPERSEDED THEIR ELDER BROTHER AND THE LIKE, OR BY OTHERS THAT ARE UNWORTHY OF COMPANY.—(170)

Bhāṣya.

'*Devoid of self-restraint*'—uncontrolled; whose practices are not controlled by the scriptures.

'*Those who have superseded their elder brother,*' and

the like, are, in fact, outside the pale of the scriptures; yet they have been mentioned here with a view to differentiate them from others, and also to indicate the gravity of their offence.

'*Others that are unworthy of company*'—such as the blind man, the man affected with elephantiasis, and so forth.

The food that is eaten by those people, at a *Shrāddha*, is consumed by 'demons'—the enemies of gods,—and not by one's ancestors. That is to say, the *Shrāddha* becomes entirely useless.

The mention of '*demons*' is a purely deprecatory exaggeration.—(170)

VERSE CLXXI.

HE WHO UNITES HIMSELF WITH "WIFE" AND "AGNIHOTRA," WHILE HIS ELDER REMAINS, IS TO BE REGARDED AS THE "SUPERSEDER OF HIS ELDER;" AND THE ELDER IS TO BE REGARDED AS "ONE WHO IS SUPERSEDED."'—(171)

Bhāṣya.

'*Agraja,*' '*elder brother*'—is the uterine brother born before one. Thus has it been asserted—'There is no harm in the superseding of the uncle's sons, the step-mother's sons and the sons of other's wives, by marriage and the setting up of fire;' hence, in the present context, the term 'elder brother' stands for the uterine brother. While he '*remains*'—*i.e.*, without marriage and without having set up the fire; the root '*sthā*' (in the term '*sthite*') has been used in the sense of *the absence of the act mentioned.*

The term '*agnihotra*,' though the name of the *act* of sacrifice, stands for the *setting up of fire* for purposes of that act.

In another *smṛti*, we find an exception—'the lunatic, the sinner, the leper, the outcast, the eunuch and the consumptive need not be waited for.' What is mentioned here is meant to be indicative of the condition in the form of the elder brother being in any way not entitled (to marry

and set up the fire). Hence the 'defiler of company' is also included.

A special period has also been specified during which one is to wait for his elder brother to marry and set up the fire—'one should wait for eight years,'—'some say for six years' (*Gautama*, 18.19). This period is to be reckoned from the time when the younger brother has reached the age of marriage; and the age of marriage is the time when one has duly fulfilled the injunction of Vedic Study.

"As a matter of fact, the period of time stated in the passage quoted refers to the man who has gone out travelling. The passage quoted above begins with the word 'the elder brother being,' which refers to the time during which the elder brother is out on travel. [So that it can have no bearing upon *supersession* by marriage]."

True; but the term 'who has gone out on travel' is distinctly found to be connected with one sentence [this sentence being '*pravrajite nivṛttiḥ prasaṅgāt, Gautama*, 18.16]; so that, for connecting the same word with another sentence ['*bhrātari chaivam jyāyasi yavīyān*, 18.18], some special reasons should be stated. There is, however, no such reason; as there is in the case of such words as 'there is connection between this and the term *svarita*;' no such words, however, are found in the case of the sentences in question; nor is one sentence incomplete without the connection of the word in question.

Vashiṣṭha has used the generic term 'fire;' and has, therefore, meant the '*Smārta*' Fire.

Some people have held this definition of 'superseder' to apply also to one whose father has not set up the Fire; the term '*agraja*,' 'elder,' meaning simply 'one born before one;' so that the Father also is one's 'elder.'

In this manner, what is said here would apply to other 'older' persons also; as a matter of fact, however, the terms 'younger' and 'elder' are never used between father and son.

In another *Smṛti* we find—'the elder *brother* being, etc., etc.' (Gautama, 18·18, where the *Brother* is specifically mentioned).

The elder brother is called the '*superseded*.'—(171)

VERSE CLXXII.

THE SUPERSEDED ELDER BROTHER, THE SUPERSEDING YOUNGER BROTHER, AND SHE THROUGH WHOM THE SUPERSEDING IS DONE,—ALL THESE GO TO HELL, ALONG WITH THE GIVER AND THE OFFICIATING PRIEST AS THE FIFTH.—(172)

Bhāṣya.

While he is dealing with the subject of 'supersession,' the author proceeds to state its prohibition by showing the evil that befalls all persons connected with it.

He who is passed over, insulted, by the marriage is the '*superseded elder brother*;' and he who does the passing over of the elder brother is '*the superseding younger brother*;' —that girl through whom the superseding is done;—'*all these go to hell*.'

The '*giver*' and the officiating priest form the fifth of those that go to hell. The '*giver*' meant here must be that of the girl, her father and other guardians; that such is the meaning is clear from the context.

The '*officiating priest*' is one who performs the *Homa* in marriage, or he who guides the ceremony. Or, it may mean 'one who officiates as priest at the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices by the aforesaid four persons—the superseded elder brother, the superseding younger brother, the girl that is married, and he who gives her away.'

For this reason, the elder brother should act in such a manner that he does not form an obstacle in the marriage of his younger brother; and the younger brother also should wait for twelve, eight or six years; and the girl also should not allow herself to be given away to such a person.

The compound '*dātṛyājakapañchamāḥ*' is to be expound-

ed as a *Bahuvrīhi*, containing *Dvandva* : a '*Dātṛyājākau* (*Dvandva*) *pañchamau yēṣām*' (Bahuvrīhi).—(172)

VERSE CLXXIII.

HE WHO WOULD LASCIVIOUSLY MAKE LOVE TO THE WIFE OF HIS DEAD BROTHER, EVEN THOUGH SHE MAY HAVE BEEN APPOINTED ACCORDING TO LAW (TO BEAR A CHILD BY HIM), SHOULD BE KNOWN AS THE "DIDHIṢŪPATI."—(173)

Bhāṣya.

He who, acting in accordance with the law of '*Niyoga*,' should happen to make love to—take delight in intercourse with—the wife of his dead brother ;—'*lasciviously*'—*i.e.*, in transgression of the exact form of '*Niyoga*,'—*i.e.*, renouncing the injunction that 'one should hav eintercourse with his brother's wife only *once* during her periods,'—if he should have recourse, at will, to such advances as consist in firm embrace, kissing, and so forth,—or if he should have intercourse with her more than once,—or even allow his mind to be inclined that way,—then, such a person, impressed with the mark of passion by such signs, as casting longing glances upon the woman, and so forth, is to be known as the '*didhiṣūpati*.'

The exact definition of the '*agrēdidhiṣūpati*' is to be learnt from another *Smṛti*, which says—'when the brother is alive, the man is to be known as the *agrēdidhiṣūpati*.'

Some people have held that the present verse does not form part of the text at all ; and as a reason for this, they urge the fact of its being incomplete. It being necessary to provide definitions of both (the *didhiṣūpati* and the *agredidhiṣūpati*), it is not possible for authors who know their business to provide the definition of only one of them ; specially, as another *Smṛti* has provided the definitions of both :—(*a*) 'the wise men regard him as *didhiṣūpati*, who is the husband of a woman who has had a previous husband ; and (*b*) that Brāhmaṇa is to be regarded as the *agrēdidhiṣūpati* of whom that woman was the wife ;'—and

these definitions are not applicable to the present context (which might have justified the omission by our author); as 'the husband of a woman who has had a previous husband' has been excluded already before (in verse 160). Hence the '*didhiṣūpati*' must be different from the one defined as such in the passage just quoted (from another *Smṛti*).—(173)

VERSE CLXXIV.

By the wives of other men two kinds of sons are born: the "Kuṇḍa" and the "Golaka;" he who is born while the husband is alive is the "Kuṇḍa," and one born after the death of the husband is the "Golaka." —(174)

Bhāṣya.

While the husband is alive, if a son is born to his wife living in his house, from a paramour tolerated by the forgiving nature of the husband,—this son born of a stranger is called '*Kuṇḍa*.'

That born after the husband has died, is '*Golaka*.'

Some people have held that these names are given to sons born to the woman not 'appointed' by her husband (to bear children).

This, however, is not right; as in that case their exclusion would be secured by the mere fact of their being *non-Brāhmaṇas*. Hence we conclude that the '*Kuṇḍa*' and the '*Golaka*' are sons born to the woman 'appointed' by her husband.

"But how is it that the sons born to the *unappointed* woman are *non-Brahmaṇas*, while those born to the *appointed* woman are *Brāhmaṇas*?"

This follows from the fact that, in the definition of castes, the term 'wife' is mentioned: 'In the case of all castes, one born of the *wife* of the same caste, etc., etc.' (10.5). This term '*wife*,' like the term '*husband*,' is a relative one; the term 'wife,' '*patnī*,' again, has been

explained (etymologically) as *associated with one at sacrificial performances* ; and no man is entitled to perform sacrifices in association with another man's wife.

"If that be so, then no *Brāhmaṇa-hood* should belong to the sons born to the *appointed woman*, in whose case also the same reason is applicable."

This question we shall determine under Discourse 10 (verse 5).

Or, both—the sons of the appointed as well as those of the unappointed woman—may be regarded as 'non-Brāhmaṇas;' but the difficulty is that, as has been already pointed out above, if these persons are not Brāhmaṇas, then, there being no possibility of these being admitted to dinners, any prohibition of them would be altogether uncalled for. Specially, as their exclusion would be secured by the exclusion of the 'out-cast.' Being an 'out-cast' consists in falling off from the duties of the Brāhmaṇa; and as *eating at shrāddhas* is a duty of the Brāhmaṇa, such feeding may not be possible for the out-cast. And yet we find his exclusion asserted in verse 150 above,—(174)

VERSE CLXXV

THESE CREATURES, BORN OF OTHER MEN'S WIVES, CAUSE, FOR THE GIVER, THE DESTRUCTION, IN THIS LIFE AS WELL AS AFTER DEATH, OF THEIR OFFERINGS TO GODS AND PITṚS THAT HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THEM.—(175)

Bhāṣya.

The plural number in *'prāṇinaḥ,'* 'creatures,' is according to Pāṇini 1.2.58.

These people do not deserve the names of '*Brāhmaṇa*,' and the rest; and they only deserve to be called 'creatures;' they are not worthy of any other name. For this reason, they '*cause the destruction of the offerings to gods and Pitṛs;*'—*i.e.*, they render them fruitless—'*for the givers*'—those who give it to them.

The terms '*parivēttṛ*' (superseder) and the rest are not sufficiently well known in ordinary usage; nor are they capable of being etymologically analysed. Hence, the author has provided the definition of these.—(175)

VERSE CLXXVI.

IF ONE WHO IS UNWORTHY OF COMPANY HAPPEN TO LOOK UPON A NUMBER OF THOSE THAT ARE WORTHY OF COMPANY, WHILE THOSE ARE EATING, THEN THE FOOLISH GIVER (OF FOOD) DOES NOT OBTAIN THE REWARD OF FEEDING SO MANY MEN.—(176).

Bhāṣya.

'*Pāṅktya*' are those that deserve the *paṅkti*, *line*. One is called '*pāṅktya*' when one is deserving of sitting on the same seat as, and eating in the company of, good men. He who is not so deserving, is '*a-pāṅktya.*'

As many worthy people—learned men, ascetics and persons learned in the Veda—the unworthy man happens to look upon while the former are eating,—the reward of feeding so many men,—in the shape of the satisfaction of his ancestors—fails to be accomplished.

For this reason, when one is performing *shrāddhas*, one hould send away from that place all thieves and others.

'*Foolish*'—ignorant.—(176)

VERSE CLXVII.

THE BLIND MAN, BY LOOKING, DESTROYS THE FEEDER'S REWARD FOR FEEDING NINETY MEN, THE ONE-EYED MAN OF SIXTY, THE LEPER OF ONE HUNDRED, AND THE MAN AFFLICTED WITH A FOUL DISEASE OF A THOUSAND.—(177)

Bhāṣya.

"How can there be any *looking* by the blind man;—by virtue of which the text says '*the* blind man *by looking*, etc.'?"

True; what is meant is only his proximity to the place. The meaning is that, in an uncovered place, the blind man

should be removed away from such distance from which the man with eyes could see.

'*The one-eyed man of sixty*;'—this does not mean that if the number is more than these, they may be fed (even in the presence of the blind, etc.). All that the reducing of the number means is that the delinquency would be less serious, and hence the expiatory rite to be performed would be on a smaller scale.

It is the *leper* that is called '*shvitrī*.'

'*The man suffering from a foul disease*'—is well known. —(177)

VERSE CLXXVIII.

AS MANY BRĀHMAṆAS THE OFFICIATOR AT THE SACRIFICES PERFORMED BY SHŪDRAS MAY HAPPEN TO TOUCH WITH HIS LIMBS, —THE REWARD RELATING TO CHARITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE GIFT TO SO MANY BRĀHMAṆAS FAILS TO ACCRUE TO THE GIVER.—(178)

Bhāṣya.

As many Brāhmaṇas he may happen to touch with his limbs,—when he happens to enter the same line with them;—here also the actual touching of the body is not meant; mere presence at the place is meant.

'*Reward relating to charity*'—*i.e.*, the rewards that follow from gifts made outside the sacrificial altar.—(178)

VERSE CLXXIX.

IF A BRĀHMAṆA, THOUGH LEARNED IN THE VEDA, SHOULD, THROUGH COVETOUSNESS, ACCEPT A GIFT FROM HIM,—HE QUICKLY PERISHES; JUST LIKE THE UNBAKED VESSEL IN WATER.—(179)

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the present subject, the author points out the impropriety of receiving gifts from one who officiates at sacrifices performed by *Shūdras*.

'*Though learned in the Veda*;'—if he accepts the gift of something belonging to one who officiates at sacrifices performed by *Shūdras*,

'*Through covetousness*'—is a mere reiterative reference.

He also *perishes quickly*—*i.e.*, he is deprived of what he desires,—in the shape of wealth, children, cattle, body, and the like.

When such is the fate of one learned in the Veda—what is to be said of one who is ignorant of the Veda ?

The author will point out later on that there is not much harm in the learned man's receiving gifts.

'*Āma*'—unbaked—'*pātra*'—vessels, such as saucer, and the like.

'*In water*'—*i.e.*, when thrown into water.—(179)

VERSE CLXXX.

WHAT IS GIVEN TO THE SOMA-SELLER BECOMES ORDURE; TO THE PHYSICIAN, PUS AND BLOOD; THAT TO THE TEMPLE-ATTENDANT BECOMES LOST; AND THAT TO THE USURER HAS NO PLACE.—(180)

Bhāṣya.

The sense is that the man becomes born in that species of creatures where ordure is eaten.

Similarly, with the physician.

'*Becomes lost*'—*i.e.*, fruitless ; or source of anxiety ; anything that is 'lost' becomes a source of anxiety.

That which has no place, no existence at all, is called '*apratiṣṭham*.'

Various forms of expression have been used here to show the fruitlessness of the gift and also the evils attaching to the giver. The terms '*lost*' and '*without place*' should not be regarded as synonymous, as there is a distinct difference in their effects.—(180)

VERSE CLXXXI.

THAT WHICH IS GIVEN TO THE TRADER IS NEITHER HERE NOR THERE. SIMILARLY, WHAT IS GIVEN TO THE BRAHMAṆA BORN OF A REMARRIED WOMAN IS LIKE A LIBATION POURED ON ASHES.—(181)

Bhāṣya.

This also is to be explained as the preceding verse.

It is the *feeding* of the Trader that is prohibited, not his proximity to the place; because there is no ground for taking the words of the present verse as conveying this latter sense, as there was in the case of a previous verse (177), where the term, 'by looking,' was taken as indirectly indicating 'visible place,' and hence prohibiting the man's proximity to the place.

The man '*born of the a remarried woman*' shall be described later on, under discourse 9 (verse 175)—(187)

VERSE CLXXXII.

THE WISE ONES DECLARE THAT FOOD GIVEN TO THE OTHER UNFIT PERSONS UNWORTHY OF COMPANY, DESCRIBED ABOVE, BECOMES FAT, BLOOD, FLESH, MARROW AND BONE.—(182)

Bhāṣya.

A few unfit persons,—such as the *blind*, and the rest—have been specifically mentioned in the foregoing verses, describing the evil results of giving food to those unworthy of company; apart from these, there are others, the '*thief*,' and the rest, mentioned in the several contexts; when these are fed, the following things accrue to the giver: *viz.*, fat, blood, flesh, &c. That is, he becomes born as creatures who feed on these things; *i.e.*, such creatures as insects and such carnivorous animals as vultures, and the like.

"*The wise*"—those learned in the Veda say this.

The upshot of the whole is as follows:—If one feeds such persons as are unworthy of company, the duty of performing the *Shrāddha* is not accomplished; and its non-performance leads inevitably to the sin of disobeying an injunction;—specially, as the injunction of *Shrāddha* is absolutely obligatory.—(182)

SECTION (9)—THE SANCTIFIERS OF COMPANY.

VERSE CLXXXIII.

NOW LISTEN TO THE FULL DESCRIPTION OF THOSE CHIEF OF TWICE-BORN MEN, THE SANCTIFIERS OF COMPANY, BY WHICH BEST OF THE TWICE-BORN A COMPANY DEFILED BY MEN UNWORTHY OF COMPANY BECOMES PURIFIED.—(183)

Bhāṣya.

'*By men unworthy of company*'—as described above—'*defiled*'—rendered defective,—'*company*'— assembly — by which *Brāhmaṇas* '*become purified*'—rendered free from defilement,—to those '*listen*'—as described in the coming verses ;—'*full*'—the description that is being given by me fully.

The remaining words are purely laudatory reiterations.

What is meant is that the 'sanctifier of company,' by reason of the excellence of his qualities, removes the defects of other persons also by dining with them ; just as the impure man, dining with others, makes even faultless men defective.

This verse does not sanction the feeding of men unworthy of company. All that it means is, that one should always seek for the 'sanctifier of company ;' and that if one such person has been found, one might feed,—even though it be futile to do so,—those who have not been carefully examined to three degrees of ancestors, if they are not found to be marked by any perceptible disqualifications. It is with this end in view that the author provides the description of the 'sanctifier of company.'—(183)

VERSE CLXXXIV.

THOSE PERSONS SHOULD BE KNOWN AS "SANCTIFIERS OF COMPANY" WHO ARE FOREMOST IN ALL THE VEDAS AND IN ALL THE EXPLANATORY SCIENCES, AND WHO ARE BORN IN THE FAMILY OF MEN LEARNED IN THE VEDA.—(184)

Bhāṣya.

'*Foremost*'—most excellent ; who have carefully made

the Vedas their own by having all doubts regarding them set aside.

'*Foremost also in all the explanatory sciences*'—*i.e.*, the subsidiary sciences which serve to explain what is contained in the Veda. That is, those persons who have learnt, and are learning, the Veda along with the six subsidiary sciences.

'*Those who are born in the family of men learned in the Veda*'—*i.e.*, those whose father and grandfather, etc., are also equally learned in the Veda and the subsidiary sciences.

"It is persons such as these that have been mentioned as fit for being fed; what further excellence is here mentioned, by virtue of which these men are described as 'sanctifiers of company?'"

It has been laid down above that food should be given to one possessed of even slight knowledge, only if he happens to be learned in the Veda. In the present instance, however, mere learning is not mentioned as the only condition of being a 'Sanctifier of Company.' In fact, this latter character of being a 'Sanctifier of Company' is dependent upon the presence of special qualifications; and hence it cannot be right to accept it in cases of lower qualifications. Thus the present verse is meant to sanction the giving of food to one who is simply learning the Veda, in the absence of fully learned persons. So that, in the absence of the fully learned man, the giving of food to one who is learning the Veda is the first course to be adopted, and not merely a secondary one.

The plural number is used, in view of the individual men.

The particle '*cha*' has the cumulative sense.—(184)

VERSE CLXXXV.

ONE WHO HAS LEARNT THE "TIṆĀCHIKĒTA," ONE WHO KNOWS THE SIENCE OF THE FIVE FIRES, ONE WHO HAS LEARNT THE "TRISUPARṆA," ONE WHO KNOWS THE SIX-LIMBED SCIENCE, ONE WHO IS BORN OF A WOMAN MARRIED IN THE "BRAHMA" FORM, ONE WHO SINGS THE JYĒṢṬHA-SĀMAS.—(185)

Bhāṣya.

'*Triṇāchikēta*' is the name of a portion of the Yajurveda, beginning with the words '*pītodakā jagdhatṛṇā*; and the man is called '*triṇāchiketa*' by the circumstance of his having learnt that portion. Others, however, explain that there are certain observances prescribed for those who are learning the *Triṇāchikēta* Mantras; and the person who has kept these observances is called '*Triṇāchiketa*.' Here also the term is applied to the man only figuratively.

It should not be thought that merely this (fact of having learnt a certain portion of the Veda) makes one a 'Sanctifier of Company;' what is meant is, that when the other qualifications of being learned in the Veda and the like are present, the circumstance here mentioned forms an additional qualification as indicating the character of being a 'Sanctifier of Company.'

'*Five fires*,' '*Pañchāgnividyā*,' is the name of a certain teaching occurring in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (5.10·9), the reward whereof has been described in the words '*stēnohiraṇyasya*, etc.' The man is also so called by the circumstance of his having learnt the said teaching, as in the case of the previous word.

Others have explained the term '*Pañchāgni*' as 'one maintains the five fires,'—*i.e.*, the three sacrificial fires, the social fire and the domestic fire. Of these, the 'social fire' is that which is lighted in many countries with large quantities of fuel, for the purpose of relieving cold.

'*Trisuparṇa*' is the name of a *mantra* occurring in the

Taittirīya Veda, and also in the *Ṛgveda*, beginning with the words '*yē brāhmaṇās trisuparṇam paṭhanti*, etc.'

The '*six-limbed science*' is the Veda; one who has learnt this.

One who is born of a woman who has been married in the "Brāhma" form,—*i. e.*, who has been given to a bridegroom brought home by invitation.

'*One who sings the Jyēṣṭha Sāmas*;—The '*Jyēṣṭhadohas*' are *Sāman-mantras* found in the *Āraṇyaka*; one who sings these is called '*Jyēṣṭhasāmaga*.' Here also the man is so called by reason of his singing the *Sāman* and keeping the observances in relation to it.—(185)

VERSE CLXXXVI.

HE WHO UNDERSTANDS THE MEANING OF THE VEDA, HE WHO EXPOUNDS IT, THE STUDENT, THE GIVER OF A THOUSAND, THE CENTENARIAN;—THESE BRĀHMAṆAS SHOULD BE KNOWN AS "SANCTIFIERS OF COMPANY."—(186)

Bhāṣya.

'*He who understands the meaning of the Veda.*'

"The *knower of the* '*six-limbed science*' has already been mentioned."

True; but the man meant here is one who himself, even without the help of the Subsidiary Sciences, finds out the meaning of the Veda, by his own intelligence. Or, the same person spoken of before may be taken as referred to again and again; the meaning being that in the absence of the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda, people are not deserving of being fed at *Shrāddhas*, even though they may have other qualifications.

'*One who expounds it*'—*i. e.*, the meaning of the Veda.

'*The Student.*'

'*The giver of a thousand*;'—in the absence of mention of any particular thing, this should be taken to mean '*one who has given away a thousand cows*.' But the right view appears to be that the term, '*thousand*,' standing for *much*,

the person meant is one who gives much, *i.e.*, the extremely generous person ; specially, as there is nothing definite to indicate that the number refers to *cows*. But the Veda having asserted that 'cows are the mothers of sacrifice,'—where no particular thing is mentioned—*cows* should be understood to be meant.

'*The centenarian*'—*i.e.*, one who is of advanced age ; such a person, having all his impurities cleared off, acquires the sanctifying character. The '*centenarian*' is one whose life extends over a hundred years ; the number being taken, on the basis of usage, as referring *to years*. Or, the term 'hundred' may be taken as standing for *many*, so that the word means 'long-lived,' 'of advanced age.'

Gautama (15.10-11) has declared that 'gifts should first be made to young men ;—others say it is like the Father;' and people have taken the term '*Student*' of the present verse as conveying this same idea ; the student being the person of 'early age.'—(186)

SECTION (10)—METHOD OF INVITATION.

VERSE CLXXXVII.

WHEN THE SHRĀDDHA-PERFORMANCE HAS APPROACHED, ONE SHOULD INVITE, EITHER ON THE PRECEDING DAY OR THE NEXT DAY, IN THE PROPER MANNER, AT LEAST THREE BRĀHMAṆAS, SUCH AS HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED.—(187)

Bhāṣya.

It has been explained what sort of Brāhmanas should be fed ; now the author proceeds to describe other details of procedure.

'*On the preceding day*'—on the day preceding the one on which the *shrāddha* is to be performed; *i.e.*, if the performance falls on the *Amāvāsyā* or the *Trayodashī*, then on *Chaturdashī* or *Dvādashī*, respectively;—*i.e.*, when one is going to perform the *Shrāddha* to-morrow, one should invite the Brāhmaṇas to-day.

'*On the next day*'—*i.e.*, on the same day as the performance.

The option here laid down is in consideration of the rules : if one is able to follow the rules closely, then one should do the inviting on the previous day; but if one is unable to do so, then one may do it on the same day. There is no doubt, however, that a strict observance of the rules would bring great rewards.

When the invitation is made, the inviter is to be approached and urged with entreaties.

Those of whom three is the least number,—this is what is meant by '*at least three.*' That is, the least number that should be fed is *three* ; in the event of his being able to feed more, 'he should feed an odd number, according to his enthusiasm,'—as has already been prescribed above.

The rest of the words are meant only to fill up the verse.

'*Approached,*'—arrived.

'*Such as has been described,*'—*i.e.*, mentioned above.—(187)

VERSE CLXXXVIII.

THE BRĀHMAṆA INVITED AT A RITE IN HONOR OF PITṚS SHALL REMAIN SELF-CONTROLLED AND SHALL NOT RECITE THE VEDA; SO ALSO THE MAN WHO PERFORMS THE SHRĀDDHA.—(188)

Bhāṣya.

One invited '*at a rite in honour of Pitṛs*'—*i.e.*, at a *shrāddha*—'*shall remain self-controlled*;' *i.e.*, with his mind under control, he shall maintain continence and keep up also the other restraints and observances—such as the observances of the '*Snātaka*,' and so forth. The avoidance of dancing, music, etc., which are the observances to be kept up by men, has been prescribed as part and parcel of religious rites; hence the performer of the *shrāddha* shall so arrange things that the invited Brāhamaṇa, from the moment he has been invited, shall keep control over his sense-organs; otherwise the *shrāddha* would become defective.

'*He shall not recite the Veda*;'—what is prohibited is the *reciting* of the texts of the Veda; the mere repeating of *mantras* during the evening and morning prayers is not prohibited.

'*Also the man who performs the Shrāddha*'—*i.e.*, at the rite that one performs in honour of the Pitṛs, one should, like the invitee, remain self-controlled; the construction is—'So the man also...... shall remain self-controlled.' The meaning is, that the rule regarding self-control and avoiding of Veda-reciting applies alike to the inviter and the invitee, from the moment of invitation onwards.—(188)

VERSE CLXXXIX.

THE PITṚS ATTEND UPON THOSE INVITED BRĀHMAṆAS; LIKE THE WIND, THEY FOLLOW THEM AND SIT DOWN WHEN THEY ARE SEATED.—(189)

Bhāṣyā.

The present verse supplies a recommendation in support of the injunction that the invited person should remain self-controlled.

Because *'the Pitṛs,'*—in their invisible forms—*'attend upon'*—enter into the body of—*'the invited Brāhmaṇas;'* just in the same manner in which people are obsessed by evil spirits.

'Like the wind they follow him;'—when a man moves along, the *'wind'*—in the form of his breath—follows him; and it does not leave him while he is moving; and the Pitṛs also are in the form of air.

'So when they'—*the Brāhmaṇas*—*'are seated,'* *"they sit down;' i.e.*, they move when the Brāhmaṇas move and sit down when they are seated. The meaning is that the invited Brāhmaṇas take the form of the Pitṛs; hence those invited shall not be unrestrained in their behaviour.—(189)

VERSE CXC.

THE BEST OF BRĀHMAṆAS, WHO, WHEN DULY INVITED AT THE RITE IN HONOUR OF GODS AND PITṚS, HAPPENS, SOMEHOW, TO NEGLECT IT, INCURS SIN AND BECOMES A HOG.'—(190)

Bhāṣya.

'Kētitaḥ' means *invited.*

'Havyē kavyē'—at the rite in honour of Gods, and at the rite in honour of the Pitṛs. Having accepted the invitation and promised to eat,—if *'somehow he neglects it,'*—*i.e.*, does not present himself at the time of eating, or, if he does not maintain continence,—then such a Brāhmaṇa *'becomes a hog.'*

'Somehow'—*i.e.*, either intentionally, or through lapse of memory.

'Duly'—this has been added for the purpose of filling up the verse.

Others have held that the *'neglect'* here stands for *non-acceptance of the invitation*; according to what has been said in the *Shrāddhakalpa*—'one should not fail to accept the invitation of a man free from all blame.'

This, however, is not right ; it is through desire to eat that men become prone to go to *shrāddhas* ; and if a man

happens to have no such desire, and hence refuses the invitation, what sin could there be in this ?—(190.)

VERSE CXCI.

IF THE MAN INVITED AT THE SHRĀDDHA DALLIES WITH A WOMAN, HE TAKES UPON HIMSELF ALL THE SIN THAT THERE MAY BE IN THE GIVER.—(191)

Bhāṣyā.

The term '*vṛṣalī*' here stands for *woman* in general; this is indicated by the fact that the invitee has been advised to observe strict *continence* (and not only avoidance of improper intercourse). Hence, in the present context, the Brāhmaṇa woman also is a '*vṛṣalī*;' the term (in this sense) being etymologically explained as 'she who tempts her husband' (*bhartāram vṛṣasyati*). Thus, what the passage means is as follows :—Having accepted invitation, if the man dallies with a woman,—*i.e.*, with a view to having sexual intercourse with her, engages in such acts as conversation, embracing, and so forth,—then he incurs the following evil: whatever sin there might be in the 'giver,' *i.e.*, the performer of the *Shrāddha*—passes on to him. What this indicates is the coming about of undesirable results ; if this were not what is meant, then it would mean that there is nothing wrong in doing this, in a case where the giver is a sinless person.

'*Dallying*' stands for obtaining pleasure ; hence it follows that one should not do even such acts as conversation, embracing, and the like.—(191)

VERSE CXCII.

THE PITṚS ARE THE FOREMOST GODS, FREE FROM ANGER, EVER INTENT ON PURITY, CHASTE, RID OF ALL MEANS OF OFFENCE, AND SUPREMELY BLESSED.—(192)

Bhāṣya.

'*Free from anger*'—without wrath.

'*Intent on purity;*'—'purity' standing either for external purity obtained by means of clay and water, or internal purity obtained by means of expiatory rites.

'*Ever*'—qualifies 'purity.' Hence the meaning is that, whenever one happens to spit or do any such unclean act, one should rinse one's mouth immediately.

'*Chaste*'—avoiding all intercourse with women.

'*Rid of all means of offence*,'—those by whom the means of offence have been laid aside. 'Offence' stands for roughness and strife of all kinds.

'*Supremely blessed*;'—'blessedness' consists in the presence of such qualities as nobility, prosperity, and so forth.

Since it is in all this form that the Pitṛs enter into the body of the Brāhmaṇas,—therefore, the Brāhmaṇas also should assume these same forms ;—this is what is enjoined by means of the commendatory description contained in the verse.

'*Foremost gods.*'—That in another time-cycle the ancestors were gods, is an eulogium bestowed on the ancestors. They are called '*foremost*' because they are worshipped *before* the gods.—(192)

SECTION (11)—ORIGIN OF THE PITṚS AND THE MODE OF WORSHIPPING THEM.

VERSE CXCIII.

NOW FULLY LEARN FROM WHOM ALL THESE HAVE THEIR ORIGIN AND WHO ARE TO BE WORSHIPPED, BY WHOM AND BY WHAT RULES.—(193

Bhāṣya.

He from whom these—Pitṛs—'*have their origin,*' and '*who*'—which Pitṛs—'*have to be worshipped by whom,*' *i. e.,* the 'Somapa' Manes by *Brāhmaṇas,* the '*Haviṣmat*' Pitṛs by *Kṣattriyas,* and so forth;—all this '*learn fully,*' as described now.

'*Rules*;'—this is a mere reiterative reference; the rules having been already laid down in the words, 'one should remain self-controlled, &c., &c.' The plural number is due to there being a large number of rules.—(193)

VERSE CXCIV.

OF MAÑU, THE SON OF HIRAṆYAGARBHA, MARÎCHI AND THE REST WERE SONS; AND THE SONS OF ALL THESE SAGES HAVE BEEN DECLARED TO CONSTITUTE THE "BODY OF PITṚS." —(194)

Bhāṣya.

'*Hiraṇyagarbha*' is Prajāpati; his son is '*Manu, the son of Hiraṇyagarbha*;' as has been declared under Discourse I—'Having created all this and myself, &c., &c.;'—of this Manu, the sons were '*Marīchi and the rest*'—*i. e.,* Atri, Aṅgiras, and so forth; and these constitute the 'Body of Pitṛs,' '*Pitṛgaṇa.*'

An objection is raised—"For every person, his own Father, &c., are his '*Pitṛs.*' The injunctions also are in the words—'one should offer balls to his father, grandfather and great-grandfather;' 'after this, the sons should make offerings to three ancestors.' What then is this that is being said now—that 'the sons oft he sages are the *Pitṛs,*'—or that 'the *Somapās* are the Pitṛs of Brāhmaṇas?' We cannot accept any such option as that—'one shall make an offering to the *Somapā*

Pitṛs,' or 'he shall make the offering to his father and grandfather;' for the simple reason that in the original injunction we find the words 'this should be done *by the son*;' and 'son' is a relative term; and later on (verse 221) we read—'he whose father may be dead &c., &c.' It has, therefore, got to be explained what is the real meaning of the present context."

The answer to the above is as follows:—What the present verse contains is merely a commendatory description supplementary to the foregoing injunctions; and we never hear of the '*Somapa*' and other Pitṛs spoken as the recipients of offerings.

"But there is the injunction (in 193) that these *have to be worshipped.*"

The root '*chara*' (in '*upacharyāḥ*') is denotative of mere *action* in general; and as such, it cannot form the subject of any injunction. In the Veda, we do not find any such action spoken of as '*upachāra*,' in the same manner as the acts of *sacrificing*, *giving* and the like. In most cases, the root '*chara*' is used, like the root '*kṛ*,' as pertaining to some other *act* mentioned in close proximity to it; and in the present case, the act mentioned in close proximity is that of *offering the shrāddha*. This latter act having been already enjoined as to be offered to a definite set of recipients, could not be again enjoined as to be offered to other recipients. If it were again the enjoined itself, then it would not be regarded as being in proximity to another enjoined act; and the presence of the root '*chara*' distinctly precludes the possibility of any other act being understood, which is not in proximity to another enjoined act. As for such usages in ordinary parlance as 'the Teacher should be worshipped,' '*guravaḥ upacharyāḥ*' (where we have the same term '*upacharyāḥ*'), there also the act that is understood to be expressed is *service*, in the form of *washing the feet*, and the like; and no such act as these is possible in connection with

the Pitṛs. And so long as a passage is capable of being construed in a certain sense along with the context in which it occurs, there can be no justification for assuming another meaning for it. If the '*Somapa*' and the rest had been really intended as the recepients of the *Shrāddha* offered by the several castes, then alone would there have been any use for the description of their birth, &c. (as found in the present verse). When, however, the verse is taken as a mere commendatory description, then any description might come in useful.

Hence, the conclusion is, that the present verse proceeds with a view to make those people undertake the performance of *Shrāddha* who may happen to have no regard for their ancestors, and hence having no inclination for doing any act on their behalf;—the purport being—' do not you think that the Pitṛs being dead men, what harm could they do if they were not satisfied at the Shrāddha, or what good they could do by being satisfied?—because they are, in reality, beings of tremendous power, being the grandsons of Manu, who is the son of Hiraṇyagarbha, the lord of the whole universe.' It is for conveying this sense that the text has used the term, 'of the sages;' which means that they are not ordinary sons of Manu; it is those great sages, Marīchi and the rest, who are known as possessed of great powers; and it is of such sages that the Pitṛs are the sons.

There are many people who would be led to the performance of *Shrāddhas*, just by means of such laudatory descriptions.

Some people explain the verse to mean that "one should look upon the Pitṛs as *Somapa* and the rest."

These, however, have to be disregarded; as there is no authority for any such notion. We have no such assertion to this effect, as we have in connection with the propriety of looking at the sun as *Brahman*.

Others, again, have offered the explanation that, what is meant is, that the rule being that 'offerings to the Pitṛs

should be made after pronouncing their *gotra* and name,' and '*Somapā*,' &c., are just the names that have to be pronounced in connection with the several castes.

This also is not right; since the expression used is "*somapā nāma*," '*by name* Somapā,' these must be *names*, not *gotras*.

"But the term 'name' would be applicable also when these were *names* of *gotras* only."

If these were the names of *gotras*, then the two could not be in apposition; the proper form would be, '*Somapā* is the *gotra* of the Pitṛs,' and not that 'the Pitṛs are *Somapa*.'

"It is often found that the descendant is identified with his *gotra*, and the name of the latter is applied to the former; *e.g.*, in such expressions as 'Babhru is Mandu.'"

Our answer to this is as follows:—It has to be considered here what is it that is called 'gotra.' As a matter of fact, the '*gotra*' of a family is its first progenitor who imparts his name to it, being the most renowned person by virtue of his possessing such qualities as learning, opulence, bravery, nobility and the like; and it is after him that the family becomes named. Thus it is that among Brāhmaṇas and others, there are sub-divisions of *gotras*. The personage whom his descendants remember with such feelings as 'we are the descendants of such and such a person,' would thus be the one after which that particular family should be named. As a matter of fact, however, no men are found to think of themselves as being '*Somapā*' and thus regarding '*Somapā*' as the name of their *gotra*;—in the manner in which people regard the names of 'Bhṛgu', 'Garga' and 'Gālava.' It is by these latter names that the *gotras* of Brāhmaṇas should be known; as these are the principal *gotras*; the name '*gotra*' applying to them by convention, and not by virtue of their fulfilling the condition mentioned in the above-mentioned definition that 'the first progenitor,

imparting his name to the family, is its *gotra* ;' in fact, '*Bhṛgu*,' &c., have been known as '*gotra*' from beginningless time, and their use in this sense is as much without beginning as the use of the caste-names, '*Brāhmaṇa*,' and the rest. Prior to Parāshara's birth, no Brāhmaṇas could have been named after him ; hence, if the '*gotra*' consisted in the first progenitor, &c., then the Veda (which makes mention of Parāshara as *gotra*) would have a beginning in time. Thus, then, since the use of the name '*gotra*' is beginningless, it is this '*gotra*' that is to be used in the pouring of water-libations. The persons imparting their names to families are not beginningless ; they are modern ; and at a Vedic rite, so long as one can make use of eternal names, there can be no justification for pronouncing names that have had a beginning in time. For these reasons, what the Brāhmaṇa should do when offering the libation of water, &c., is to pronounce the appropriate '*gotra*-name'—such as 'may this offering go to the *Gargya*,' or 'to one belonging to the *Garga-gotra*'—and then pronounce the name of the person.

Among the *Kṣattriya* and the other castes, however, there is no such usage regarding *gotra*. These latter do not retain the memory of their '*gotra*' in the same manner as the Brāhmaṇas do. Hence, for them, the '*gotra*' must be something pertaining to this world ; and it is for these that the '*gotra*' consists of the 'first progenitor, the most renowned, who imparts his name to the family :' hence it is that they are referred to in *Shrāddha*, *etc*., by this *gotra-name*, even though it is one that has had a beginning in time. These, *Kṣattriya*, *etc*., are not worthy of being called by such titles as '*Havirbhuk*,' and the like.

Some people have held that—"the offerings enjoined as to be made with such expressions as 'I am inviting the Somapās,' 'may this reach the Somapās,' and the like, are by those persons, the names of whose father and other ancestors are unknown."

This also is not right; as it has been distinctly laid down that 'one not knowing the names of one's ancestors should make the offerings simply with the words *to the father, to the grandfather*, and so forth.'

Further, there might be some justification for having recourse to the several explanations of this verse, only if it were absolutely impossible to construe it as serving the purposes of a commendatory description supplementary to the foregoing injunction. But so long as it is possible to construe the verse along with what has gone before, it cannot be right to take it as an isolated assertion by itself.—(194)

VERSE CXCV.

THE SOMASADS, THE SONS OF VIRĀJ, HAVE BEEN DECLARED TO BE THE PITṚS OF THE SĀDHYAS; AND THE AGNISVĀTTAS, THE SONS OF MARĪCHI, ARE FAMED IN THE WORLD AS THE PITṚS OF THE GODS.—(195)

Bhāṣya.

All these verses are laudatory descriptions relating to *Shrāddhas*; as they are all construable together. The 'Pitṛs of the Sādhyas' have not been laid down as the recipients of *Shrāddhas*; specially because they are gods, and also because the *Sādhyas* also, who are themselves gods, are not entitled to the performance of *Shrāddhas*; for the simple reason that they are not such as can be directed to do an act. Gods cannot be directed to do an act; for, if they were, this would deprive them of their god-like character. If gods were entitled to the performance of an act, they would be regarded as the '*doer*;' and the 'doer' or 'agent' could never be the 'recipient;' while, in reality, the very nature of the gods consists in their being 'recipients' (of sacrifices).

The sons of Virāj are the *Somasads*; and these are the 'Pitṛs of the Sādhyas.'

[The sense of all this laudatory description is as follows]—This rite in honour of the Pitṛs must always be performed; since, even the *Sādhyas*, who are *gods*, and as such, have accomplished all that they had to do, worship their Pitṛs.

The *Agniṣvāttas*, who are the Pitṛs of Agni and other Gods, relish the cake and milk and rice cooked on fire.

'*Mārīchāḥ*'—sons of Marīchi.

'*Lokavishrutāḥ*'—famed in the world.—(195)

VERSE CXCVI.

THE BARHIṢADS, THE SONS OF ATRI, ARE DECLARED TO BE THE PITṚS OF DAITYAS, DĀNAVAS, YAKṢAS, GANDHARVAS, URAGAS, RĀKṢASAS, SUPARṆAS AND KINNARAS.—(196)

Bhāṣya.

All these, Daityas, &c., though not worthy of being mentioned in scriptures, have been mentioned here for purposes of the laudatory description. The forms and character of these beings are as described in the *Itihāsas.*

'*Suparṇas*'—are a particular kind of birds.

'*Kinnaras*'—are horse-faced beings.

The purport of this laudatory description is that—so essential is the performance of *Shrāddhas* that even Daityas, Dānavas and Rākṣasas, who generally interfere with sacrificial performances, cannot avoid it; nor even animals, who have no intelligence and no memory.

The sons of Atri are called '*Barhiṣads.*'—(196)

VERSE CXCVII.

THOSE BY NAME SOMAPĀS ARE THE PITṚS OF BRĀHMAṆAS; THE HAVIRBHUJS ARE THE PITṚS OF KṢATTRIYAS; THOSE BY NAME ĀJYAPAS, OF VAISHYAS; AND OF SHŪDRAS, SUKĀLINS.—(197)

Bhāṣya.

What this verse means has been explained before.

The '*Somapās*' are *those that drink Soma*; *i.e.*, Indra and other deities of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices.

'*Havirbhujs*'—are the deities for cooked rice, cake, &c.

'*Ājyapas*'—are the deities for the libations called '*Āghāra*,' '*Ājyabhāga*,' '*Prayāja*,' and so forth.

'*Sukālins*'—are those who *complete, accomplish*, sacrificial rites. The deities conducive to the accomplishment of sacrificial rites are those prescribed in such *Mantras* as '*Ayāshchāgnēsyanabhishasti*, &c., &c.'—(197)

VERSE CXCVIII.

SOMAPAS ARE THE SONS OF KAVI ; HAVIṢMATS ARE THE SONS OF AṄGIRAS ; ĀJYAPĀS ARE THE SONS OF PULASTYA, AND SUKĀLINS, OF VASHIṢṬHA.—(198)

Bhāṣya.

The Havirbhujs are here spoken of as 'Haviṣmats.'

'*Kavi*' is Bhṛgu. They say that 'Ushanas is called *Kāvya*, as also *Bhārgava*.'

'Just as these gods are the sons of sages, so your Pitṛs also are god-like in their nature; hence you should not disregard them,'—[such is the purport of these verses].—(198)

VERSE CXCIX.

'THE ANAGNIDAGDHAS, THE AGNIDAGDHAS, THE KĀVYAS, THE BARHIṢADS, THE AGNIṢVĀTTAS, AND THE SAUMYAS,—THESE ONE SHOULD REGARD AS THE PITṚS OF BRĀHMAṆAS.—(199)

Bhāṣya.

Soma (the Soma plant) is what is called '*anagnidagdha*' ('not burnt by fire'); because it is not cooked on fire; and the gods to whom sacrifices are offered with *Soma*, also come to be called '*Anagnidagdha* ;' which connotes the quality of *prosperity*.

Similarly, '*agnidagdha*' ('burnt by fire') stands for such substances as cooked rice, cake, and the like, which are all prepared on fire ; and the gods to whom sacrifices are offered with these are called '*Agnidagdha*.'

As before, we construe the verse to mean as follows :—'Those that are called *Agnidagdha* should be mentioned as *agnidagdha*, and those that are called *Anagnidagdha* should be mentioned as *Somapā*.'

Similarly with '*Kāvyas*' and '*Barhiṣads* ;' the '*Kāvyas*' have been described (in 198) as 'Somapā ;' and '*Barhiṣads*' as 'the sons of Atri.'

The particle '*ēva*' is not to be construed where it occurs ; as, in that case, the meaning would be that all those mentioned are the Pitṛs of *Brāhmaṇas only*, not of *Kṣattriyas* and

others; and this would be contrary to what has gone before. Nor have the beings in question been mentioned as the Pitṛs of various castes, which alone could justify a few of them being selected and marked as belonging specifically to *Brāhmaṇas only*. Hence the '*eva*' should be construed along with the '*Agniṣvāttas*,' the '*Saumyas*,' and the rest.

The mention of the '*Brāhmaṇa*' being purely reiterative, stands for the Kṣattriya, &c. also.

The Pitṛs bearing the names here mentioned are found mentioned in the Veda also:—'The Pitṛs, named Agniṣvātta, Agnidagdha, Anagnidagdha.' And it is out of those mentioned in this *mantra* that our author has selected some and described them here.

Or, the verse may be construed in the following manner:—'The Pitṛs that are spoken of by these names, all these one should mention as the Brāhmaṇa's Pitṛs:' the mere difference in the names should not lead one to think of the named beings being different.' In this case, the term '*Brāhmaṇa*' would stand for 'persons entitled to the performance of Shrāddha;' the Brāhmaṇa being so, above all others; and it is always the predominant factor that serves as the indicative; as we find in the case of such expressions as 'the king is passing by.'

[*This latter interpretation, being much the simpler of the two, has been adopted in the Text.*]—(199)

VERSE CC.

OF THE PRINCIPAL BODIES OF PITṚS THAT HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED, KNOW THAT THERE ARE ENDLESS SONS AND GRANDSONS IN THIS WORLD.—(200)

Bhāṣya.

The '*Somapā*,' and the rest, are the '*principal bodies of Pitṛs*.' Of these there are endless sons and grandsons; and these latter also are Pitṛs.

The mention of this indefinite number indicates that the offerings are not to be made in reference to the *Somapa* and

others ; for, if the sons and grandsons of these were 'Pitṛs,' then, as Pitṛs, these sons and grandsons also may have the offerings made in reference to them ; and yet no names of these have been mentioned ; whence it is clear that all this is merely laudatory description.

The singular number in '*putrapautrakam*' is in accordance with Pāṇini 2.4.10.

'*Endless*'—unlimited ; the '*ka*' having the reflexive sense.—(200)

VERSE CCI.

FROM THE SAGES WERE BORN THE PTIṚS, GODS AND MEN ; AND FROM THE GODS THE ENTIRE WORLD, MOVEABLE AND IMMOVEABLE, IN DUE ORDER.—(201)

Bhāṣya.

The rite in honour of the Pitṛs should not be looked upon as inferior to that in honour of the gods ; in fact, the former is the more important of the two ; because by birth, the Pitṛs are elder than the gods. For, the order of creation is that the Pitṛs were born from the sages, and the gods were born from the Pitṛs, and from the gods, the whole of the rest of the world—'*moveable*'—animate—as well as '*immoveable*'—inanimate.

'*In due order*'—the order having been already described under Discourse I.

The entire series of purely laudatory descriptions has now come to an end.—(201)

SECTION (12)—VESSELS TO BE USED AT SHRADDHAS.

VERSE CCII.

EVEN WATER OFFERED TO THESE WITH FAITH, IN VESSELS, EITHER MADE OF SILVER OR CONNECTED WITH SILVER, IS CONDUCIVE TO IMPERISHABILITY.—(202)

Bhāṣya.

'*Vessels made of silver*'—those built entirely of silver. In the absence of these 'those, *connected with silver*'—*i.e.*, vessels of wood, or of copper, or of gold, should have one part touched with silver. The vessels referred to here are those in which large quantities of butter, honey and vegetables and other things are kept for being offered; and in connection with these, it is enjoined that they should be *of silver*. As for the actual offering of the *ball* and other things, this has to be done with the hands; the libations of water—such as those poured over the balls, etc.—these also should be offered with the hands; in view of the clear injunction that these offerings should be made 'with hand, the thread passing over the right shoulder.' The daily libations of water also are to be offered with the hands—the thread passing over the left or the right shoulder.

"But all this has been laid down in connection with *shrāddhas*, and, as such, cannot be connected with another act."

Even such subsidiary details are admissible in an act as are not mentioned in the same context with itself.

"But such details are already mentioned in connection with the act itself."

That may be so; and in that case, the present right may be only a reiteration of the same.

'*Even water*'—the term '*even*' indicates high praise; the sense being that—'to say nothing of the offering of richly cooked food, even water alone, if offered in a silver-vessel, becomes, by reason of its connection with silver, '*conducive*

to imperishability'—*i.e.*, it becomes the source of ever-lasting satisfaction (to the Pitṛs).

'*With faith*;'—being already enjoined in connection with *all givings*, its mention here is purely reiterative.—(202)

SECTION (13)—ORDER OF SEQUENCE.

VERSE CCIII.

FOR TWICE-BORN MEN, THE RITE IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS EXCELS THAT IN HONOUR OF THE GODS; THE RITE IN HONOUR OF THE GODS HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE THE PREVIOUS SUSTAINER OF THE RITE IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS.—(203)

Bhāṣya.

The rite done in honour of the gods is excelled by that done in honour of the Pitṛs; *i.e.*, the latter has been more emphatically enjoined.

This only indicates the predominance of the rite in honour of the Pitṛs; the meaning being that the rite in honour of the gods is subsidiary to that in honour of the Pitṛs.

This same subsidiary character is more clearly stated,—'*The rite*'—*i.e.*, the feeding of Brāhmaṇas—'*that is done in honour of the gods*' is the '*sustainer*'—hleper—'*of the rite done in honour of the Pitṛs*;' so that it is not by itself an important act, being only an aid of that in honour of the Pitṛs.—(203)

VERSE CCIV.

ONE SHOULD FIRST ENGAGE THE BRĀHMAṆA IN HONOUR OF THE GODS, AS A PROTECTION TO THESE (OFFERINGS TO) PITṚS; FOR THE RĀKṢASAS TAKE AWAY THE SHRĀDDHA THAT IS DEVOID OF PROTECTION.—(204)

Bhāṣya.

'*Ārakṣa*' is the same as '*rakṣā*;' and that which has reached that is called '*ārakṣabhūtam*;' *i.e.*, that which serves the purpose of protecting.

Or, the term '*bhūtam*' may be taken as connoting *similitude*; in which case, the meaning is—'which is, as it were, a protection.'

Because it is so, therefore '*one should first engage*'—invite—'*the Brāhmaṇa in honour of the gods*'—and make him sit upon a proper seat.

The rest of the verse is a purely laudatory description.

'*Rākṣasas* ;'—certain invisible beings, described in *Itihāsas* —'*take away*'—the Shrāddha—from the Pitṛs.

"Who are the gods, in honour of whom the Brāhmaṇa is to be invited?"

In the *Gṛhyasūtra*, we find the *mantra*—'We invite the Vishvēdēvas, &c.'—as the one to be used; from which it follows that the *Vishvēdēvas* are the gods. In the *Purāṇas* also it is said—'The *Shruti* says that it is *Vishvēdēvas*.' —(204)

VERSE CCV.

ONE SHOULD ENDEAVOUR TO MAKE IT (THE SHRĀDDHA) BEGIN AND END WITH A RITE IN HONOUR OF THE GODS; IT SHOULD NEVER BE ONE BEGINNING AND ENDING WITH A RITE IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS. ONE WHO TRIES TO MAKE IT BEGIN AND END WITH A RITE IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS QUICKLY PERISHES, ALONG WITH HIS PROGENY.—(205)

Bhāṣya.

That in whose beginning and at whose end a rite in honour of the gods is performed is said to '*begin and end with a rite in honour of the gods*.' The beginning of the *Shrāddha*-rite should be made with a rite performed in honour of the gods; it is for this reason that the invitation of the Brāhmaṇas in honour of the gods should be done first. '*End*' is *completion*. The meaning is that the Brāhmaṇas fed in honour of the gods should be dismissed after those fed in honour of the Pitṛs have been sent away.

Some people hold that in the offering of sandal-paste, &c. also, beginning should be made with what is done in honour of the gods.

But, in regard to these details, it is not possible to make either the beginning or the end with what is done in honour of the gods; as this would lead to repetition. Further, that *it should begin and end with what is done in honour of the gods* has been laid down here as pertaining to the entire procedure, and not to each of the intervening details. That the

performance of the details shall begin with what is done in honour of the gods would follow from the natural course of the action; it having been fixed that the inviting is to begin with those invited in honour of the gods, it would be only natural that the other details shall also start with the same with which that first step had started; since one detail controls the starting of another detail, as laid down in the assertion that—'the starting of the details is determined by the time fixed for them in connection with the Primary Act.'

Such a *Shrāddha*-rite one shall 'endeavour' to perform.

The rest of the verse is a purely laudatory description.

'*It should never be one beginning and ending with a rite in honour of the Pitṛs.*'—Inasmuch as it has been already enjoined that the act should begin and end with what is done in honour of the gods, the further prohibition of beginning and ending with what is done in honour of the Pitṛs has to be taken, in the manner of ordinary assertions, as a purely descriptive reiteration. In ordinary parlance, having laid down one thing, one often negatives its contrary, even though there be no possibility of this latter being adopted. As a matter of fact, an action controls the substance, not what is not a substance.

'*Quickly perishes, along with his progeny*;'—this deprecatoy description is meant to indicate that the man fails to obtain the reward in the form of offsprings.

From this it follows that all the acts, of serving the food and the like, should begin with what is done in honour of the gods. As for what is done during the process—the serving of more rice, &c., at intervals, the supplying of water to those that may happen to want water for drinking, and so forth,—all this should be done first to one who may happen to express his desire first. If one were to offer these things to one who does not want them, simply because of his being invited in honour of the gods, then one would be trans-

gressing the principal injunction that—'one should make the Brāhmaṇas happy.'

Some one may happen to be fond of sweets, another may be one who finds acids more wholesome ; so that, having provided "various edibles and fragrant drinks" (Manu, 3. 227), if, by other considerations, one were to give to one what suits his taste and constitution, the invitee would contract disease.

From all this it follows that in the feeding it is only the beginning and end that should be done with those invited in honour of the gods.—(205)

Section (14)—METHOD OF FEEDING.

VERSE CCVI.

ONE SHOULD PREPARE WITH CARE A CLEAN AND SECLUDED PLACE SLOPING TOWARDS THE SOUTH, AND SMEAR IT WITH COWDUNG. —(206)

Bhāṣya.

'*Clean*'—not defiled by the presence of ashes, bones, skulls, and such things.

'*Secluded*'—large and unoccupied by many men.

'*Sloping towards the south*'—that which is of lower level on the southern side. Such he should make the place, '*with care.*' That is, if one fails to find a spot that is not naturally so, one should make it so, by one's own effort.

This place he should smear with cowdung. This precludes the use of clay and such things, the rule being that the smearing should be done with cowdung.—(206)

VERSE CCVII.

THE PITṚS ARE ALWAYS PLEASED WITH WHAT IS OFFERED IN CLEAN PLACES, ON WATER-BANKS AND IN SECLUDED PLACES.—(207)

Bhāṣya.

'*Avakāsha,*' is *place, spot.*

'*Chokṣa*'—naturally clean and tending to mental calm; such as forests, etc.

'*Water-banks*'—sand-banks, near rivers.

'*Secluded places*'—uncrowded sacred places.

This verse contains a totally different injunction. Hence, in the case of such places, the rule regarding *smearing with cowdung* does not apply; because the rule (in the preceding verse) distinctly says that 'one should make it so;' which means that the rule applies to a place where *cleanness* has to be brought about. In regard to places that are naturally clean, their fitness is secured by 'being examined and sprinkled with water.'

By the Shrāddha '*offered*'—performed—in such places, the Pitṛs become greatly pleased.—(207)

VERSE CCVIII.

SEATS WITH KUSHA GRASS HAVING BEEN SEPARATELY PLACED, HE SHOULD SEAT THE SAID BRĀHMAṆAS WHO HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ABLUTIONS.—(208)

Bhāṣya.

'*Placed*'—*i.e.*, prepared and duly arranged.

'*Separately*'—with proper partition. He shall not provide for all a single seat, in the form of a long piece of cloth or wooden plank. They shall be seated in such a manner that they should not touch one another. It is in this sense that '*separately*' has been added.

'*With kusha grass*'—with bundles of Kusha spread over them.

'*Who have performed their ablutions*'—*i.e.*, who have bathed and rinsed their mouth in the prescribed manner.

'*The said*'—those previously invited—'*he should seat.*'—(208)

VERSE CCIX.

HAVING SEATED THOSE UNREPROACHED BRĀHMAṆAS ON THOSE SEATS, HE SHOULD WORSHIP THEM WITH SWEET-SMELLING PERFUMES AND GARLANDS, BEGINNING WITH THOSE INVITED IN HONOUR OF THE GODS.—(209)

Bhāṣya.

After having seated them, he should worship them *with perfumes and garlands.* '*Perfumes*'—in the form of saffron, camphor, and such things—he should offer them; and so also '*garlands*'—strings of flowers. The eptihet '*sweet-smelling*' qualifies '*garlands*;' the sense being that one should not offer flowers devoid of sweet smell. The epithet is proper as qualifying 'perfumes' also, as there are evil-smelling perfumes also, which have to be excluded.

Or, the term may stand for '*surabhi*' *incense*, in which case, this term would stand by itself.

Having first given these things to the Brāhmaṇas invited in honour of the gods, he should give them to those invited in honour of the Pitṛs.

This rule, that these things shall be given first to those invited in honour of the gods, is meant to imply that before the Brāhmaṇas have commenced eating, things should be given to them in that order. When once they have begun to eat, there can be no restriction regarding the serving of the several vegetables, etc. This is the explanation that is offered; as otherwise, why should this have been laid down over and over again.

'*Unreproached*'—blameless—'*Brāhmaṇas.*' This is a mere reiteration; as it is only such Brāhmaṇas as have been specified for being invited. Or, the use of the past-participal affix may be taken as prohibiting the act denoted by the verbal root; the sense being—that 'he should not reproach, or find fault with them, after (they have been invited and seated).' People who favour this explanation argue that it is better to abandon the denotation of the affix than give up that of the entire word; and if it is taken as a mere reiteration, the whole word becomes redundant and meaningless.—(209)

VERSE CCX.

HAVING PRESENTED TO THEM WATER, AND ALSO SESĀMUM ALONG WITH KUSHA-BLADE, THE BRĀHMAṆA, PERMITTED BY THE BRĀHMAṆAS COLLECTIVELY, SHOULD MAKE AN OFFERING INTO FIRE.—(210)

Bhāṣya.

When the Brāhmaṇas have been smeared with perfumes, adorned with garlands and have smelt the incense, the water-offering should be presented; and, along with this, also sesamum along with *Kusha-blade*;—the term '*pavitra*' being used in the sense of *Kusha grass.*

'*Having presented,*'—offered—water to the Brāhmaṇas, and being permitted by them, one should offer libations into fire. The construction is—'*brāhmaṇaiḥ anujñātaḥ kuryāt.*'

'*Collectively*'—*i.e.*, all the Brāhmaṇas should give the permission together.

This necessity of obtaining permission implies also the use of some words to be addressed in seeking the permission; they could not grant the permission without being asked for it. From this it follows that the words to be used should be such as—'May I make the offering into fire,' 'I shall make it,' and so forth. The use of words for according the permission is also hereby implied. All this should be done by means of correct forms of words; this has been shown by the authors of *Gṛhyasūtras*—'He should seek their permission with such words as, *May I make the offering into fire—may I do it*; and they should say, *Yes do it*.'—(210).

VERSE CCXI.

HAVING AT FIRST BROUGHT ABOUT THE SATISFACTION OF AGNI AND SOMA-YAMA BY THE OFFERING OF SACRIFICIAL FOOD, HE SHOULD AFTERWARDS SATISFY, ACCORDING TO RULE, THE PITṚS.—(211).

Bhāṣya.

It is now described what is to be done in the Fire.

The Genitive in '*agnēḥ*' has the sense of the Dative.

Agni is one deity, and Soma-Yama conjointly form one conjunct deity; just like Agni-Soma.

Of these two deities, '*having brought about at first, the satisfaction, by the offering of sacrificial food, he should afterwards satisfy the Pitṛs*.' That is, he should offer balls of food and feed the Brāhmaṇas.

In the *Gṛhyasūtra*, other deities have been prescribed; so that the deities mentioned in the present text are for those who have no *Gṛhyasūtra* of their own.

'*Satisfaction*' stands for *sustenance*. That gods are sustained by sacrificial food, is a laudatory exaggertion.—(211).

VERSE CCXII.

IN THE ABSENCE OF FIRE, HE SHALL MAKE THE OFFERING INTO THE BRĀHMAṆA'S HAND; FOR IT HAS BEEN DECLARED BY THE BRĀHMAṆA SEERS OF VEDIC TEXTS THAT WHAT THE FIRE IS, THAT SAME IS THE BRĀHMAṆA.—(212).

Bhāṣya.

The present text lays down an injunction in connection with those cases where there is no fire, *i.e.*, neither one set up according to '*smārta*' rites, nor that kindled at marriage, nor that set up after succession. As for the ordinary fire, since sacrificing to the Pitṛs in such fire has been prohibited, there need be no consideration of the presence or absence of such fire. It is going to be said later on (verse 282) that—'oblations in connection with the offering to the Pitṛs should not be offered in the ordinary fire.'

Question—"How can there be any possibility of the said Fire being absent?"

Answer—It has been laid down that when a man is away from home and without his Fire, if he happen to come by a desirable place, the proper materials and the right type of Brāhmaṇas, he shall regard this as a suitable opportunity for offering *Shrāddha*; and it is not that the moonless day is the only one on which *Shrāddha* is to be performed. Hence the present rule is meant for the man who, when out on a journey, comes by a 'sanctifier of company,' or finds such suitable materials as the '*Kālashāka*,' and the like.

"How can one away from home be entitled to the performance of *Shrāddhas*? If the wife is also with him, away from home, then the Fire also should be with them; since it is not considered desirable for the Fire to be separated from both the sacrificer and his wife. It has been declared that—'for people away from home, the Fire shall not be separated.' If the Householder should happen to go out alone, then there may be 'absence of Fire;' but the man is entitled to make offerings only when associated with his

wife ; so that, when the wife is not near him, her acquiescence being not available, how could there be any possibility of the man making use of materials belonging to both ? In the case of a material belonging to both, there can be no giving away, in the absence of the desire of either party. Against this it might be argued that—'by the line of reasoning just put forward, it would be impossible to perform *Shrāddhas* in sacred places (during pilgrimages) ; and such non-performance would be contrary to such declarations as—'at Puṣkara the Shrāddha is inexhaustible, austerity is highly meritorious ; the same is to be held regarding the Ocean and Prabhāsa.' There is no force in this ; as such performance would be quite possible for the man who has set up the Fire, when he goes out on pilgrimage along with his wife. In the case in question, however, since the man would be journeying with his wife, the Fire could not be absent. If, however, the man be journeying alone, then, since he would be ignorant of his wife's wishes in the matter, he could not be entitled to the performance."

Our answer to the above is as follows :—When a man is proceeding on a journey, he seeks his wife's permission in the following words—' I shall be spending our belongings over religious performances ;' and having obtained this permission, he could be entitled to the performance of *Shrāddhas*.

Or, the rule laid down in the present text might pertain to boys before their initiation, at which time the Fire has not been set up ; and the uninitiated boy also is entitled to the performance of *Shrāddha*, as has been shown under the text where it has been declared that the boy is not entitled to any rite, *except the offering of Shrāddhas*. Further, for the Accomplished Student also, if his father happens to die before his marriage, there would be 'absence of fire.'

"In the Kāṭhaka, it is found stated that, on the death of the master of the house, fire should be set up (by his successor)."

This should be taken as applying to one who has married, and not to one who has merely just completed his studies. Two points of time have been laid down for the setting up of the '*Smārta*' Fire—on marriage and on succession. So that, if one has not set up the Fire on marriage,—either because he does not set up a separate household apart from his father, or because he continues to live with his elder brother, according to the law that 'for brothers that have not separated there is a common religious rite,'—for such a person, there is the other point of time, *on succession*, according to the injunction—'or, from the time of succession;' and the 'time of succession' is just the time when the Father dies. And it is to such cases that the following declarations apply, —'having become pure, one should make offerings to the Pitṛs,' 'one should bring fire from the fryer's pan and then keep vigil,' and so forth. The setting up of the Fire mentioned in these texts (referring to the Fire kindled for the day only) could not be regarded as an essential factor in *Shrāddha*; for, if it were so, then, before the kindling of this Fire, since the Fire would not be there, no *Shrāddha* could be performed. Nor, again, is it possible that such a fire (set up for a temporary purpose) should not be abandoned. It has been declared that 'this is the Aupasada Fire, in which the culinary offerings have to be made;' and to the culinary offerings also a man without a wife is not entitled; because of such injunctions as 'the butter is examined by the wife,' 'the wife should keep the observances,' and so forth. It will not be right to argue that—"this keeping of observances and the examining of the butter are meant to apply to cases where the wife is present;"—because both these acts have been enjoined as entirely obligatory. Hence the meaning comes to be that libations are to be poured into the 'Aupasada' fire.

"The father's death is not the precise time of *succession*; since it has been declared that the sons shall divide

the property, after having performed the *Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa Shrāddha* (which is done one year after death)."

The time herein mentioned is that for *division*, not *succession*. In fact, for division also there is no such absolute rule that it must be done after the *Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa* ; as it has been declared that 'separation among brothers is in view of religious rites ;' and the act of separation becomes 'religious,' when the members separating severally perform *Shrāddhas* and entertain guests, and so forth. Nor will it be right to argue that such assertions as 'the sons shall offer the nine *Shrāddhas* conjointly'—refers to persons who have finished their studies. Because it may be that a man, having acquired only a little learning, marries a wife with a view to guard himself against transgressing the rule of having intercourse with one's own wife, to which he would be prone by excess of sexual desire ; but having married, be might devote greater attention to the studies he had begun, and thus complete his studies within a year. And it is with reference to such cases that we have the rule regarding the sons dividing their property after having performed the *Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa*.

Then again, when a man has lost a wife and is going to marry another, till he has married again, there would be 'absence of fire.' Specially because, in view of the general law that 'one should make sacrificial offerings in the company of his wife,' which shows that there can be no setting up of fire for one who has not married.

Such being the case, when Fire is absent, one should place the oblations in the hands of the Brāhmaṇa—"Of which Brāhmaṇa ?"—Of one of those that have been invited ; either of one who has been invited in honour of the gods, or of some other invited Brāhmaṇa.

As a laudatory description, we have the words—'*what the Fire is, &c.*'

This is the opinion of those 'seers of mantras' who know their meanings.—(212).

VERSE CCXIII.

THE ANCIENTS DESCRIBE THESE GOOD BRĀHMAṆAS AS THE "GODS OF SHRĀDDHA," FREE FROM ANGER, EASILY SATISFIED, INTENT UPON SUSTAINING THE UNIVERSE.—(213).

Bhāṣya.

This is a purely laudatory declaration; and it makes the Brāhmaṇas attain the dignity of gods. [The sense being]—Agni (Fire) is a god, and when a libation is poured into the Fire, the gods eat it, through the Fire as their mouth; the *Brāhmaṇas* also have the same character; and whatever is placed in their hands, that also the gods eat.

"What is that character of the gods, by virtue of which the Brāhmaṇas are spoken of as having the same character?"

It is in answer to this that the text adds—'*free from anger &c.*' As regards the question why they are so described, the explanation is that what is meant is that the libations of butter should be offered into the hands of such Brāhmaṇas as are endowed with the character here described.

Others have explained that in a foregoing verse (192), '*freedom from anger*' and the rest have been laid down as the qualities to be sought for those invited in honour of the Pitṛs and who were meant to be eulogised,—while the present text lays down these as to be sought for in those invited in honour of the gods. This is the difference between the two texts. It is in this sense that they have been described as '*the gods of shrāddha.*'

'*Ancients*'—*i.e.*, the sages.

Or, we may read the term '*purātana*' with the accusative ending; 'ancient' (in this case) qualifying '*gods*;'—the 'ancient gods' standing for those deities born in this cycle who are called '*sādhyas.*'

'*Intent upon sustaining the universe,*'—*i.e.*, it is with a view to gratifying people that they eat at *shrāddhas*; hence one should not think that 'these men are eating through greediness, and for the purpose of obtaining the perceptible

pleasure (of eating tasty food), and hence why should any honour be rendered to them?' Because these men sustain the universe,—*i.e.*, the Earth, the Sky and the Heaven; therefore, they should not be treated with disrespect.—(213)

VERSE CCXIV

HAVING DONE THE ENTIRE SERIAL PERFORMANCE IN FIRE, IN THE "APASAVYA" FORM, HE SHOULD OFFER WATER ON THE GROUND WITH THE HAND IN THE "APASAVYA" POSITION.—(214)

Bhāṣya.

What is done in fire, in the form of pouring the libation, with the words, '*agnayē svadhā namaḥ*' ('this is an offering for Agni,') should be done in the '*apasavya*' form.

Some people explain the term '*apasavya*' to mean that the act should be done with the right hand, not with the left, nor by both; in view of the prohibition contained in verse 225 below. This, according to these people, has been added, in view of it being thought possible to do the act with both hands.

This, however, is not right. Because the '*apasavya form*' here enjoined is in reference to the 'serial performance' of those libations that are poured into Fire; hence, what is meant is that the libations should be poured in such a manner that they tend *towards the South, not towards the North*;—this latter being what is right in the case of offerings to the gods. That is to say, when the sacrificial material is being poured with the ladle, one should be facing the South, and not the North—this rule standing on the same footing as that which prescribes the pouring of water-libations to the Pitṛs in such a manner that it flows between the thumb and the index-finger.

The epithet '*entire*' indicates that all such acts as the placing of the material in the dish, and so forth, should be done in the '*apasavya*' form.

'*He should offer water with the hand in the apasavya position.*'

'*Shanaiḥ*' (for '*bhuvi*') is another reading.

The purpose of this rule is that it has been emphasised with a view to preclude the use of silver implements (according to 202).

'*Āvṛt*' *stands for* '*Āvṛtti*,' 'repetition.'—(214)

VERSE CCXV.

HAVING MADE THESE BALLS OUT OF THE REMNANT OF THE SAID SACRIFICIAL MATERIAL, HE SHOULD, WITH COLLECTED MIND AND FACING THE SOUTH, OFFER THEM IN THE MANNER OF THE WATER-LIBATIONS.—(215)

Bhāṣya.

From out of the material that had been held in the vessel, and out of which the fire-oblations have been offered,—'*having made three balls*,' turning his face towards the South, he should '*offer them*'—*i.e.*, throw them on the *kusha-grass*, with reference to the Pitṛs.

The term '*piṇḍa*,' 'ball,' stands for something *solid*; hence, one should not, in this connection, offer disintegrated articles of food.

'*In the manner of the water-libations*'—*i.e.*, the manner of offering water-libations, which has been just pointed out (in the preceding verse).

In this connection, the following question arises:—"Should the purificatory rites necessary for the sacrificial material be performed over the substance taken out of the food that has been cooked for feeding the Brāhmaṇas?—or, should separate rice be cooked?—and also what should be the quantity of that sacrificial material? The rule laying down 'four handfulls' cannot apply to this case."

This question has been already discussed; in the absence of any specific rules on the subject, one is free to do what one likes; and the quantity should be just what may be necessary for the purpose in view.

Inasmuch as 'the manner of the water-libations' is laid down as applicable to the offering of balls, it follows that this

latter offering is to be done with 'hands in the *apasavya* position,' and not with silver implements.

'*With collected mind*'—this has been added for the purpose of filling up the metre.—(215)

VERSE CCXVI.

SELF-CONTROLLED, HE SHOULD, AFTER HAVING OFFERED THOSE BALLS ON KUSHA-BLADES, ACCORDING TO RULE, WIPE THAT HAND ON THOSE SAME (KUSHA-BLADES), FOR THE SAKE OF THE "PARTAKERS OF SMEARINGS."—(216)

Bhāṣya.

'*Nyupya*'—'having offered,'—'*on kusha-blades*'—he should wipe that hand *on those* same kusha-blades,—those same on which the balls have been offered.

In accordance with the opinion of other *Smṛtis*, the wiping is to be done on the root-end of the kusha-blades.

Others have held that this rule does not mean simply that the food and water attaching to the hand should be so wiped; in fact, even though nothing may be attached to the hand, yet even the hand itself should be wiped on the blades. The reason for this is that the act here prescribed is not in the nature of the 'disposal of remnants,' in which case alone it could be held to be done only when the stated conditions would be present. Specially as what is prescribed is, not that 'one should wipe *what is attaching to the hand*,' but that 'he should wipe the *hand*.'

Against this it might be argued that—"we find it stated that the act is 'for the sake of the Partakers of Smearings,' which shows that it cannot be done when there is no 'smearing' at all. Why, then, should it be said that, even when there is nothing sticking to the hand, the act should be done?"

The answer to this is as follows:—It is possible that solid food may not stick to the hand; but when the ball of food is being rolled up, the juices of the food are sure to

stick to the hand, by reason of the contact with heat; and it is this that is called the '*smearing*.'

The genitive ending in '*lēpabhāginām*' connotes the connection of the act of *wiping* with the particular class of Pitṛs. Any such beings as 'Partakers of Smearings' are not visible to the eye; hence it is not possible to bring about their 'possession' in connection with the 'smearing.' Hence, all that is meant is that 'one should think in his mind that the smearing is meant to be the share of the 'Partakers of Smearings;' or, he may even say this in so many words.

Others have held that ancestors above the great grandfather are spoken of as 'Partakers of Smearings.' According to this view, if the names of those ancestors are not pronounced, they may be referred to by means of such expressions as 'this to the father of my great-grandfather,' 'this to the grandfather of my great-grandfather,' and so forth.

The singular number in '*hand*' shows that the ball is to be offered with a single hand in the '*apasavya*' form.

'*Self-controlled*'—this is a mere reiteration: such control having been already prescribed above.

'*According to rule*'—refers to the rules of procedure laid down in other scriptures; *e.g.*, Shañkha says—'One should offer the ball along with sandal-paint, garlands, incense, cloth and dressings.' The 'rule' that has been prescribed in the text by Manu himself has been stated in his own words; hence the phrase, 'according to rule,' would be meaningless (if it referred to that rule itself). It is for this reason that this phrase should be taken as summing up the details prescribed in other scriptures.—(216).

VERSE CCXVII.

TURNING TO THE NORTH, HAVING SIPPED WATER AND HAVING GENTLY SUPPRESSED HIS BREATH THREE TIMES, HE SHALL SALUTE, WITH PROPER FORMULAS, THE SIX SEASONS AND ALSO THE PITṚS.—(217).

Bhāṣya.

Having placed the balls on the kusha-grass, he should

turn towards the North, leftwards ; since we read in another *Smṛti*—'turning to the left, towards the north.'

Seated with his face towards the North, he should sip water. '*Having sipped water*'—he should perform 'breath-suppression' three times ; *e.g.*, simply supressing the breath three times—only this much ;—the rule relating to the repeating of the *Gāyatrī* verse along with the '*Shiras*' formula (Yājña. *Āchāra* 23) not applying to the present case.

'*Gently*'—so that there may not be much pain. This is what has been asserted (elsewhere) in the words—'having suppressed the breathing as much as one can.'

Still facing the North, he should salute, &c., &c.—saying, 'Salutation to the spring !' and so forth.

He should also salute the Pitṛs ; '*with proper formulas* ;' *i.e.*, with the *mantra*, '*Namo vaḥ pitaraḥ*, &c., &c.' This saluting of the Pitṛs should be done with face turned towards the Balls ; for another *Smṛti* says that this is to be done by 'turning round.'—(217).

VERSE CCXVIII.

THE REMAINING WATER HE SHOULD GENTLY POUR NEAR THE BALLS ; AND WITH COLLECTED MIND HE SHOULD SMELL THOSE BALLS IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY WERE OFFERED.—(218).

Bhāṣya.

Water should be poured again near the balls, out of the same vessel from which it had been poured upon the kusha-blades, before the offering of the balls.

'*Remaining*' ;—this is meant to show that the act mentioned is to be regarded as the 'disposal of remnants ;' it is only in this sense that the term '*remaining*' becomes justifiable. From this it follows that, in the event of there being no 'remnant,' there shall be no 'pouring.' But in the *Gṛhyasūtra*, it has been declared that this 'pouring of water' is obligatory.

'*He should smell these balls* ;'—'*smelling*,' consists of

eeling the odour; but in the *Gṛhyasūtra* it is said that 'he should *eat* it with his breath.'

'*In the order in which they were offered*,'—the order in which they were offered being, *first* to the father, *second* to the grandfather, and *third* to the great-grandfather;—'*with collected mind*'—this is for filling up the metre.—(218.)

VERSE CCXIX.

HAVING, IN DUE ORDER OF SEQUENCE, TAKEN VERY SMALL PORTIONS OUT OF THE BALLS, HE SHALL FIRST FEED THOSE SAME SEATED BRĀHMAṆAS WITH THEM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE.—(219).

Bhāṣya.

Extremely small portions—parts of the ball offered to the Father should be made to be eaten by the Brāhmaṇa who has been previously seated in honour of the Father.

'*In due order of sequence*';—the meaning of this has been already explained.

The pronoun 'those' refers to those mentiond in the present context; and, it is in view of this that, in 212, our author has not thought it necessary to specify the Brāhmaṇa as the one thus mentioned.

'*First*'—*i.e.*, before every other kind of food.—(219).

VERSE CCXX.

WHILE HIS FATHER HOLDS, ONE SHOULD MAKE THE OFFERING TO THE PREVIOUS ANCESTORS; OR, HE MAY FEED HIS OWN FATHER AT THE SHRĀDDHA AS A BRĀHMAṆA.—(220).

Bhāṣya.

It has been said that 'one shall offer balls to the Pitṛs.' Now the qnestion arises—Who are these '*Pitṛs*?' The term '*pitṛ*' has several meanings, and denotes 'progenitor'; (A) it is used in the sense of the relative term, 'father'; (B) it is also used in the sense of one's father and other relations that have died before. It is in this latter sense that we have the term used in the *plural* in all such *Nigada-mantras* as '*namo vaḥ pitaraḥ*, &c.'. It is for the same

reason, again, that at the Shrāddha offered to females, these mantras do not undergo transmutation into the form '*namo vo mātaraḥ*, &c.;' on the same grounds, again, at the the *Shrāddha* offered to a single person, it is only the *number* that is changed, not the *basic noun* (pitṛ). Says the author of the *Sūtra* also—'Mantras should be transformed only in regard to the singular number;' the transformed words being—'*namastē pitaḥ*.' Similarly, he who performs the unitary Shrāddha of his brother or grandfather, uses the *mantra* in the form '*namastē bhrātaḥ*,' '*namastē pitāmaha*,' '*namastē pitṛvya*,' and so forth. The offering of *Shrāddha* to one's childless uncle has been enjoined as necessary, in such passages as—'what one receives from another that he shall give unto him.' (C) Further, the term '*pitṛ*' also denotes a particular Deity; and in this sense, it would stand for an unchanging eternal being. In fact, the author of the *Nirukta*, in the Daivata Section of the work, gives the name '*Pitṛ*,' to the divine Beings occupying the Middle Regions, describing them as '*Pitṛs*, the Maruts bearing the rosary of beads.'

The term '*pitṛ*,' thus having several meanings, the Text proceeds to specify what is meant by it in the present context.

'*While his father holds*,'—is alive—'*one should make the offering to the previous ancestors*,'—*i. e.*, to the three, the grandfather, the great-grandfather and the father of the latter; that these three are meant is indicated by the plural number. Says the *Gṛhyasūtra*—'The son should offer to those to whom the father offers, if both father and son are persons who have set up the fire.'

"But they say that the ball does not reach the fourth ancestor."

True; but, in the case in question, no *fourth* ball is offered.

The text provides another alternative course to be adopted—'*As a Brāhmaṇa*, etc.' That is, Brāhmaṇas, Religious Students and Ascetics are invited and honoured and worship-

ped and fed; and exactly in the same manner should the father be honoured and fed by one whose father is still alive;' '*at the Shrāddha*,'—*i. e.*, the food cooked for the *Shrāddha* offerings.

In this case, the fact of the man being his father, is the sole ground for his being fed; hence it is not necessary to look into his caste and qualifications. To this end they declare thus:—'The *Shrāddha* is for the purpose of giving pleasure to one's ancestors;—hence the bringing about of the pleasure of the dead father being necessary, what harm would there be in feeding the living father, in view of which he could not be fed?

'*Own*'—Is merely reiterative; what is denoted by this being already connoted by the relative term, 'father,' itself.

What is laid down here is the actual *feeding* of the Father; but the Balls are placed for the Pitṛs on *Kusha* blades; as otherwise, there would be an incompatibility with the formula 'this ball is for you.' If the Kusha-blades be regarded as substitutes for the Dish, then, in the event of the living Father's possession being brought about (by the act of offering), it would not be right to make him eat 'a very small portion;' because, for the living person, the eating is to be in accordance with the eater's desire. Further, in this case, there would be no need of pouring water and other things over the ball offered; as such a process would lead to the undesirable contingency of a 'hybrid performance;' any effect produced by the pouring of water, in this case, would serve no useful purpose, either for the man himself or for his father; so that it could only serve an imperceptible transcendental purpose; on the other hand, if water were not poured over the ball, it might be fit for being eaten either by the father, or by the offerer himself, or by some one else. It is in this way that the act may turn out to be of a 'hybrid' character.

For these reasons, it follows that, in this alternative, the

ball is to be offered to only two persons, the grandfather and the great-grandfather.

The authors of the Gṛhyasūtras, however, declare that—'for one whose father is alive there is neiher *Piṇḍapitṛyajña*, nor *Shrāddha* ;—there is either non-performance of these rites, or their performance only up to the stage of pouring libations into fire.'—(220)

VERSE CCXXI.

HE WHOSE FATHER IS DEAD, BUT GRANDFATHER IS LIVING, SHOULD MENTION THE GREAT-GRANDFATHER AFTER HAVING PRONOUNCED THE NAME OF THE FATHER.—(221)

Bhāṣya.

The pronouncing of the Father's name stands here for his invitation, offering of the ball and the feeding of Brāhmaṇas.

'*Should mention the great-grandfather* ;'—*i.e.*, he should not make any offering to the living grandfather ; it should be made to his previous ancestors ; as it has been declared that 'one should make offerings to his father's ancestors.'—(221)

VERSE CCXXII.

MANU HAS DECLARED THAT EITHER THE GRANDFATHER MAY EAT AT THAT SHRĀDDHA, OR THE MAN HIMSELF MAY, ACCORDING TO HIS WILL, PERFORM IT, AFTHER BEING PERMITTED BY HIM.—(222)

Bhāṣya.

Just as the living father is fed, so is the grandfather also.

Having sought permission from the grandfather, the man himself may perform the *shrāddha* ; *i.e.*, he should make the offering to the two remoter ancestors, or to the great-grandfather only. This is what is implied by the terms '*may*' and '*according to his will.*'—(222)

VERSE CCXXIII.

HAVING POURED INTO THEIR HANDS WATER AND SESAMUM ALONG WITH KUSHA BLADES, HE SHOULD OFFER THE TOP PORTION OF THE BALL, SAYING "MAY THIS BE SVADHĀ TO THESE."—(223)

Bhāṣya.

It has been said above (219) that—'he shall make them eat very small portions of the balls;' and the present text lays down the time for this feeding—and the place (from which the portion is to be drawn). The portion is to be taken from the top of the ball; and this portion of the ball should be offered after the Kusha-blades and water and sesamum have been offered.

'*Saying—May this be svadhā to these.*' The pronoun 'these' stands for the individual names; the construction being—'having pronounced the names of the particular ancestor, he should say, *May this be svadhā to him.*' In this sense, the Dative should be used in connection with the term '*svadhā*,'—the right form being—'*svadhā Dēvadattaya astu,*' '*svadhā Yajñadattāya astu,*' 'may this be *svadhā to* Devadatta,' 'may this be *svadhā* to Yajñadatta,' and so forth.

By explaining our text thus, we do not run counter to other scriptural injunctions.—(223)

VERSE CCXXIV.

TAKING UP WITH HIS HANDS THE SUPPLY OF FOOD, HE SHALL HIMSELF GENTLY PLACE IT NEAR THE BRĀHMAṆAS, THINKING OF HIS PITṚS (ALL THE TIME).—(224)

Bhāṣya.

With both hands he should himself take up '*the supply of food,*'—*i.e.*, the dish supplied with food,—from the kitchen-house, to the place where the Brāhmaṇas are being fed, and—'*place it near the Brāhmaṇas.*'

Others explain the verse as follows:—The term '*vardhitam,*' '*supply,*' stands for the *massed food*; this he

should place before the Brāhmaṇas, 'thinking of his *Pitṛs*'—*i.e.*, in his mind saying, 'this is for you'—he should scatter the food.

This is not right. Later on (228), our author is going to declare that 'having brought up the food, he should serve it all;' hence the '*placing*' mentioned in the present verse must simply mean the bringing of the food from another place and depositing it near the Brāhmaṇas.—(224)

VERSE CCXXV.

THE WICKED-MINDED DEMONS FORCIBLY DESTROY THAT FOOD WHICH IS ABANDONED BY BOTH HANDS.—(225)

Bhāṣya.

The food should be *fetched* and *served* with both hands, not with one hand, *serving* also being a kind of *fetching*; hence, the rule laid down in connection with the latter is applicable to the former also. In support of this, the present verse supplies a commendatory supplement.

That which is '*abandond*'—not held—'*by both hands*,' such food, when brought up for serving,—the '*demons destroy*' '*forcibly*;'—'*wicked-minded*'—of malevolent nature;—'*demons*' *i.e.*, the enemies of gods.

In '*ubhayoḥ*,' '*both*,' the Locative ending denotes location; and '*abandoned*' means *not held*. As a matter of fact, case-endings are used even when what is spoken of is the *negation* of what is denoted by the ending; *e.g.*, we have such expressions as 'he does *not come from the village*,' 'he does *not sit on the seat*,' 'he does *not fast for three days*.' [Similarly, in the text, though *negation of holding* is mentioned, yet we have the Locative ending denoting location].—(225)

VERSE CXXVI.

PURE AND WITH COLLECTED MIND, HE SHALL FIRST PLACE ON THE GROUND THE ACCESSORIES, SUCH AS SOUPS AND VEGETABLES, &C., MILK, CURD, BUTTER AND HONEY—(226)

Bhāṣya.

'*Accessories*'—the seasonings. The subsequent words are meant to describe the details of these—'*soups and vegetables*, etc.,

'*He should place*'—deposit—'*on the ground,*'—not upon the wooden board and such other things.—(226)

VERSE CCXXVII.

ALSO HARD FOOD AND SOFT FOOD OF VARIOUS KINDS, ROOTS, FRUITS, SAVOURY MEAT AND SWEET-SMELLING DRINKS.—(227)

Bhāṣya.

'*Hard food*'—parched grains and pastries; what is tough, distinct, and requires to be masticated, is called '*hard food,' bhakṣya.*'

'*Soft food*'—butter-pudding, &c.—(227)

VERSE CCXXVIII.

HAVING GENTLY BROUGHT UP ALL THIS, HE SHALL, WITH COLLECTED MIND AND PURE, SERVE IT,—DESCRIBING ALL ITS QUALITIES.—(228)

Bhāṣya.

'*Having brought up*'—having presented before the Brāhmaṇas,—'*he shall serve it*'—which means the placing of it in the dish in which the person eats. Though all that is meant by 'serving' is the placing of the food within reach of the diner,—yet this placing should be done in such a way that among the several persons dining, the articles of food shall not flow from one man's dish into another's.

'*Qualities,*'—*i.e.*, those qualities of the Hard and Soft food, which consist of acidity, etc.,—these he should describe, saying—'this is acid—this is sweet,—this is a pastry' and so forth. When they have been thus apprised, 'he should give them whatever they relish most'—this has to be construed from what follows later on (in verse 231).

'*Gently*'—this is a reiteration for filling up the metre.—(228)

VERSE CCXXIX.

NEVER SHOULD HE SHED TEARS; NOR SHOULD HE BECOME ANGRY; NOR TELL A LIE. HE SHOULD NOT TOUCH THE FOOD WITH HIS FOOT, NOR SHAKE IT.—(229)

Bhāṣya.

'*Asra*' is tear; this he should not '*shed*'—drop. As a rule, during the performance of *Shrāddha* in honour of the

dead, one is apt to recall the grief caused by the loss of the loved person, which leads to the shedding of tears; and this is what is prohibited here; there is no harm in the sudden dropping of the tears of joy.

'*Never*'—on no account—shall he shed tears.

'*He should not become angry,*'—should not take up an angry attitude.

The telling of a lie having been already prohibited with a view to the fulfilment of man's purpose in general, it is again prohibited here, with a view to the due fulfilment of the act of *shrāddha*.

'*He should not touch the food with his foot*'—any food, either in the form of leavings or otherwise.

'*He should not shake it*'—*i.e.*, he shall not throw it by hand and then again take it in.

Others have explained this verse to mean that he shall not shake a piece of cloth over the food, as is often done for the removing of dust, etc., from it.—(229)

VERSE CCXXX.

TEARS MAKE THE FOOD GO TO GHOSTS, ANGER TO EMEMIES, LIE TO DOGS, TOUCHING WITH THE FOOT TO DEMONS, AND SHAKING TO SINNERS.—(230)

Bhāṣya.

This verse is supplementary to what has gone before in the preceding verse.

The shedding of tears, when done, makes the Shrāddha-offering go—*i.e.*, sends it—to '*ghosts*;' and it does not become helpful to the Pitṛs. The term '*prēta*,' 'ghost,' here stands for a particular class of beings, of the same kind as *Pishāchas*; and not for persons recently dead and not yet joined to their ancestors.

'*Demons*'—also should be understood in the same manner as 'ghosts.'

'*Enemies*'—well-known.

'*Sinners*'—People addicted to sinful deeds.—(230)

VERSE CCXXXI.

WHATEVER MAY BE AGREEABLE TO THE BRĀHMAṆAS, THAT HE SHALL GIVE UNGRUDGINGLY. HE SHALL RELATE STORIES TOLD IN THE VEDA; AS THIS IS LIKED BY THE PITṚS.—(231)

Bhāṣya.

Whatever food, vegetable or drink they may ask for,—all this he shall give '*ungrudgingly*'—without the least hesitation or covetousness. The term '*matsara*' stands here for *avarice.*

'*Be agreeable to*'—*i.e.*, cause pleasure to.

'*Told in the Veda*'—those that are related in the Veda; such, *e.g.*, as the story of the war between the gods and demons, that of the death of Vṛttra, the doings of Saramā, and so forth. Or, it may stand for such stories as '*Kaḥ svidēkākī charati*,' etc. (Vājasanēya Samhitā, 23.9).

Another reading is '*brahmādyāshcha kathāḥ*'—*i.e.*, discourses, in ordinary language, upon the meaning of mantras bearing upon Brahman.

'*This is liked by the Pitṛs*;'—this is a commendatory supplement.—(231)

VERSE CCXXXII.

AT THE RITE IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS, ONE SHOULD RECITE THE VEDIC TEXT, LEGAL INSTITUTES, STORIES, HISTORIES, LEGENDS AND SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTS.—(232)

Bhāṣya.

'*Svādhyāyaḥ*'—Vedic Text.

'*Legal Institutes*'—the works of Manu and others.

'*Stories*'—such as those of Suparṇa, Mitrāvaruṇa, and the rest, related in the Ṛgveda.

'*Histories*'—Mahābhārata, etc.

'*Legends*'—describing the creation of the world and such other subjects, written by Vyāsa and others.

'*Supplementary texts*'—*e.g.*, the *Shrī-sūkta*, the *Mahānāmnikā*, and the like.—(232)

VERSE CCXXXIII.

BEING HAPPY HIMSELF, HE SHALL BRING DELIGHT TO THE BRĀHMAṆAS ; HE SHALL FEED THEM, GENTLY AND SLOWLY, WITH DISHES, AND URGE THEM REPEATEDLY BY MEANS OF SEASONINGS.—(233)

Bhāṣya.

Even if he has cause for grief, he should not show it, by heaving a sigh, or in any other way ; in fact, he should show himself quite happy.

'*He should bring delight to the Brāhmaṇas,*'—by means of songs and such things sung by other persons ; or, by means of such jokes as may be not improper and be in keeping with the occasion. If the reciting of Vedic texts were continued unceasingly, the Brāhmaṇas might begin to feel bored ; hence, now and again, he should cease and amuse the guests by means of music, etc.

'*He should feed them gently* ; '—he should make them eat by addressing to them such agreeable words as ' Do take a few morsels, this dish is nice ; ' and this should be done '*gently*'—not in a hurried or pressing tone ;—' *with dishes* '—such as milk-rice, and the like.

'*By means of seasonings,*'—when the seasonings are taken up for being served, he should describe them as very tasty and thereby tempt the guests to eat ; saying such words as—' these cakes are delicious, this preparation of milk is highly flavoured ; ' and taking the things in hand and standing before each guest , he shall say such words again and again. This is what constitutes ' urging.'—(233)

VERSE CCXXXIV.

AT A SHRĀDDHA HE SHOULD, WITH SPECIAL CARE, FEED THE DAUGHTER'S SON, EVEN THOUGH HE BE STILL UNDER VOWS (OF STUDENTSHIP). HE SHOULD OFFER THE BLANKET AS SEAT AND SCATTER SESAMUM ON THE GROUND.—(234)

Bhāṣya.

The propriety of feeding the daughter's son is put

forward here as a substitute (for what has been enjoined in the preceding verses).

The '*Kutapa*' is a piece of cloth of the shape of a blanket, and made of the goat-wool; it is known among the Northerners as '*Kambala*' (Blanket). This he should give as seat.

This does not apply to the case of the daughter's son only, but to that of all guests; that this is so, is shown by what is going to be said regarding 'three things being sacred at shrāddhas' (next verse); which shows that this is meant to apply to every kind of *shrāddha*.

'*Scatter sesamum*'—on the ground.—(234)

VERSE CCXXXV.

THREE THINGS ARE SACRED AT SHRĀDDHAS—THE DAUGHTER'S SON, BLANKET AND SESAMUM, AND THEY COMMEND THREE THINGS IN THIS CONNECTION—CLEANLINESS, ABSENCE OF ANGER AND ABSENCE OF HASTE.—(235)

Bhāṣya.

'*Sacred*'—*i.e.*, conducive to sanctity, bringing about excellence.

The first half of this verse is purely reiterative, and the latter half is injunctive.

'*Cleanliness*'—avoidance of contact with unclean things; and if, through want of care, the man happens to become unclean, he should purify himself with clay, water, &c., in the manner prescribed in the scriptures.

'*Absence of haste*'—*i.e.*, the feeding of Brāhmaṇas and doing the other acts with confidence and in a steady manner.—(235)

VERSE CCXXXVI.

ALL THE FOOD SHOULD BE VERY HOT, AND THEY SHOULD EAT WITH CONTROLLED SPEECH; WHEN ASKED BY THE GIVER, THE BRĀHMAṆAS SHOULD NOT DESCRIBE THE QUALITIES OF THE SACRIFICIAL FOOD.—(236)

'*Atyuṣṇa*,' 'very hot,' stands for 'hot;' the term being

expounded as '*atigatam uṣṇam,*' 'with heat developed;' just as '*praparṇa*' stands for '*prapatitaparṇa,*' 'that of which the leaves have fallen.'

'*All*'—*i.e.*, the food as well as the seasonings.

This injunction regarding 'being hot' applies to only those things which ought to be eaten hot, and not to rice cooked in curd and such things, which, when eaten hot, are disagreeable and harmful; and this would be contrary to what has been said before regarding 'bringing delight to the Brāhmaṇas.'

In view of the injunction of eating hot food, the entire quantity should not be served at once; as, in that case, for persons who eat much, it would become cold. Hence, as the food is eaten little by little, more should be given. It will not be right to argue that "the food out of which a part has been served becomes a 'remnant,' and it would not be right to serve it as such;" because the rule regarding feeding is that the action of the eater extends till his complete satisfaction. Further, the Rice and other things do not come in, in the act of feeding, as 'gifts to be received;' that is why there is no reciting of mantras connected with the receiving of gifts, over the Rice and other articles of food.

'*With controlled speech*'—*i.e.*, having their speech under full control; the reversed order of the two terms of the compound is an archaism. Or, the compound '*vāgyatāḥ*' may be expounded as '*vachā yatāḥ,*' 'controlled of speech;' the compound in this case being in accordance with Pāṇini's aphorism, '*Sādhanam kṛtā*'; and, in this sense, the term '*yataḥ*' would have the sense of the active past-participle. 'Control' means *stopping of operation*; and the 'operation' of 'speech' is *uttering of words*; and it is this latter that is prohibited; the meaning being that no words, distinct or indistinct, shall be uttered.

Nor are the qualities of the food to be described. It has been declared that 'excellent and well-behaved people, while taking food, shall not speak to the giver.'

"This injunction is already implied by that relating to the control of speech."

True; what is meant by the second injunction is that it should not be done by gestures even; the root '*brū*' denotes *describing*; so that the word '*brūyuḥ*' does not necessarily mean *articulate utterance*.—(236)

VERSE CCXXXVII.

AS LONG AS THE FOOD IS STEAMING, AS LONG AS THEY EAT WITH SPEECH CONTROLLED, SO LONG DO THE PITṚS EAT, AS LONG AS THE QUALITIES OF THE FOOD ARE NOT DESCRIBED.—(237)

Bhāṣya.

This is a commendatory supplement to the foregoing Injunction.

'*Steaming*'—*i.e.*, hot.—(237)

VERSE CCXXXVIII.

WHAT THE GUEST EATS WITH HIS HEAD WOUND UP, WHAT HE EATS WITH HIS FACE TOWARDS THE SOUTH, WHAT HE EATS WITH SHOES ON, ALL THIS VERILY THE DEMONS EAT.—(238)

Bhāṣya.

'*Wound up*'—with turban and such other things. The Northerners cover their heads with cloth.

Some people explain that this refers also to persons who cover their heads with their hairs arranged in the form of a top-knot. But what they say is not reasonable; as, in this case, it is the *hair* that is 'wound up,' not the *head*; and the *hairs* do not form the *head*; in fact, they are *on the head.* The prohibition does not apply to threads and such things; as such things are not regarded as 'covering' the head.

What is meant by indicating the facing of the south as defective is that, when there is want of space, eating with face towards all directions *except the south* is permissible. If this were not meant, where would there be any possibility of anyone eating with face to the south, when it has been distinctly enjoined that one should eat facing the north?

'*Shoes*'—foot-guards made of leather. Some people explain this as sandals of leather.

'*The demons eat*,'—and not the Pitṛs.

This is deprecatory of the conditions described.—(238)

VERSE CCXXXIX.

THE CHĀṆḌĀLA, THE PIG, THE COCK, AS ALSO THE DOG, THE UNCLEAN WOMAN AND THE EUNUCH SHOULD NOT LOOK AT THE BRĀHMAṆAS WHILE EATING.—(239)

Bhāṣya.

'*Pig*'—the village-hog.

Though it has been declared that 'these shall not *look* at close quarters,' yet what the cultured people avoid is these being near the place. In verse 241 below also, the mention of an act (other than *seeing*) in the passage 'the pig spoils the food by *smelling*' is a purely deprecatory supplement. Certainly, there can be no *smelling* by one who does not *see*.

In fact, the verse merely describes the things that may happen to be near by; what is meant is the Injunction that, since, as a rule, the pig is prone to sniff at the food, and the cock is prone to flapping its wings, and so forth,—therefore, one should feed the Brāhmaṇas in a sheltered place; and the purpose served by the present verse is that it implies that, where there is no danger of such untoward happenings, the feeding may be done in an unsheltered place also.

'*Eunuch*'—One without the signs of masculinity.—(239)

VERSE CCXXXX.

AT THE OFFERING INTO FIRE, AT GIFTS, AT FEEDING, OR AT ANY RITE IN HONOUR OF THE GODS OR OF THE PITṚS,—WHATEVER IS SEEN BY THESE GOES WRONG.—(240)

Bhāṣya.

'*At the offering into Fire*'—such as the *Agnihotra*, or the propitiatory offerings.

'*At gifts*'—of such valuable things as the cow, gold and so forth—made for the purpose of attaining prosperity.

'*Feeding*'—where Brāhmaṇas are fed for a religious purpose.

'*Rite in honour of the gods*'—such the as offering at the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* and other sacrifices.

'*Rite in honour of the Pitṛs*'—*i.e.*, *Shrāddha.*

'*Goes wrong,*'—that is, it brings about results contrary to what it was intended for.

Though *Shrāddha* forms the subject-matter of the present context, yet, through syntactical connection, the present prohibition applies to other acts also, in the shape of the *offering into fire* and so forth.—(240)

VERSE CCXXXI.

THE PIG DEFILES BY SNIFFING, THE COCK BY WIND RAISED BY ITS WINGS, THE DOG BY CASTING HIS EYE, AND THE MAN BORN OF THE LOW CASTE BY TOUCH.—(241).

Bhāṣya.

The cock defiles by the wind raised by its wings.

The meaning of this verse has already been explained above (under 239) ; the sense is that the proximity of these should be avoided up to such distance that they may not be able to see the performance.

'*The man born of the low caste*'—here meant is the *Chāṇḍāla* ; as it is this that has been spoken of above.

It has been already explained above that the actions of *touching* and the rest stand here for the action that has been mentioned above (in 239), and not for these actions themselves. For this reason, there is no room for the following criticism.—" The touch of the *Chāṇḍāla* being already prohibited generally, there could be no possibility of such touching, and hence the prohibition here contained becomes superfluous; hence the 'man born of the low caste' must be taken as the *Shūdra*; and what is prohibited is the Shūdra touching the *Shrāddha*, etc., offered by twice-born men, but not those performed by himself."

Even if the actions of *touching*, etc., stand for themselves,—what is meant is not that evil results from the Chāṇḍāla touching the articles of food and drink, but that he should not touch the unsheltered spot on the river-bank and such other places that has been selected for the performance; as the impurity caused by such contact has been described as removed by wind and fire. And thus, inasmuch as the touch of such persons would be quite possible (under the circumstances just described), it is only right that it should be prohibited.—(241)

VERSE CCXXXXII.

THE CRIPPLE, OR THE ONE-EYED MAN, THE MAN WITHOUT A LIMB, OR THE MAN WITH A REDUNDANT LIMB,—EVEN IF HE BE THE OFFERER'S SERVANT—HE SHOULD REMOVE FROM THERE.—(242)

Bhāṣya.

'*Servant*'—a paid attendant.

The term '*even*' indicates that a relation or any other person also, who may, by chance, happen to be there, should be removed.

'*Cripple*'—one incapable of moving; not able to walk.

'*One who is without a limb, and one who has a redundant limb*'—*i.e.*, one who is maimed, one with a crippled arm, one suffering from elephantiasis, and so forth.—(242)

VEESE CCXXXXIII.

THE BRĀHMAṆA OR THE MENDICANT WHO COMES SEEKING FOR FOOD, HE SHALL ENTERTAIN, TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY, ON BEING PERMITTED BY THE BRĀHMAṆAS. —(243)

Bhāṣya.

'*The Brāhmaṇa*'—who may arrive as a guest.

'*The mendicant*'—the Brāhmaṇa that may come begging for alms.

'*On being permitted by the Brāhmaṇas,*' busy with eating, '*he shall entertain,*' according to his ability, *i.e.*, he shall honour them by offering food, or by giving alms in the proper manner. [The permission of the invited Brāhmaṇas

is essential, because] on that day, the food has been cooked specially for them.—(243)

VERSE CCXXXXIV.

HAVING MIXED UP THE FOOD OF ALL KINDS AND WETTED IT WITH WATER, HE SHOULD THROW IT BEFORE THE BRĀHMAṆAS WHO HAVE EATEN, SCATTERING IT ON THE GROUND.—(244)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*varṇa*' should be taken as standing for *kind.* Having '*mixed up*'—brought together—the food along with all the various kinds of seasonings—'*having wetted it with water*'—'*he should throw it before the Brāhmaṇas who have eaten*'—*i.e.*, become fully satisfied; after they have pronounced the words, 'We are fully satisfied;' '*scattering it*'—*i.e.*, it should not be thrown at one place, but broken up and scattered;—'*on the ground*'—not in any vessel; on the ground also, not on the bare ground, but on *Kusha-grass*, as it is going to be laid down in the next verse. Shaṅkha says that the scattering should be done 'either once or thrice.'—(244)

VERSE CCXXXXV.

THE REMNANT AND THAT WHICH HAS BEEN SCATTERED ON THE KUSHA GRASS FORM THE SHARE OF THOSE WHO HAVE DIED WITHOUT SACRAMENTS, AND OF THOSE WHO HAVE ABANDONED FAMILY LADIES.—(245)

Bhāṣya.

In connection with infants who have not completed their third year, it is going to be said that 'cremation shall not be performed for him;' it is these that are spoken of here as '*those who have died without sacraments.*'

'*The remnant*'—contained in the dishes; as also '*what is scattered on the Kusha*' forms their '*share.*' The term '*bhāga-dhēya*' is the same as '*bhāga.*'

This does not mean that these persons are not helped by the *shrāddha.*

'*Those who have abandoned*'—their elders. Or, 'those who have abandoned the ladies of their family, without finding

any fault in them.' According to the former explanation, the term '*Kulayoṣitām*' is to be construed by itself, and taken to mean 'unmarried maidens.'

For the reason stated, the remnant should be offered to the persons mentioned.

It would not be right to raise the question—"Since the remnant would be unclean, how could it be offered as the said share?"—because, in view of this very text, there is no uncleanliness attaching to the remnant; just as there is none in the case of the remnant of Soma-juice (at the Soma-sacrifices).—(245)

VERSE CCXXXXVI.

AT THE RITE IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS, THE REMNANT FALLEN ON THE GROUND IS REGARDED AS THE SHARE OF STRAIGHTFORWARD, DUTIFUL SERVANTS.—(246)

Bhāṣya.

The preceding verse has described the disposal of the remnant in the dishes; the present verse mentions the fact that the remnant fallen on the ground is for servants.

'*Ajihma*' means '*not dishonest*,' 'straightforward.'

'*Ashaṭha*' is 'not idle,' 'dutiful.'

Of such servants the said remnant is the share.

For this reason, large quantities of food shall be served, so that, when the invited person is eating, something may fall on the ground.—(246)

VERSE CCXXXXVII.

FOR THE TWICE-BORN PERSON JUST DEAD, THERE SHOULD BE (PERFORMED) THE RITE UP TO THE 'SAPIṆḌĪKARAṆA: ONE SHOULD DO THE FEEDING AT HIS SHRĀDDHA WITHOUT ANY IN HONOUR OF THE GODS, AND HE SHALL OFFER ONE BALL.—(247)

Bhāṣya.

'*For the twice-born person, just dead*'—one should perform the rite up to 'Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa;' *i.e.*, the offering of balls conjointly with the two preceding ancestors, which

constitutes the Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa, the 'Amalgamating Rite,' shall not be made once—what, then, shall be offered ?—'*He should offer one ball* ;' the particle '*cha*' having the sense of '*only*;' the sense is that 'one ball shall be offered, only to the person just dead.' The Brāhmaṇa also shall be fed in honour of that person only.

In another *Smṛti*, there is declared another specific procedure—' It shall be without invitation and doing in fire' (*Yājñavalkya, āchāra* 251) ; where 'doing in fire' stands for the seeking of permission with the words, 'I shall do this in fire ;' and the pouring of libations into fire is not prohibited. In the *Gṛhyasūtra*, libations into fire have been laid down in connection with the *Shrāddha* offered to the recent dead.

At what time and how long is the rite to be performed—information on these points should be sought for from another *Smṛti* ; where it is said that—(A) 'The first *Shrāddha* is on the eleventh day,'—(B) 'on the date of death, for one year, the Shrāddha should be done every month, and every year it shall be performed, like the monthly performance,'—and in the *Kaṭhaka* it is said, 'This should be done every year.'

(A) The term 'eleventh' is only indicative of the day on which the period of impurity ceases ; since it has been declared that 'having become pure, one should make offerings to the Pitṛs.'

(B) The author of *Gṛhyasūtras* declares that the 'Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa' shall be performed at the end of the year.

The *Shrāddha* mentioned in the text is called '*Ekoddiṣṭa*' ('offered to one person') ; and the 'offering' (of the ball) is part of it.

It has been held that, on account of the declaration of the *Shruti* 'one should make offerings to the Pitṛs' (quoted above),—the offering should be made to the Father, Grandfather and Great-grandfather. But it cannot be right to make this offering (to all three) until the '*Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa*'

has been performed. Because the *Smṛti* (regarding the *Sāpiṇḍīkaraṇa*) cannot be entirely set aside by the said Vedic declaration.—(247)

VERSE CCXXXVIII.

BUT AFTER THE AMALGAMATING RITE HAS BEEN DULY PERFORMED, THE OFFERING OF BALLS SHALL BE DONE BY THE SONS, BY THIS SAME METHOD.—(248)

Bhāṣya.

After the *Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa* or the Amalgamating Rite has been performed, offering should be made to all the three ancestors, by '*that same method* ;' *i.e.*, in accordance with the procedure of the "*Pārvaṇa-shrāddha.*" The term '*āvṛt*' means *procedure, method* ; which is thus prescribed—'The *Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa Shrāddha* should be performed, as preceded by the rite in honour of the gods ;—the Pitṛs should be fed, —and among them the person just dead.' By the term 'Pitṛs' here are meant the three ancestors beginning with the Grandfather, who have already entered the category of the 'Pitṛs,' by having been 'united ;' these should be fed ; —and 'among them'—*i.e.*, among those same Brāhmaṇas that are fed for the united Pitṛs, the 'person just dead' should be invited ; as it is thus that he becomes united with the ancestors ; and this rite is meant to bring about this union Though Viṣṇu reads—'One should feed Brāhmaṇas in honour of the dead person, also in that of the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather of the dead person,'—yet here also it is not stated that they shall be fed separately. So that, just as a sacrificial material intended for several deities is offered to them all in a single oblation, similarly, the Brāhmaṇa also may be fed in honour of several ancestors ; and there would be no incongruity in this. In fact, it is only thus that the use of the term '*saha*' (in our text) becomes justified ; and thus also it is that one avoids the feeding of an even number of Brāhmaṇas at the rite in honour of the Pitṛs [as there would be, if the Brāhmaṇa fed in honour of the dead person were distinct from the three fed in honour of the

three higher *united* ancestors.] Further, according to those persons who accept the second alternative mentioned in verse 125, and feed one Brāhmaṇa each at the rite, in honour of the gods and that in honour of the Pitṛs, only one man is fed in honour of the three ancestors; similarly, here also (the same Brāhmaṇa shall be fed for four).

"The same line of argument would apply also to the rule that 'three persons should be fed at the rite, in honour of the Pitṛs;' and there also each of these three men might be fed in honour of all the Pitṛs; as there also there is no mention of their being distinct."

How do you say that there is no such mention? We read in the *Gṛhyasūtra*—'One ball alone shall not be offered to all,—this has been made clear by the term *balls* itself.' Then again, it is said that 'the cup dedicated to the deceased shall be poured into the cups dedicated to the Pitṛs;' and if the cup of the deceased person were not distinct, from which cup could the water-offering be poured? If it be said that it would be poured out of the cup dedicated to all in common,—this would be highly improper; for that cup will have been dedicated to the three ancestors beginning with the grandfather, and not to the father (just dead); and it would not be proper to offer the water to the latter out of that which has been dedicated to others. It might be argued that the *mixing up* (laid down in the text just quoted) might be done after the water-offering has been made. But in that case, the said mixing would be done for the purposes of an entirely different offering; and this would be contrary to the injunction regarding the 'pouring out.' On the other hand, there is no incongruity in the method described by us above.

The next question that arises is—Who is it that is called '*Prēta*,' 'departed,' 'deceased' (mentioned by Viṣṇu above as one in whose honour Brāhmaṇas should be fed)? [The word meaning 'dead' should apply to all ancestors.]. As a matter of fact, however, no ball is offered to the great-grandfather after the Amalgamating Rite has been performed, since he has be-

come united with the previous ancestors. Says the *Smṛti*,—'One who offers a separate ball to the *united* deceased, becomes by that act, the murderer of Injunctions, as also of his father.' And yet the ball is offered to the 'deceased' separately; and one and the same ball is not offered in common to all. In fact, the mantras that are recited at the rite also express the same idea—'*yē samānāḥ*, &c.'

Our answer to the above is as follows :—The term '*prēta*,' 'departed,' does not denote the act connoted by the root '*iṇ*,' 'to go;' in fact, it is used, not in its etymological, but conventional, sense of 'one *recently* dead;' certainly, one who has gone out on a long journey is not called a '*prēta*' (as he should be, if the term were used in its etymological sense). Further, the action of 'going' is present in the person who died long ago, as well as in one only just dead. It is for this reason that we have such expressions in the *Shruti* as—(*a*) '*Prayannevāsmallokād-yēsamānāḥ*, etc.,' and (*b*) '*prētāyām-andinatrayam*'—where the term '*prēta*' is applied to one recently dead. As for the text quoted above—'he who would offer a separate ball to the deceased, etc.,'—the meaning of it is as follows: After the 'Amalgamating Rite,' the '*Ekoddiṣṭa*,' the 'Unitary Rite,' should not be performed,—whenever *shrāddha* is performed, it should be offered to all the three ancestors,—and on the date of death also, it should be offered to the three ancestors, and not to the Father only. It is thus that the method of the '*Pārvaṇa-shrāddha*' has been mentioned in the present text,—by the words, 'by this same method'—as to be adopted in the *Shrāddha* in question also.

"The pronoun 'this' appears to stand for what forms the subject-matter of the present context; as pronouns, by their very nature, denote what is nearest to them; and in the present instance, what is nearest is the injunction regarding the 'Unitary Rite.'"

Not so. If, even after the performance of the 'Amalgamating Rite,' the offering were made to one person only,

then there would be no point in mentioning the two cases separately (as is done in 247 and 248). Further, the particle '*tu*,' 'but,' clearly indicates deviation from the method of what forms the subject-matter of the context; the sense being—'the rule that has been laid down pertains to the case where the Amalgamating Rite has not been performed; but this should not be applied to the case where the said Rite has been performed.' From all this it follows that, even though the mention of the method of the '*Pārvaṇa*' is more remote, yet it is that which is meant to be adopted in the present connection. Further, if after the performance of the 'Amalgamating Rite,' whenever it would be necessary to perform the 'Unitary Rite,' the offering to all three ancestors would be made on the Amāvasyā day,—then what would be the difference? For, in this case also, would not there be present the condition mentioned in the present text —'after the Amalgamating Rite has been performed, etc., etc.' Nor in the Institutes of Manu do we find any other time prescribed, such as 'every year on the date of death etc.,' to which the present text could be held to apply. So that (by the reasoning of the opponent), in all cases, it would be the 'Unitary Rite' that would have to be performed. And this would be contrary to the declaration of the Mahābhārata, where, in reference to the places of pilgrimage, it is said— 'He satisfied his forefathers by means of *shrāddha*.'

As regards the text of the other *Smṛti*—'Every year, the shrāddha shall be performed like the monthly performance,'—here also the '*monthly shrāddha*' refers to the *shrāddha* on the *Amāvasyā*; as this latter is the archetype of all *shrāddhas*; and it is in connection with this that all the details have been prescribed. And it will not be right to take the term, 'monthly performance,' as standing for the *Shrāddha* performed every month during the year; because no specific details have been prescribed in connection with this latter, whereby it could be differentiated. As for the 'Unitary Rite,' the first of its kind is performed on the eleventh day (after

death, for the *Brāhmaṇa*), and on the thirteenth day (for the *Kṣattriya*), and so forth. Hence it cannot be right to refer to the 'Unitary Rite' by the term 'monthly performance;' the monthly performance is so called because of its connection with the 'month' as the time; but there is no connection between the Unitary Rite and any such time as the 'month;' it having been shown that it is connected with other points of time also. For instance, it having been declared that—'becoming pure, one should make offerings to the Pitṛs,' it follows that such offerings could be made before the end of the month, as well as after it; so that there is no reason for speaking of it by the name 'monthly performance.' As for the '*Amāvasyā Shrāddha*,' on the other hand, its originative injunction containing the term '*Pūrṇamāsa*' (the Full Moon Day, which literally means *Full-Month*),—the time being fixed by such texts as 'the offering should be made *monthly*,'—and no other time being mentioned in this connection,—and all the details of the *Amāvasyā Shrāddha* being found present in the *Shrāddha* in question also,—it is only right that this latter should be declared as having the details of the '*Amāvasyā*' applicable to it.

The Shrāddha-offering with uncooked substances also has its archetype in the '*Pārvaṇa-Shrāddha*;' and having this for its archetype, it would follow that the offering is to be made to three ancestors; and hence (in view of the possibility of this being accepted), the text enjoins the propriety of the 'Unitary Offering' only.

As for Yājñavalkya's declaration (*Āchāra*, 256)—'For one year, every month, on the date of death, the Shrāddha should be performed; similarly, at the end of each year; the first Shrāddha being performed on the eleventh day (after death);'—here also it is the same method that is prescribed. There also it is the '*Amāvasyā Shrāddha*,' that has been recognised as the archetype. Even if the 'Unitary

Rite' were connected with the 'month' as the time, it would not be right to make it borrow its details from the Rite here mentioned; as a beggar does not beg from another beggar; so that, since this also would be as much of an 'Ectypal Rite' as the 'Unitary Rite' itself (there could be no borrowing between them).

Further, there is only one *Shrāddha*; and the term 'monthly' being a generic one, there is nothing to indicate that it stands for the 'Unitary Rite' only.

In Yājñavalkya also we find the same thing. If Yājñavalkya's text were taken as referring to what has gone immediately before it, then the method of the 'Amalgamating Rite' should be applicable to it; as the *Shrāddha* in question is found mentioned after this latter. Having said—'this is the Amalgamating Rite,' and 'before the Amalgamating Rite,'—it is said immediately after this 'on the date of death, &c.'

From all this it follows that not taking any account of mere proximity, the details that are indicated as belonging to it are those of the '*Amāvasyā Shrāddha.*'

The Mantras also support our view. It says—'Become united with the previous ancestors, &c., &c.;' and it is the person recently dead who is thus addressed; the plural number in '*Samsṛjyadhvam*; being purely honorific: as says the author of the *Nirukta*—'In the expression *etā utyā uṣasaḥ* &c., the single *Uṣas*, Dawn, is spoken of in the plural, for the purpose of showing respect to it."

"The term '*Samsṛjyadhvam*,' 'become united,' should refer to those balls into which the ball offered to the deceased is thrown in; and this latter ball also should be referred to by words in the plural, '*pūrvēbhiḥ pitṛbhiḥ* etc.' For in this case it is only this latter plural number that will have to be regarded as figurative. Otherwise, if the plural verb '*Samsṛjyadhvam*' also were taken as referring to the ball that is thrown in, the plural number in both would have to be regarded as figurative and unreal."

There is no force in this also. Because as a matter of fact, what becomes united with each one of the balls is only a portion of the ball that is thrown in; as is clear from the direction—'having offered the fourth ball, one should divide it into three parts and put it into the balls;' so that the three balls do not all become the *container*, at one and the same time; and it is only if this were the case that the plural number in '*Samsṛjyadhvam*' could be applicable literally.

"If each of the three is referred to separately, even so, why could not the plural in '*Samsṛjyadhvam*,' and the indirect address be taken as referring to the balls into which the one ball is thrown in? Specially as the word '*purvēbhiḥ*' referring to the ball that is thrown in, it would not be right to refer to it by the pronoun '*ēbhiḥ*,' 'these.'"

Well, the Mantra in question—'*Samsṛjyadhvam* etc.' not being an injunctive one, we need not trouble ourselves over its interpretation; it is, as a matter of fact, purely descriptive; and the description applies to what is enjoined; and in the present connection what has been enjoined is the *uniting* of the balls; so that this *uniting* is all that is indicated by the *Mantra*. As for the *number* (singular or plural), this is not directly enjoined (by any text), and hence also not obtained by implication; it becomes connected with the passage by mere probability, and this *probability* is recognised prior to the *Mantra* (which therefore could have no bearing upon it).

Some people have said that—"the term 'fourth' (in the text just quoted) may mean simply *predecessor*; so that the deceased (father) being the first, in relation to him the great-grandfather would be the 'fourth' predecessor."

This also is not right. In fact, it is the ball offered to the deceased which is called the *fourth*,—this being the one which completes the number *four*, after the balls to his ancestors have been deposited. Further, the *Shrāddha* in question begins with the *Pitṛs*, and not with

the deceased; since it has been declared that—'one shall invite the Pitṛs, not mentioning the deceased.' So that the order to be adopted would be that the first ball offered is to the father (of the deceased); and in regard to this also the following rule has been laid down. The *dividing into three parts* and the placing upon the balls to the Pitṛs are to be done of that same ball which is the fourth. All that is meant there is that 'one should give away the fourth ball after having divided it into three parts;' the connection of the 'ball' with the act of 'giving away' being clearly implied. When the question arises as to what is that which is to be divided into three parts,—it is *the ball* that is mentioned in close proximity which becomes connected with it. All doubts being set at rest by this, there is apparently no ground for connecting the term 'fourth' also with it.

Then again, when there is a doubt as to which ball is it that is to be divided, the answer is supplied by another Smṛti—'Having offered four balls to each individual name, the offerer of the ball should divide the *first* with the two mantras beginning with *ye samānāḥ*.' The one particular ball is called '*first*' only in view of its being the first to be offered, and not because of its being related to the first ancestor. Because the great-grandfather would be the 'predecessor' of the grandfather, who, in his turn, would be the 'predecessor' of the Father; so that there being no definiteness, the exact meaning of the verse would remain uncertain. The order of the *offering*, however, is fixed by rule; hence in that there is no indefiniteness.

Thus then, the act of *dividing into three parts* having been connected with the fourth ball, this dividing should be done, on the strength of another *Smṛti*, in the order of the *offering*. Consequently, it is said in the *Kāṭhaka* that—'it is clear that the dividing is of the previously dead,';—we ask now—whence does it follow that this is clear?

It has been held that—"the offering is not made to the deceased because he has become included among the Pitṛs."

This also is nothing. Because it is in accordance with a direct injunction that the offering is not made: 'The ball does not go to the fourth;' again 'the ball proceeds to three only.' As for the reading invented by the writer himself—'he shall not mention the deceased,' and the explanation of this as that 'the deceased having become united with the Pitṛs, this text prohibits a further offering to him,'—the fact of the matter is that the reading of the text is not thus; in reality no prohibitive term is found in the text at all; what is found is the cumulative particle ('*cha*' instead of '*na*'). Even if the reading contained the negative particle, the same explanation would apply to this case which we have pointed out in connection with the prohibition of a separate ball for the deceased contained in the verse—'*yaḥ sapiṇḍīkṛtam* etc. etc'.

As regards such assertions as—'after the Amalgamating Rite the son shall perform for his parents, every year, the Unitary Rite, and for the rest the *Pārvaṇa* rite',—and so forth, if there are really such passages (in authoritative works) then what is the use of the proclaiming of the name '*Amāvasyā* ?' In fact, these passages are not found in any of the well-known Smṛti texts recognised by cultured people.

For these reasons, we conclude that there is nothing to indicate any differentiation, from which we could deduce the fact that the balls offered to the ancestors are placed upon that offered to the deceased. For this same reason the established practice should not be abandoned. It has also been shown that this same view is in accordance with reason. Thus it is clear that some people have been led to accept the view that the balls of the ancestors are to be deposited, by construing the words of the text in a different manner.

In verse 247 here—where it is said that 'For the twice-born person just dead, there should be performed the rite upto Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa, one should do the feeding at his *Shrāddha* without any in honour of the gods, and he shall offer one ball;'—the '*Sapiṇḍīkaraṇa*' or 'Amalgamating Rite' should be regarded only as partially binding in a case where

the Father has died, while the Grandfather is still alive; *i.e.*, it is to be performed only when no regard is paid to the prohibition contained in the words 'one shall not make an offering that involves the ignoring of a living person.' When, however, one accepts the view that 'there should be precedence etc. etc.' then, the Grandfather should be left out and the dead father should be united to the higher ancestors. Similarly, the rite is only partially binding when the Father is offering the *Shrāddha* to his dead son. Similarly, too, when one's wife dies without issue, the performance is only partially binding upon the step-son whose mother may be living.

Says the text—'For those that die childless, others shall perform the rite, and those ladies again for those.'

The term '*sutaiḥ*,' 'sons' in the text stands for *children*; though the presence of the term '*suta*' might be taken to indicate the inclusion of the son's substitutes also, if the particle '*sva*,' 'own,' were not taken as precluding those others.—(248)

SECTION (15)—PROCEDURE AFTER FEEDING.

VERSE CCXLIX.

HE WHO, HAVING EATEN AT A SHRĀDDHA, GIVES THE LEAVINGS TO A SHŪDRA,—THIS FOOLISH MAN FALLS HEADLONG INTO THE KĀLASŪTRA HELL.—(249)

Bhāṣya.

Though the text mentions the evil accruing to the diner, yet the advice intended is conveyed to the performer of the *shrāddha* ; the sense being that 'he should manage it so that the diner does not offer the leavings to a *Shūdra*.' This form of the rule is analogous to that pertaining to the Priests (where also what is meant is that the master of the sacrifice so arranges things that the Priests do not commit any breaches of law).

'*Vṛṣala*'—Shūdra.

'*Head-long*'—With the feet upwards.

The term '*shrāddha*' has been repeated here for the purpose of guarding against the idea that what is here stated pertains to the 'Amalgamating Rite' only.—(249)

VERSE CCL.

HAVING EATEN AT A SHRĀDDHA, IF ONE ENTERS THE BED OF A WOMAN ON THAT DAY, HIS ANCESTORS LIE IN HER ORDURE FOR THE WHOLE OF THAT MONTH.—(250)

Bhāṣya.

They say that the term '*vṛṣalī*' in this verse stands for *woman* generally ; and in this sense they explain the etymology of the term to mean—'*vṛṣasyati*'—*chālayati*, 'moves'—'*bhartāram*.' 'her husband,' Be this woman a *Brāhmaṇī* or any other caste—all are prohibited. Says another *Smṛti* (Gautama, 15-23)—'On that day he shall remain firmly continent.'

'*Bed*' denotes *sexual intercourse* ; the prohibition does not apply to merely *entering the bed.*

'*Day*' stands for day and night; hence the prohibition applies to the night also.

'*Ordure*'—this is a deprecatory exaggeration, intended to dissuade men.

'*His ancestors*'—*i.e.*, the ancestors of the man eating at the *shrāddha*.

This also has to be explained as before; that is, the rule applies to both (the feeder and the eater). As regards the eater, what is here laid down is only 'circumstantial;' that is, it is enjoined as to be observed by him only when the circumstance of eating at *shrāddhas* is present. From the context, however, it is clear that it pertains to the Rite (and hence to the Performer) also.—(250)

VERSE CCLI.

HAVING ASKED—"HAVE YOU DINED WELL?"—HE SHALL, AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN FULLY SATISFIED, MAKE THEM WASH; AND WHEN THEY HAVE WASHED, HE SHALL SAY—"YOU MAY REST WHERE YOU CHOOSE.—(251)

Bhāṣya.

After food, drink and water for sipping have been offered, the guests should be questioned—with the words 'have you eaten well?'

According to another *Smṛti*, the question should be put by the host, food in hand. It is the nature of some people that if the food is not near at hand, they do not ask for it, even though they may have desire for it, fearing the trouble they would cause; but if the food is close by, they take it.

'*After they have been fully satisfied, he shall make them wash.*'

Others have explained this to mean that the guests should be put the question—'Are you fully satisfied?' And when they have ascertained the fact of their having been fully satisfied, they should be further propitiated by the question—'Have you dined well?' It is going to be de-

clared (under 254) that 'at the rite in honour of the Pitṛs one should say *Have you dined well?*'

'*When they have washed, he shall say &c.*'—'*Where you choose*'—*i.e.*, at either of the two places,—here or at your own house, you may take your rest, in any manner you choose.—(251)

VERSE CCLII.

THE BRĀHMAṆAS SHOULD THEREUPON TELL HIM—"MAY THERE BE SVADHĀ." AT ALL RITES PERFORMED IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS, THE SYLLABLE "SVADHĀ" CONSTITUTES THE HIGHEST BENEDICTION.—(252)

Bhāṣya.

When the Brāhmaṇas have dined and obtained permission to go, they should pronounce the syllable '*svadhā.*'

The syllable '*svadhā*'—*i.e.*, the utterance of the syllable '*svadhā*'—constitutes the '*highest benediction,*'—at all rites performed in honour of the Pitṛs;—those performed with cooked food as well as those offered with uncooked food.—(252)

VERSE CCLIII.

HE SHALL THEN INFORM THEM OF THE FOOD THAT MAY BE LEFT AFTER THEY HAVE EATEN; BEING PERMITTED BY THE BRĀHMAṆAS HE SHALL DO AS THEY TELL HIM.—(253)

Bhāṣya.

They shall be informed of the food that has been eaten; they should be told—'here is this.' '*Being permitted by them, he shall do as they tell him;*' that is, without their permission he shall not make any other use of the food.—(253)

VERSE CCLIV.

AT THE RITE IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS, ONE SHOULD SAY "SVADITAM" (WELL-DINED); AT THE GOṢṬHA, "SUSHṚTAM" (WELL-COOKED); AT THE ĀBHYUDAYIKA RITE, "SAMPANNAM" (ACCOMPLISHED); AND AT THE RITE IN HONOUR OF THE GODS, "RUCHITAM" (AGREEABLE).—(254)

Bhāṣya.

Other persons also, happening to be present on the

occasion, should offer words of encouragement; and the terms to be used are here mentioned.

Another commentator explains as follows:—The permission to take food should be sought by means of these terms; hence these words have got to be uttered by the performer of the *Shrāddha*. But he should say, '*Svadadhvam*,' 'please eat well,' and not '*Svaditam*,' 'well eaten;' or, the reading may be '*Svadatu*' ('do eat please').

This explanation is based upon another *Smṛti* and upon custom; and, according to this, when the Brāhmaṇas have begun to eat, they should be enlivened by the performer of the *Shrāddha* with these words.

'*At the goṣṭha*'—*i.e.*, when several cows are sitting at the same place;—the word to be pronounced is '*Suṣhṛtam*,' 'well-cooked.'

The word '*Astu*,' 'may it be,' is understood everywhere.

At the rite in honour of the gods, the term used should be '*ruchitam*' or '*rochitam*.'—(254)

SECTION (16)—ESSENTIALS OF SHRADDHA.

VERSE CCLV.

THE AFTERNOON, KUSHA-GRASS, SETTING UP OF THE DWELLING, SESAMUM GRAINS, LIBERALITY, CLEANING AND SUPERIOR BRĀHMAṆAS;—THESE ARE THE ESSENTIALS OF SHRĀDDHA-RITES.—(255)

Bhāṣya.

The *Shrāddha* should be performed in the afternoon.

'*These are the essentials of Shrāddha rites,*'—*i.e.*, attempt should be made to bring about all these things.

Though the present text mentions the 'afternoon' without reference to any particular *Shrāddha*, yet it is not to be observed in connection with *all* Shrāddhas: for we have another Smṛti-text to the effect that—'rites in honour of the gods shall be performed in the forenoon; that in honour of the Pitṛs in the afternoon; the Shrāddha offered to a single person shall be performed at mid-day, while that in connection with auspicious rites shall be performed in the morning.'

'*Dwelling*'—house; the '*setting up*' of this consists in the white-washing of the walls with lime etc., the smearing of the floor with cowdung; having its slope towards the south.

'*Liberality*'—charity; *i.e.*, unstinted giving away of food and vegetables.

'*Cleaning*'—washing; *i.e.*, a particular manner of preparing the food.

Others have explained this verse to mean that these things constitute the 'excellence'—the superiority—of the rites,—and not that they shall not be performed without these.—(255)

VERSE CCLVI.

KUSHA-GRASS, THE SANCTIFICATORY TEXTS, THE FORENOON, ALL KINDS OF SACRIFICIAL FOOD, PURITY AND ALSO THE AFORE-MENTIONED;—THESE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE ESSENTIALS OF A SACRIFICE.—(256)

Bhāṣya.

'*Kusha-grass*'—is well-known.

'*Sanctificatory texts*'—Mantras.

'*Sacrificial food*'—articles of food fit for sacrifices; these are going to be described in the next verse.

'*Purity*'—cleanliness of conduct.

'*And also the afore-mentioned*'—*i.e.*, what have been mentioned in the preceding verse, in the shape of 'setting up of the dwelling, liberality, cleaning, superior Brāhmaṇas' equipped with character and learning.

'*Essentials of a sacrifice*'—'Sacrifice' consists in the act of offering to the gods and of feeding Brāhmaṇas in honour of the gods; the term '*havya*,' 'sacrifice,' standing for what is done in honour of the gods.—(256)

VERSE CCLVII.

THE FOOD OF HERMITS, MILK, THE SOMA-HERB, MEAT THAT IS NOT FORBIDDEN, SALT OTHER THAN ALKALINE ARE, BY NATURE, CALLED "SACRIFICIAL FOOD."—(257)

Bhāṣya.

'*Hermit*'—*i.e.*, the Vānaprastha; his '*food*' consists of the *Nīvāra* and other wild-growing grains; this is mentioned only by way of illustration; it indicates the *Vrīhi* and other similar grains; and it is in view of this that in the preceding verse we have the phrase 'of all kinds,' and also in the verse 266, the expression, 'sacrificial food which serves for a long time,' which introduces the enumeration of artificially grown grains also, such as '*tila, vrīhi, yava, māṣa*,' and so forth.

'*Milk*'—which includes its preparations, such as curds and the like; such being the sense of *Smṛtis* and also sanctioned by usage.

'*Unforbidden*'—sanctioned, not prohibited. Meat obtained from slaughter-houses is regarded as 'forbidden.'

'*Akṣāralavaṇa*.'—A doubt arises here as to whether this is a negative compound containing a copulative one, or a purely negative compound. Does it mean merely 'absence of salts and alkalines' (as it would, if it were a negative com-

pound with a copulative one), or is '*kṣāra-lavaṇa*' (alkaline salt) the name of a particular kind of salt, and the text permits the use of salts other than that kind? It appears better to take it as standing for a particular kind of salt. If it meant the mere negation of a copulative compound, there would be two compounds, and the negative particle would have to be construed with each of the two members of the copulative compound; and all this would involve a great deal of complication.

"*Sacrificial food, by nature*;'—that is, all this is to be regarded as 'sacrificial food,' without any qualifications; this is what is to be understood to be the meaning in all such general injunctions as 'he lives upon *sacrificial food*,' breakfasts on *sacrificial food*,' and so forth—(257).

SECTION (17)—REQUEST FOR BENEDICTION OF ANCESTORS.

VERSE CCLVIII.

HAVING DISMISSED THOSE BRĀHMAṆAS, HE, WITH COLLECTED MIND, CONTROLLED IN SPEECH AND PURE, TURNING TOWARDS THE SOUTHERN QUARTER, SHALL BEG THESE BOONS OF HIS ANCESTORS.—(258)

Bhāṣya.

The preceding verse was only by the way ; the present verse takes up the thread of the context.

'*Dismissed*'—having permitted them to go wherever they please.

'*Those Brāhmaṇas*'—who have dined.

After this, looking towards the southern direction, he should '*beg*'—ask for—the following '*boons*'—desirable things—'*of his ancestors;*' thinking all the time of his ancestors. He should beg—with such words as—'may this and this be mine after you have been satisfied.'—(258)

The next verse describes what the boons are that should be begged.

VERSE CCLIX.

'MAY OUR BENEFACTORS PROSPER! AS ALSO THE VEDAS AND OUR PROGENY! MAY OUR FAITH NEVER WAVER! MAY THERE BE MUCH FOR US TO GIVE AWAY!'—(259)

Bhāṣya.

This has to be recited like a Mantra-text—(259)

SECTION (18)—DISPOSAL OF OFFERINGS.

VERSE CCLX.

HAVING MADE THE OFFERING THUS, HE SHOULD, AFTER THIS, EITHER MAKE THE COW OR THE BRĀHMAṆA OR THE GOAT OR THE FIRE TO EAT THE BALLS, OR THROW THEM INTO WATER.—(260)

Bhāṣya.

'*After this*'—after the offering of the balls.

'*The balls*'—that have been offered to the Pitṛs—'he should make the cow, etc. to eat.' In the case of the fire, the 'making to eat' would consist in their being thrown into the fire.

'*Prāpayēt*' (offer) is another reading for '*prāshayēt*' (make to eat).—(260)

VERSE CCLXI.

SOME PEOPLE DO THE BALL-OFFERING AFTERWARDS, OTHERS CAUSE THEM TO BE EATEN BY BIRDS, OR THROW THEM INTO FIRE OR WATER.—(261)

Bhāṣya.

Some people make the offering *after* the Brāhmaṇas have been fed.

'*They cause them to be eaten by birds.*'—This mode of disposal is in addition to those mentioned above.

'*Fire;*'—this is only a reiteration of what has been said above.

This offering of balls, after the feeding of Brāhmaṇas, is meant to be done near the place where the leavings of the dinner lie.—(261)

VERSE CCLXII.

THE LAWFUL WIFE, DEVOTED TO HER HUSBAND AND INTENT UPON THE WORSHIPPING OF THE PITṚS, SHOULD, IF DESIROUS OF A SON, EAT IN THE PROPER MANNER, THE MIDDLEMOST BALL.—(262)

Bhāṣya.

The modes of disposal mentioned above apply to the first and the last balls; but the middlemost of the balls the lawful

wife, desiring a son, should eat; *i.e.*, the wife who has not been married merely for the sake of pleasure.

'Devoted to her husband;'—one who makes it her vow that—'I shall serve my husband alone, even in my mind I shall never entertain even a thought of faithlessness to him.'

'Intent upon'—with full faith in—*'the worshipping'*—the *shrāddha* and other rites—*'of the Pitṛs.'* That is, she betakes herself with great care to the performance of these.

'Should eat in the proper manner;'—*i.e.*, fully observing the rules regarding the rinsing of the mouth and sipping of water etc., etc.—(262)

VERSE CCLXIII.

SHE BRINGS FORTH A LONG-LIVED SON, ENDOWED WITH FAME AND INTELLIGENCE, WEALTHY, WITH NUMEROUS OFFSPRING, GOOD AND RIGHTEOUS.—(263)

Bhāṣya.

Having eaten the said ball, *'she brings forth'*—gives birth to—*'a son.'*

'Intelligence'—the faculty of grasping things; the child is endowed with this.

'Sattva,' 'goodness,' is an attribute postulated by the Sāṅkhyas; and its presence is indicated by firmness, courage, and such other qualities—(263).

SECTION (19)—FEEDING OF RELATIONS.

VERSE CCLXIV.

HAVING WASHED THE HANDS AND SIPPED WATER, HE SHOULD MAKE OFFERINGS TO HIS PATERNAL RELATIONS; AND HAVING TREATED HIS PATERNAL RELATIONS WELL, HE SHOULD FEED HIS OTHER RELATIONS ALSO.—(264)

Bhāṣya.

The balls having been disposed of, he should wash his hands; and then follow the rules regarding sipping of water.

'*Jñatiprāyam*'—is to be explained as 'that which goes to (*praiti*) to the paternal relations (*jñātiṣu*);' this he should make; *i.e.*, he should offer food to them.

'*Having treated them well, he should feed other relations.*'

Those belonging to the same '*gotra*' are called '*jñati*,' 'paternal relations,' while those related on the mother's and the wife's side are called '*bāndhava*,' 'releations.'

The following question is here raised:—

"It has been said above (in verse 253) that 'he should do as they tell him;' now if they were to tell him, 'Send all this food to our home,' then, what would become of the *Vaishvadeva* and other oblations?"

In that case, the man will have to cook food again. Or, the offering of the remnant to the Brāhmaṇas may be regarded as being prescribed only with a view to some transcendental result,—and not with a view to their actually taking it all away. For instance, it has been laid down that—'When informed of food having been left, they should say *it is for your friends*;' and this direction would have to be regarded as only optional, if, in certain cases, the Brāhmaṇas were to take away the food.—(264)

SECTION (20)—DOMESTIC OFFERINGS AFTER SHRADDHA.

VERSE CCLXV.

THE LEAVINGS SHALL REMAIN UNTIL THE BRĀHMAṆAS HAVE BEEN DISMISSED. AFTER THAT, HE SHOULD MAKE THE DOMESTIC OFFERINGS. SUCH IS THE ESTABLISHED LAW.—(265)

Bhāṣya.

Until the Brāhmaṇas have departed, the food that may be contained in the dishes out of which they have eaten, or which may have fallen on the ground, shall not be removed.

'*After that, he should make the domestic offering.*' The *Shrāddha* rite having been finished, he should offer the oblation to the Vishvēdēvas and attend to the daily routine of feeding the guests, &c. The term '*offering*' is merely indicative.

Others offer the following explanation :—"The term 'offering' here stands for the offering made to the elementals ; and in this way the pouring of libations into fire before the feeding of *Brāhmaṇas*, does not become improper. It will not be right to argue that—'when the rite in honour of the Pitṛs has been begun, it cannot be right to thrust into it other rites; '—for, according to the rule by which the *Shrāddha* extends over two days, though the inviting of the Brāhmaṇaṣ (which is part of the *Shrāddha*) is done on the preceding day, yet there is nothing wrong in the morning and evening libations being offered into fire ; and the same may be the case with the *Vaishvadēva* libation, which also is poured into the 'Upasad' fire. So that what are postponed (till after the completion of the *Shrāddha*) are only those details that come *after*—and not those that come *before*—the offering to the elementals."

Our reply to the above is as follows:—If the *Vaishvadēva* oblation is offered into the fire beforehand, then the *ball-offering* would come after the *Shrāddha*; and in that case the 'sacrifice to the gods' and the 'offering to the elementals' would become separated ; and this would militate against the

prescribed order of sequence. Further, the time being taken up by the *Shrāddha* offered to the Pitṛs, this does not quite interfere with the time of the *Vaishvadēva* oblation. From all this it follows that all the 'Great Sacrifices' should be performed after the *Shrāddha*.

SECTION (21)—RELATIVE MERITS OF THE OFFERING-MATERIALS.

VERSE CCLXVI.

I SHALL NOW FULLY DESCRIBE WHAT OFFERING-MATERIAL, ON BEING OFFERED TO THE PITṚS, ACCORDING TO RULE, SERVES FOR A LONG TIME, AND FOR ETERNITY.—(266)

Bhāṣya.

'The term '*chira-rātra*' means *long time.*

'*That which serves for eternity*' as well as that which brings about long-standing satisfaction;—both these I am going to describe.

This is said for the purpose of attracting the attention of the audience.

After '*kalpatē,*' the term '*prētē,*' 'for the food,' should be supplied.—(266)

VERSE CCLXVII.

BY THE PROPER OFFERING OF SESAMUM, RICE AND BARLEY, MĀṢA, WATER, ROOTS AND FRUITS, MEN'S ANCESTORS ARE SATISFIED FOR ONE MONTH.—(267)

Bhāṣya.

The mention of the sesamum and other grains is not meant to be preclusive of other grains; it is meant only to be indicative of the peculiar results following from their offering; the sense being that when those are offered in the right manner, the ancestors remain satisfied for one year.

'*Proper,*' '*ancestors,*' '*men's.*'—These terms are purely reiterative, put in for the purpose of filling up the metre.—(267)

VERSE CCLXVIII.

FOR TWO MONTHS BY FISH-MEAT; FOR THREE MONTHS BY THE MEAT OF DEER; FOR FOUR BY THAT OF SHEEP, AND FOR FIVE BY THAT OF BIRDS.—(268)

Bhāṣya.

'*Urabhra*'—Sheep.

'*Birds*'—Wild cocks, etc.

'*Fish*'—*Pāṭhīna,* and the rest.—(268)

VERSE CCLXIX.

FOR SIX MONTHS BY THE MEAT OF GOAT; FOR SEVEN BY THAT OF SPOTTED DEER; FOR EIGHT BY THAT OF THE BLACK ANTELOPE, AND FOR NINE BY THAT OF THE RURU DEER.—(269)

Bhāṣya.

'*Ruru*,' '*pṛṣat*' and '*ēṇa*' denote special varieties of the deer.

In the terms '*raurava*,' '*pārṣata*,' and '*aiṇēya*' the nominal affix denotes *arising from*.—(269)

VERSE CCLXX.

THEY ARE SATISFIED FOR TEN MONTHS BY THE MEAT OF BOARS AND BUFFALOES; AND FOR ELEVEN MONTHS BY THE MEAT OF THE HARE AND THE TORTOISE.'—(270)

Bhāṣya.

The '*boar*' here stands for the *wild* species.—(270)

VERSE CCLXXI.

FOR ONE YEAR BY COW'S MILK AND MILK-PREPARATIONS; AND BY THE MEAT OF OLD GOAT THERE IS SATISFACTION LASTING FOR TWELVE YEARS.—(271)

Bhāṣya.

As between direct and indirect connection, the former being more authoritative, we construe '*gavyēna*'—'*cow's*'—with '*payasā*,' 'milk;' and not with '*māmsa*,' 'meat,' which forms the subject-matter of the context.

Others, however, explain the particle '*cha*' as having a cumulative force, and then explain the passage to mean, 'meat of the cow, and milk or milk-rice.'

'*Pāyasa*,' '*milk-preparations*,' stands for curds and such things, as also rice cooked in milk.

'*Vārdhrīṇasa*'—is *old goat*. The scriptures describe it as follows:—'Drinking with three, devoid of sense-virility and white,—such a goat has been called *Vārdhriṇasa* by persons learned in sacrifices, in connection with sacrificial rituals.' That goat is called 'drinking with three' who wets his tongue and two ears, while drinking water.

The Expiatary Rite that Shaṅkha has prescribed in connection with the eating of beef, should be understood to apply to eating apart from the '*Madhuparka*' offering and from the '*Aṣṭakā*' *Shrāddhas*.—(271)

VERSE CCLXXII.

THE "KĀLASHĀKA," THE PORCUPINE, THE MEAT OF THE RHINOCEROS AND THE RED GOAT, AND HONEY SERVE FOR ENDLESS TIME; AS ALSO ALL KINDS OF HERMIT'S FOOD.—(272)

Bhāṣya.

'*Kālashāka*'—is a well-known variety of vegetable; applying to the darker variety of the '*Vāstūka*.'

'*Mahāshalka*' stands for the porcupine. Others have explained it as standing for a special kind of fish.

'*Khaḍga*'—Rhinoceros.

'*Loha*'—the black goat, or one which is *red* all over. Says the *Purāṇa*—'the red goat, and the black one, serve for endless time.' Though the term '*loha*' denotes the *colour*, it indirectly indicates the goat having that colour. The term '*loha*' is used in the sense of 'black' as well as 'red'—being applied to *iron*, which is black, as also to *copper* which is red. Though this variety of colour is found in sheep and other animals also, yet, on the strength of other *Smṛtis*, it has been explained here as standing for the *goat* only.

Others, however, have explained the term '*loha*' as standing for the bird, called '*lohapṛṣṭha*,' the Heron; which is mentioned by means of a part of the name only. Just as Devadatta is often spoken of as simply 'Datta.'

It is necessary to find the support of usage in the case of both these explanations.

'*Honey*'—that collected by bees.

In the case of all the things mentioned in the present context, all that is meant is the *great satisfaction* produced by the offerings; and stress is not meant to be laid upon the exact period of time mentioned in each case. If this

were really meant, then one might be justified in omitting the performance of *Shrāddhas* for twelve years ; and this would be contrary to what has been declared, to the effect that 'Rites in honour of the Pitṛs should be performed till death.' (Verse 279).—(272)

VERSE CCLXXIII.

WHATEVER THING, MIXED WITH HONEY, ONE MIGHT OFFER ON THE THIRTEENTH DAY OF THE MONTH, DURING THE RAINS, UNDER THE ASTERISM OF MAGHĀ,—THAT ALSO WOULD BE IMPERISHABLE.—(273)

Bhāṣya.

'*Whatever*'—*food*—'*mixed with honey* ;'—'*on the thirteenth day, during the rains, and under the asterism of Maghā*,' —'*that is imperishable.*' The season, the asterism and the date are to be taken together as the desired qualification.

According to the declaration of Āpastamba, the same holds good regarding offerings made during the rains, on the thirteenth, eighth and tenth days of the month also. As regards the asterism of Maghā, however, there is no option ; as he says—'there is abundance under the asterism of Maghā.' (Āpastamba, 2-8-19-20.—(273)

VERSE CCLXXIV.

'MAY THERE BE ONE IN OUR FAMILY, WHO MAY OFFER MILK-RICE MIXED WITH HONEY AND BUTTER ON THE THIRTEENTH, AND WHEN THE SHADOW OF THE ELEPHANT FALLS TOWARDS THE EAST.'—(274)

Bhāṣya.

What is said here is with reference to the thirteenth day of the month spoken of above, as accompanied by the rainy season and the asterism of *Maghā*.

What is described in the text is the wish expressed by the Pitṛs.

'*May there be*'—born—'*in our family*'—one such person, endowed with excellent qualities, who may offer to us, on the said thirteenth day, '*milk-rice mixed with honey and butter* ;'—also '*when the shadow of the elephant falls towards*

the east;' *i.e.*, during the afternoon; towards the close of day, the shadow cast by the elephant is long and falls towards the East.

Another reading for '*prākchhāyā*' is '*prākchhāyām*;' it is in a shady place that Brāhmaṇas are fed; as for the rest of the rite, if the shade is not enough to permit of its being done there, then it should be done in a place close to the shadow. Since the details form part of the rite, the whole of it should, as far as possible, be performed in the shadow of the elephant.

Some people have explained the term 'shadow of the elephant' to mean 'eclipse,' adding that Rāhu takes the shape of the elephant and pierces the sun with darkness.

But this is not right; as in that case, the term 'elephant' will have to be regarded as figurative. Further, in another *Smṛti*, the 'elephant's shadow' has been described as something entirely different from eclipse:—'the elephant's shadow, the eclipse of the Sun, and the eclipse of the Moon' [where the three are mentioned as distinct from one another].—(274)

VERSE CCLXXV.

WHATEVER ONE ENDOWED WITH FAITH, OFFERS, ACCORDING TO RULE AND IN THE RIGHT MANNER,—THAT BECOMES ENDLESS AND INEXHAUSTIBLE FOR THE PITṚS IN THE OTHER WORLD.—(275)

Bhāṣya.

'*Whatever.*'—This term sanctions the offering of everything, not actually prohibited.

'*According to rule*' is a reiteration of what has been said by means of the term, '*in the right manner.*'

'*Endowed with faith.*'—This is what is actually prescribed in the present verse:—'one should make the offering with due faith.'

What is given in this manner '*becomes endless and inexhaustible for the Pitṛs in the other world.*' 'Endless' may be taken as denying all limitation of time;—'*Inexhaustible*' denies non-diminishing of quantity; the sense being 'it lasts for all time and becomes large in quantity.'—(275)

SECTION (22)—TIME ROR SHIDDHA.

VERSE CCLXXVI.

'NO DATES ARE SO COMMENDED FOR THE OFFERING OF SHRĀDDHA AS THOSE OF THE DARK FORTNIGHT, BEGINNING WITH THE TENTH DAY, LEAVING OUT THE FOURTEENTH.—(276)

Bhāṣya.

The mention of the days beginning with the tenth, indicates that the offering is attended by excellent results. So that on other days also the offering is to be made, if due faith is there. But on the fourteenth day there is absolute prohibition.—(276)

VERSE CCLXXVII.

PERFORMING (THE SHRĀDDHA) ON THE EVEN DATES AND UNDER THE EVEN ASTERISMS, ONE OBTAINS ALL DESIRES; AND HONOURING THE PITṚS ON THE ODD ONES, HE OBTAINS PROSPEROUS OFF-SPRING.—(277)

Bhāṣya.

'*Even dates*'—the second, the fourth, and so forth.

'*Asterism*'—lunar mansion ; '*Bharaṇī,*' and the rest are called 'even asterisms.'

The first, the third, the fifth, the seventh and the ninth days of the month are called '*odd;*' and the second, the fourth, the sixth, the eighth and the tenth are called '*even.*' Similarly, the eleventh day is 'odd,' and so on with the asterisms also.

'*All desires,*'—the desires being described in detail in *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas.*

'*Prosperous offspring,*'—that which is replete with persons possessed of wealth, learning and strength, is called '*prosperous.*'—(277)

VERSE CCLXXVIII.

JUST AS, FOR PURPOSES OF SHRĀDDHA, THE LATTER HALF OF THE MONTH IS PREFERABLE TO THE FORMER HALF, SO ALSO, THE AFTERNOON IS PREFERABLE TO THE FORENOON.—(278)

Bhāṣya.

'*Former half of the month*' is the brighter fortnight ;

and '*latter half*' is the darker fortnight ;—months being counted from the brighter fortnight of *Chaitra* onwards.

Just as, for purposes of Shrāddha, the darker fortnight is preferable to—is productive of better results than—the brighter fortnight, so is the afternoon preferable to the forenoon. From the declaration of this 'preference,' it follows that in some cases one might perform a *shrāddha* during the forenoon also.

"As a rule, the illustration should be well known ; as a matter of fact, however, nowhere has the text declared the superiority of the darker fortnight to the brighter fortnight, for purposes of *Shrāddha*. [Hence the illustration is not apt]."

Some people explain that the said superiority is understood from what has been said under 276, regarding the 'darker fortnight' and 'days beginning with the tenth.'

Our explanation, however, is as follows :—According to the principle laid down in *Mīmāmsāsūtra* 3. 5. 21, even an unknown fact can serve as an illustration ; so that, in the case in question, from the citation of the illustration itself we may even deduce the necessary injunction (regarding the performance of *Sharddhas* during the darker fortnight).—(278)

VERSE CCLXXIX.

UNTIL DEATH, ONE SHALL PERFORM, WITH ASSIDUITY, THE RITE IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS, ACCORDING TO RULE, WITH THE SACRED THREAD PASSING OVER THE RIGHT SHOULDER, MAKING OFFERINGS "FROM OFF THE LEFT" (TO THE RIGHT) WITH KUSHA-GRASS IN HIS HAND.—(279)

Bhāṣya.

This injunction applies to every act that may be done in honour of the Pitṛs.

The special terms used have all been explained before.

'*With assiduity*'—Without sloth ; *i.e.*, with due faith.

'*Until death.*'—This shows that the injunction is meant to be observed as long as one lives.

"*With Kusha-grass in his hand.*'—It has been said above (under 256) regarding 'Kusha-grass, the *Pavitra*, &c.;'—'*pavitra*' is the name given to a thing made of Kusha-grass, with a knot at the top.—(279)

VERSE CCLXXX.

ONE SHOULD NOT PERFORM SHRĀDDHA AT NIGHT; FOR THE NIGHT HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE 'FIT FOR DEMONS;'—NOR AT THE TWO TWILIGHTS, NOR WHEN THE SUN HAS JUST RISEN.—(280)

Bhāṣya.

Objection—"Inasmuch as it has been laid down that *Shrāddhas* shall be performed in the afternoon, where was there any possibility of performance *at night* (that it should have been considered necessary to prohibit it)? It might be argued that the specification of the time itself implies the possibility of performance at other times also. This may be true; but the specification contained in the words, 'the afternoon is preferable to the forenoon,' (278) clearly indicates that the performance is possible only at that time, in comparison with which the prescribed time has been declared to be 'preferable;' so that the only other time at which the *Shrāddha* might be performed is the *forenoon* (and never the *night*)."

In answer to this, some people offer the following explanation :—The present text serves to prohibit the performance at night, which might be possible under the direction that Shrāddhas shall be performed during lunar and solar eclipses. So that there being *prohibition* regarding the twilights and the night, and *sanction* regarding lunar and solar eclipses, there is option between the two twilights and the two eclipses, as also between the lunar eclipse and night.

Others, however, have explained that 'midday' is a time different from both 'afternoon' and 'forenoon;' and the present prohibition implies that there should be no performance at that time also.

'*When the sun has just risen,*'—the time being the forenoon, the prohibition applies to the first rising of the sun.

'*Fit for demons*'—this is a purely reiterative exaggeration.—(280).

VERSE CCLXXXI.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS RULE, ONE SHOULD OFFER SHRĀDDHA THRICE IN THE YEAR—DURING WINTER, SUMMER AND THE RAIN; AND THAT WHICH FORMS PART OF THE "FIVE SACRIFICES" SHOULD BE DONE EVERY DAY.—(281)

Bhāṣya.

In accordance with the rules laid down here—*i.e.*, following the procedure, beginning with inviting the Brāhmaṇas on the previous day, and ending with performing the *Shrāddha* thrice in the year—one should offer the *Shrāddha* —in what months?—'*during winter, summer and the rains.*'

What is said here regarding the *Shrāddha* to be offered 'thrice in the year' is to be regarded as optional with what has been said above (122) regarding its being offered 'month after month.'

'*That which forms part of the Five Sacrifices*'—that which has been prescribed among the 'Five Sacrifices'—should be performed every day.

In connection with this last, the only procedure to be adopted consists in—(*a*) wearing the sacred thread over the right shoulder, (*b*) making offerings from left to right, and (*c*) feeding the Brāhmaṇas with face towards the north. That is why it has been re-mentioned here.

It is in view of this text that older people have explained that the rule regarding the offering of *Shrāddha* thrice in the year is meant for one who has not set up the fire. But what authority they have for this, they alone know.—(281)

VERSE CCLXXXIII.

THE OBLATION INTO FIRE MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RITE IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS HAS NOT BEEN PRESCRIBED AS TO BE OFFERED INTO THE COMMON FIRE; AND FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA WHO HAS SET UP THE FIRE, THERE IS NO SHRĀDDHA APART FROM THE MOONLESS DAY.—(282)

Bhāṣya.

The 'Homa,' 'oblation into fire,' offered in connection with the Rite in honour of the Pitṛs is called '*Paitṛyajñika-homa*;'—this '*has not been prescribed as to be offered into the common*'—*i.e.*, the *Smārta*—'*fire*.' That is, the Scriptures do not enjoin it as to be done in that manner. Hence it follows that the offering of *Shrāddha* 'three times during the year' is to be made by one who has not set up the Fire. Though this offering three times would be 'offering into the common Fire,' yet it would be as good as '*not done*,' in comparison with what is done throughout the year. For instance, when a man who can eat a seer has eaten less, people are found to say, 'he has not eaten.'

Older commentators have explained this as a reiterative supplement to what has gone in the preceding verse.

The right view to take, however, appears to be that what is said in the text is that the oblation into Fire, in connection with *Shrāddhas*, should not be offered into the 'common Fire,'—*i.e.*, such fire as has not been set up at marriage or other prescribed times. And this prohibition of the 'oblation into Fire' implies that details other than that may be done in the common fire. If such were not the meaning, then, in view of the fact that the 'oblation into fire,' offered by the person who has set up the fire, has been prescribed as part of the *Pārvaṇa-Shrāddha*, the person who has not set up the Fire would not be entitled to the performance of *Shrāddhas* at all; just as, in view of the fact that the blind person cannot do the 'looking into the butter,' he is not entitled to the performance of the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifi-

ces. If it be, as we have explained it, then it comes to this that the *Shrāddha* performed by the man who has set up the fire would be accompanied by oblations into fire, while that performed by one who has not set up the fire would be without such oblations. And in this case, what is said here falls within what has been said in verse 212 above.

Some people have offered the following explanation :—"What is meant here is the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* ; and the oblation into fire that is offered at this is never offered into the Common Fire."

Others have said that this is not right, for even so the person who has not set up the Fire might cook the oblation day by day and then offer it.

Others, again, assert that, in view of the phrase, '*apart from the Moonless Day*,' it follows that by the person who has set up the Fire the *Shrāddha* should be offered every month ; and that the rule regarding 'three times in the year' does not apply to him.

Others, again, have declared that such is not the reading.

What then is the meaning ?

The meaning is that, apart from the *Shrāddha* performed on the Moonless Day, no other *Shrāddha*—such as the '*Maghā-Shrāddha*,' and the like—is binding upon him ; the former alone being necessary for him. For the person who has not set up the Fire, however, the *Shrāddhas* prescribed in connection with the winter, etc., also are obligatory.—(282)

SECTION (23)—REWARDS OF OFFERINGS TO PITRS

VERSE CCLXXXIII.

WHEN THE BEST OF BRĀHMAṆAS, HAVING BATHED, SATISFIES THE PITṚS WITH WATER,—BY THAT ALONE HE OBTAINS THE WHOLE REWARD OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OFFERING TO THE PITṚS.—(283)

The present verse sets forth an option to the daily *Shrāddha* that has been prescribed in connection with the 'Five Sacrifices.'

The 'offering of water' that is made after bath,—by that he obtains the reward of the offering to the Pitṛs. That is, it is not absolutely necessary to do what has been said (in 3.83) regarding the feeding of at least one Brāhmaṇa and the rest of it. It is only the *Water-offering* that must be made. —(283).

VERSE CCLXXXIV.

THEY CALL THE FATHERS "VASUS;" THE GRANDFATHERS THEY CALL "RUDRAS," AND THE GREAT-GRANDFATHERS THEY CALL "ĀDITYAS;" SUCH IS THE ANCIENT TEXT.—(284)

Bhāṣya.

This verse is intended to prompt a man who, through ill-will towards his father, is disinclined to perform Shrāddhas.

The three grades of ancestors, to whom balls are offered, are the same as the Vasus and other gods; hence they should be looked upon as gods.

'*Such is the text*'—this is found in the Veda; hence '*ancient*'—the Veda being eternal.—(284)

SECTION (24)—COMMENDED FOOD

VERSE CCLXXXV.

ONE SHOULD DAILY LIVE UPON "VIGHASA," AND DAILY HE SHOULD EAT "AMṚTA." "VIGHASA" IS THAT WHICH IS LEFT BY THOSE WHO MUST BE FED; AND "AMṚTA" IS THE REMNANT OF SACRIFICES.—(285)

Bhāṣya.

The first quarter of the verse reiterates the 'eating,' that has been laid down before, of the food left after the guests and other persons have eaten.

All scriptures being meant to be conducive to welfare, scriptural treatises always conclude with auspicious declarations; and Rites in honour of the gods are more auspicious than those in honour of the Pitṛs.

'*Remnant of sacrifices.*'—This shows that the eating of the remnants of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices stands on the same footing as the 'eating of Vighasa.'

The second half of the verse contains the explanation of the Vedic declaration, offered by the author, through kindness. He seeks to remove any misconception that people might have regarding the two terms in question, which are what have been used in some Vedic rescensional texts.

He who eats *Vighasa* is said to 'live upon Vighasa;' and he who eats *Amṛta* is said to 'eat *Amṛta*.'

'*What is left by those who must be fed*'—*i.e.*, what is left after persons, who must be fed, have been fed.

Others have explained that what is meant is 'what has been left after people have been fed at *Shrāddha*,'—on the ground that it is *Shrāddha* that forms the subject-matter of the context. To the same end there is another *Smṛti-text*—'One should eat after having served the Pitṛs.'

Some people say that the 'eating' here mentioned forms part of the *Shrāddha*-rite. While others have said that this restriction regarding food is meant to serve a special purpose

for man ; the treatment of *Shrāddhas* having ended with verse 284.

'*Remnant of sacrifices*' should be understood to mean what is left of the materials used at sacrifices.—(285)

SECTION (24)—SUMMING UP

VERSE CCLXXXVI.

THUS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED TO YOU THE PROCEDURE OF THE "FIVE SACRIFICES;" LISTEN NOW TO THE MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD FOR THE BEST OF TWICE-BORN PERSONS.—(286)

Bhāṣya.

Though much has intervened between this and the description of the 'Five Sacrifices,' yet the present reference to the latter, in the final summing up, is with a view to auspiciousness.

The second half of the verse indicates a part of the subject-matter of the next Discourse.

The usefulness of both these—the Summing Up and the Indicating of what is coming next—has already been explained.

'*The best of twice-born persons*'—*i.e.*, Brāhmaṇas. The '*means of livelihood*'—professions by which they should live.—Or, the construction may be 'the principal means of livelihood of twice-born persons.' All this shall be explained in the next chapter.—(286)

End of Discourse III.